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This study examines the structure and evolution of global refugee movements 
through the development of a network census of sending and receiving volume and 
partnerships between 242 countries and territories across five waves from 1990 to 2008. 
Degree centrality scores are analyzed using a variety of techniques to investigate three 
questions related to global refugee movement. These analyses contribute to refugee 
studies and a number of other disciplines by providing pictures of refugee movement and 
identifying important relationships that can inform future policy and theory development, 
as well as humanitarian interventions. 
The structure and evolution of the global refugee network is examined in Chapter 
Three. The refugee network becomes more diffuse from 1990 to 2008, with fewer 
refugees moving to more destinations. In spite of this diffusion, there tends to be a high 
degree of stability among the top actors in most permutations of the network. This 
analysis also identifies an increased refugee burden experienced by countries at middle 
and low levels of development. Finally, this chapter identifies clear difference between 
top actors in the dichotomized receiving network and those in the other three networks. 
Countries at the highest level of development receive refugees from the most partners, 
but do not receive the highest total numbers of refugees. Countries at middle and low 
levels of development dominate the lists of top actors in the valued networks and the 
dichotomized sending network.  
Chapter Four examines similarities and differences between the refugee and 
migrant networks, circa 2000. The migrant network is denser and more active than the 
refugee network, while the refugee network tends to be more centralized. Correlation 
analyses demonstrate the two networks are related, but at relatively low levels. In OLS 
xiv 
 
analyses examining the effects of domestic conditions and international integration on 
degree centrality in the different networks, state strength, conflict, INGO participation, 
trade openness, and receipt of foreign aid demonstrate similar effects on both migrant and 
refugee movements. Modernization, environmental, and political instability measures 
affect refugee movement but not migration. World system position demonstrates the 
clearest difference between the networks, with peripheral status demonstrating a negative 
relationship with migrant sending centrality and a positive relationship with refugee 
sending centrality. In a final set of OLS regressions using residual scores from the 
regression of the refugee network on its migrant counterpart, economic, political, and 
international measures all explain some of the observed differences between these 
networks.  
In Chapter Five, random and fixed effects models explore the effects of domestic 
conditions and international integration on degree centrality in the refugee network from 
1990 to 2008. Three important stories emerge. First, economic growth and development 
are negatively related to valued and dichotomized refugee-sending centrality. Next, 
countries that experience political instability are more central in the valued and 
dichotomized refugee-sending networks. Finally, greater foreign investment, trade 
openness, and INGO participation yield greater levels of refugees and receiving partners 
than those less involved in these networks, while more limited connections to global trade 
networks (i.e., lower world system positions) are negatively related to refugees received 





Refugee movement is an issue rife with consequences for both refugee and host at 
the political, humanitarian, economic, and personal levels. According to the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR 2009), there were 15.2 
million refugees in the world in 2008. Of these, 47 percent were female and 44 percent 
were under the age of 18. While the number of refugees in the world has grown steadily 
since the early part of the 20th century, the most recent trend shows a decline in this 
population, possibly due to increased levels of potential refugees staying within the 
borders of their own countries as internally displaced persons (IDPs).  Most countries 
host some refugee population; however, 80 percent of the world‟s refugees currently 
reside in countries in the developing world. The UNHCR (2009) estimates that half of the 
global refugee population lives in urban areas, while another third live in camps. In 
Africa, the number of refugees in camps swells to an estimated 70 percent. In spite of the 
application of protection and assistance from the UNHCR, issues of health, safety, 
repatriation or relocation, and loss are daily realities for many of these who have been 
forced to leave their homes due to violence or persecution.  
 The question of defining refugee status is an important debate in academic and 
policy discussions of refugees. Definitions exist at the personal, academic, political, and 
legal levels (Wenk 1968; Zetter 2007) with a number of different actors vying to assert 
their definition. The ability to determine who is and who is not a refugee allows the 
defining institution to dictate who should be granted asylum, receive aid, and be 
considered for relocation or repatriation.  The official definition of “refugee” for the 
2 
 
global community is the one developed in 1951 by the Convention and Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees (UNHCR 1951). This definition states that a refugee is:  
A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence 
as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to 
it… (p. 16) 
  
Two significant emphases emerge from this definition. First, refugees are individuals 
who face a well-founded fear of persecution. This qualification allows for a great deal of 
interpretation and variation in the application of the label across official definitions and 
policy development. Second, refugees are those who cross an international border, 
leaving their country of origin and relocating - temporarily or otherwise - in another 
country.  
The field of refugee studies has developed steadily over the past hundred years in 
an effort to study this unique population. Research in this field has drawn from a number 
of disciplines to provide theoretical, methodological, and practical frameworks for the 
study of the origins, destinations, consequences, and outcomes of refugee movements at 
both the micro and macro levels. While emerging as an academic discipline in its own 
right, many researchers in refugee studies have maintained close ties to both 
policymakers and organizations tasked with meeting the needs of refugee populations. 
These ties provide both opportunities for work in the field and challenges in terms of 
research directions and expectations on the part of those commissioning research. In spite 
of the volume of work developed in this area, doubt exists as to the extent to which 
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discoveries developed through academic research have actually had an impact at the 
policy level (Black 2001).  
 In an effort to contribute to the field of refugee studies and develop academic 
research that generates clear policy implications, the purpose of this study is to examine 
the structure and evolution of global refugee movements by constructing and examining a 
network census of sending and receiving volume and partnerships between countries. 
Additionally, the effects of domestic conditions and levels of international integration on 
degree centrality scores within the different permutations of this network will be 
examined to better understand how these conditions impact both outward flows of 
refugees and destination choices. Using a large, cross-national dataset and examining 
movements over multiple waves across the 1990 to 2008 time period, the analyses in this 
project are designed to develop answers to three refugee-related research questions. First, 
what does the structure of the global refugee network look like and how has it changed 
over time? Second, are the refugee and migrant networks different and, if so, what 
accounts for these differences? Finally, how do domestic conditions and levels of 
international integration affect patterns of sending and receiving centrality in the refugee 
network?  
 This study will address important gaps in the refugee and migration literatures as 
well as research questions in a variety of other frameworks, such as dependency, world-
systems, modernization, economic development, health, and world polity. Additionally, 
the development of network censuses of refugee sending and receiving volume and 
partnerships is an important contribution. The ability to examine the structure of these 
networks will generate insights into the nature of refugee sources and destinations and 
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create a new variable for use in future studies. The identification of relationships and 
trends in these networks will also provide a framework for the further development of 
refugee-specific theory. Beyond the academic contributions, better understanding of 
refugee sending and receiving centrality will have implications for future international 
refugee policy and intervention strategies.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
History of Refugee Studies 
 Scholars in the field of refugee studies have contributed significantly to 
understandings of the nature, destinations, and consequences of refugee flows.  While 
examinations and discussions of refugee flows and outcomes have taken place for much 
of human history, the field of refugee studies as an academic discipline is relatively new. 
In his review of the development of the field, Chimni (2009) identifies four distinct eras 
across the history of the discipline that reflect distinct changes in the causes and nature of 
refugee flows across the 20th and early 21st centuries.  
 The field of refugee studies was born out of the mass movements of refugees 
across Europe following the First World War. During this early period, research focused 
on practical issues like land capacity, resource use and availability, and consequences for 
those who moved. Governments and private organizations conducted most of the research 
in this period, attempting to address issues related to movements in the inter-war period 
(Chimni 2009).  
 A transition in the emphases of the field took place after World War II as a result 
of changes in the nature and handling of refugee flows. Two key changes were 
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responsible for this shift. First, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) was introduced and commissioned with the task of developing 
policy and providing interventions to address the needs of refugees across the world. 
While initially this post was intended to be temporary, dealing solely with post WWII 
refugees, it quickly became clear that the presence of an ongoing agency tasked with 
addressing refugee issues would be necessary (UNHCR 2010a). Secondly, new refugee 
movements developed as the result of the rise of oppressive socialist regimes and 
decolonization in Asia and Africa, causing refugee camps to emerge near areas 
experiencing conflict. These camps created opportunities for the study of large numbers 
of refugees gathered in a specific environment. Additionally, conflicts in Southeast Asia 
led to significant flows of new refugees moving both within the region and to destinations 
in the United States and other developed nations. During this period, research focused on 
discussions of the role of the UNHCR, studies of life and conditions in refugee camps, 
evaluations of the 1951 definition of “refugee” and its implications (Wenk 1968), and 
enumeration of individuals moving between East and West. As the Cold War conflict 
drove a good deal of refugee policy in this period, much of the work done in this era is 
colored by that conflict (see Hakovirta 1993). While exact dates are hard to determine, 
this period lasted from the mid-1940s into the early 1980s.  
 In the early 1980s, separatist conflicts, large-scale military offensives, and the rise 
of new repressive political regimes caused a sharp increase in the number of refugees 
across the world. As most of these events occurred in countries in the Global South, this 
era is characterized by a significant increase in refugee flows from the developing South 
to the industrialized North. As these flows developed, Northern governments reacted by 
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enacting more restrictive refugee and asylum policies designed to limit the number of 
refugees able to enter and settle in a country. While research in this era focused heavily 
on refugees as individuals and offered stark portrayals of refugees designed to emphasize 
their humanity and status as victims (Chimni 2009), this era is also characterized by 
research that was heavily influenced by the development and adoption of definitions and 
research frames that served to justify the exclusionary policies of Northern governments 
(Bakewell 2008).  
 The current era of refugee studies is marked by new flows of refugees due to 
ethnic and sectarian violence and ongoing military conflicts, both civil and interstate. 
According to the UNHCR (2009), there are more refugees today than at any other point 
in human history, with most of this movement characterized as regional between 
countries in the developing South. Between 75 to 90 percent of current refugees stay in 
the region from which they emerge, causing developing countries to host an estimated 80 
percent of the world‟s refugees (UNHCR 2009). These movements place significant 
pressure on already fragile economies, infrastructures, and political systems and also tax 
the resources of the UNHCR (Betts 2008). Scholarship in this era is varied, with an 
emphasis in many circles on the broader area of “forced migration studies” (Chimni 
2009). This field is an extension of refugee studies that examines not only individuals 
who move due to persecution or political violence, but also as the result of economic, 
ecological, gender, and health-related issues. An ongoing debate exists in refugee studies 
over the extent to which research that includes these other displaced populations should 
or should not be considered legitimate refugee research (see Hathaway 2007; DeWind 




Theory in Refugee Studies 
 The development of theories specific to refugee studies has proven to be a 
difficult undertaking (Hakovirta 1993). Bascom (1998) claims that no theory of refugees 
exists due to the diversity of groups, initiating factors, locations, destinations, durations, 
etc. involved in studying refugees. This lack of theory-building has been noted and 
lamented by a number of scholars (Hakovirta 1993; Kunz 1981; Robinson 1992), but few 
efforts have been made to address this gap. Theoretical frameworks that do exist in 
refugee studies tend to be borrowed from other disciplines and applied to refugee 
contexts (Black 2001). As the discipline has a history of drawing on information and 
scholars from a number of different areas (Black 2001), this strategy seems appropriate.  
 The neoclassical model as applied to migration by Lee (1966) is frequently 
referenced in the refugee literature (see Clark 1989; Iqbal and Zorn 2007). Scholars 
portray refugees as rational actors that make decisions about moving based on “push” 
factors in the home country, “pull” factors in a particular destination, and intervening 
obstacles and costs. However, unlike immigration decision-making, push factors for 
refugees often emerge quickly and at an intensity that does not allow for the weighing of 
costs or the evaluation of potential destinations. Pull factors tend to be less important as 
refugees often have little time to evaluate destination choices. Additionally, information 
about costs and obstacles is typically incomplete for refugees, limiting the extent to 
which informed, rational decisions can be made. So while some clear parallels to this 
theoretical structure exist, there are a number of ways in which the framework fails to 
apply to refugee movements and decisions. 
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 Another theory borrowed from migration is migrant network theory (Massey 
1990). The application of this theory to refugees predicts that refugees will tend to 
relocate in countries where other refugees or migrants from their country have previously 
settled due to the connections developed by earlier migrants and the reduction in 
resettlement “costs” incurred by the new refugees as they move to communities that are 
already established. Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo (1989) noted the role played by 
increased ease of communication in the current globalized era in connecting potential 
refugees with countrymen living abroad and several studies have found links between 
previously existing populations of refugees and migrants and refugee decisions about 
potential destinations (Bocker and Havinga 1998; Moore and Shellman 2007; Neumayer 
2005). In spite of these indications of the efficacy of migrant network theory to explain 
refugee movements, the shift in refugee receiving countries from the industrialized North 
to the developing South leads to the development of new destination countries that do not 
have the previous stock of refugees necessary for this theory to apply. Examining 
differences in the receiving networks over time can offer some insight into the validity of 
this theory as applied to refugee studies.  
 Theories outside of the area of migration have also been applied to various 
aspects of refugee studies. In his application of regime theory, Adepoju (1994) identified 
four “regimes” that he found to interact in the development of refugee flows. He drew 
connections between economic, demographic, political, and cultural factors and asserted 
that these interact to affect the choices made by refugees to move and in what direction. 
Hakovirta (1993) developed a systems model of combined causation that links seven 
elements in a system designed to serve as a framework for studying refugee flows and the 
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consequences incurred by both individuals and hosts within these flows. Richmond 
(1993) also utilizes this systems approach with an emphasis on links between elements in 
sending and receiving areas. Additionally, Richmond advocates bridging the gap between 
micro and macro elements in refugee movements by applying a structuration approach 
(see Giddens 1979) that emphasizes the role of individual agency in developing and 
redeveloping social relations while simultaneously being both constrained and enabled by 
these same relations. Richmond claimed that decisions to move as refugees are made by 
individuals, but within specific contexts that strongly influence how and when those 
decisions are made. This combination of individual and social elements lays the 
groundwork for an approach to refugee studies that integrates a number of different 
theoretical perspectives.  
Who is a “Refugee”?  
 As noted in the introduction, one of the most important discussions in refugee 
studies is the question of who, exactly, qualifies as a refugee. While the international 
community generally accepts the 1951 definition, the interpretation and application of 
this definition varies widely across actors. The application of refugee status carries 
enormous implications for policy, research, and interventions and has frequently been the 
product of political maneuverings (Black 2001).  Actors approaching the question from 
different perspectives have different levels of incentive to control the official definition of 
the term (Nyers 2006). As compliance with treaty policies by national governments is 
contingent upon the application of the refugee label, states often favor restrictive 
definitions that limit the pool of potential refugee entrants (Fragomen 1970). Potential 
host states have strong incentives to limit the numbers of people allowed to cross their 
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borders as refugees, as the absorptive capacity of any given state is finite and large 
influxes of additional population, even if only temporary, can generate a significant drain 
on state resources (Rees 1960). Perceptions of refugees as potential security threats 
(Chimni 2000), “vulnerable” populations in need of significant help (Clark-Kazak 2009), 
and stigmatized populations (Zetter 1988, 2007) legitimize these restrictive definitions to 
the populations of potential host countries, allowing policies of exclusion, repatriation, 
and even deportation to be accepted and - at times - demanded by local native 
populations (Zetter 2007).  
 In contrast, international and national organizations have incentive to broaden the 
definition of refugee as widely as possible. These broader definitions allow for the 
distribution of aid to the largest possible constituency and justify expanding budgets and 
operations for institutions like the UNHCR that are tasked with addressing the 
circumstances of refugees. This desire to expand the definition can be seen in the 
incorporation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) by the UNHCR into their purview 
despite this population failing to meet the refugee criteria of international border 
crossing. Even with this tendency to broaden the definition of refugee, these 
organizations draw lines between refugees (or “forced migrants”) and migrants, citing 
coercion to move as the key difference between the two (UNHCR 2010b).  
 The refugees themselves represent a third set of actors working to control the 
definition of refugee. As a number of interventions and rights are accorded to those who 
receive refugee status, it is in the interest of individuals to whom the label might be 
applied to have as broad a definition as possible. Also important to individuals is the 
development of the attachment of a positive label to the term “refugee.” As portrayals of 
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refugees have shifted toward helpless (Clark-Kazak 2009) and other less-sympathetic 
images (Zetter 2007), policies and attitudes in receiving countries have become less open 
to receiving these populations.  
 Of all of the actors vying for primacy in defining “refugee,” the state seems to 
hold the fore (Chimni 2000). Governments are not beholden to comply with UNHCR 
policies, but organizations are expected to accede to state policies in their work within 
national borders and individuals have limited recourse in efforts to define themselves. 
This combination of factors gives the state a position of power in framing the definitions 
and debates about refugees within its borders. According to the UNHCR (1997), state 
non-compliance with policies laid out in refugee treaties has become the “global norm.” 
 Scholars note that the Convention definition was driven by these kinds of state 
interests and clearly reflects a specific set of historical, social, and political circumstances 
(Black 2001) particularly related to efforts toward nation-building by Cold War powers 
(Adellman and McGrath 2007). As such, many scholars and activists who seek to 
broaden the scope of what it means to be a refugee, characterize the 1951 definition as 
outdated. Excluded from this definition are those fleeing gender-related (Whittaker 2006) 
and structural violence (Zolberg et al. 1989), those moving due to economic deprivation 
(Richmond 1993), displacement due to development (Cernea 1990, Parasuraman 1995), 
and environmental degradation (Meyers 2002). Attempts to add new categories of 
individuals have also fostered new terms for refugees, including “forced migrants” 
(Zetter 2007) and “reactive migrants” (Richmond 1993). Expansion of the definition in 
some quarters has led many scholars to move away from the traditional label of “refugee 
studies” toward the more inclusive “forced migration studies” (Chimni 2009).  Of 
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particular concern to defenders of the 1951 definition are the implications of this shift for 
the focus of the discipline (see Hathaway 2007). Those in this camp fear that an emphasis 
on forced migration rather than refugees reflects a move away from investigations of 
individual issues and outcomes and toward the study of processes and policies.  
 A final debate in the definition of refugees is the inclusion or exclusion of IDPs in 
the definition. Hathaway (2007) argues that the emphasis on IDPs furthers the push 
towards a forced migrant definition with a resulting de-emphasis on refugees, a position 
that plays into the hands of states that seek to limit refugee entry and asylum. In response, 
Cohen (2007) questions the sensibility of developing different systems and regimes for 
individuals based on whether or not they cross an international border. DeWind (2007) 
echoes this sentiment, advocating a humanitarian perspective that focuses on needs rather 
than legal status. This perspective has also been adopted by the UNHCR, which has taken 
on protection of IDPs as part of its mandate (UNHCR 2010b).  
North / South Conflict over Receiving Refugees 
 One of the consequences of the primacy of state actors in enforcing a narrow 
definition of refugees is a conflict between countries in the industrialized North and those 
in the developing South over refugee destinations. As industrialized countries effectively 
close their borders to refugees through exclusionary policies, flows have been redirected 
from destinations in the North to countries in the South that have fewer border controls 
and less ability to enforce immigration policies (Betts 2008). These destination countries 
also have fewer resources to meet the needs of incoming refugees and have varying levels 
of political stability that may be affected by the presence of large refugee populations and 
the demands they place on both resources and leadership (Betts 2008). Since 
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responsibility for meeting the needs of these refugees is left to the host country and the 
UNHCR, Northern countries are able to use aid dollars to sway policies on both fronts 
(Suhrke 1998). They are also able to influence and direct research activities, a condition 
that has led some to claim that little attention is paid to marginalized refugee populations 
in parts of Africa (Agadjanian 2008). While some have accused Northern governments of 
developing policies and strategies based on racism (Robinson 1992), it is more likely that 
these policies are simply political expediencies that benefit wealthier states to the 
detriment of those less able to effectively close their borders.  
 Many receiving countries pay a high price for their inability to deflect refugee 
flows. While some individuals and segments of the economy in host countries may 
benefit from the presence of refugees (Bernard 1986), far more experience costs, such as 
higher prices, fewer resources, and increased demand on infrastructure. Keller (1975) 
identifies three key consequences associated with large numbers of refugees in a country: 
greater political unrest in the region, increased interpersonal violence, and enhanced 
political activity on the part of refugee populations that may destabilize current political 
balances in the country. Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) have identified a clear 
relationship between the presence of refugees and the risk of new conflicts developing in 
the host country.  
 In addition to consequences for host countries, the movement of refugees into 
other poor countries in the same region can have negative outcomes for the refugees as 
they move into countries that may be hostile to them due to previous conflicts or 
racial/ethnic differences. Often these refugees find themselves isolated in camps or slums 
with limited resources and little opportunity to work or gain access to needed resources 
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through other means (Betts 2008). These refugees become trapped by the policies of the 
host country (DeWind 2007) often with no recourse, as the UNHCR does not have the 
authority to counteract the authority of the host state, even when that state is in violation 
of treaty policy (Bernard 1986).  
 Beyond the North-South conflict over the location of refugees, lines are also 
drawn over the question of the causes of refugee flows. Since the 1990s, some scholars 
have accused policymakers of developing refugee policy based on a position that 
attributes the initiation of refugee flows exclusively to conditions that exist within the 
borders of the origin countries (Chimni 1998). This internalist position focuses the blame 
on internal conditions like conflict and poor governance and has allowed developed 
countries to absolve themselves of responsibility for refugee flows and develop more 
restrictive entrance policies for refugees (Zolberg et al. 1989). Additionally, this position 
allows hosts to emphasize repatriation of refugees rather than asylum or resettlement 
(Chimni 2009). These policy shifts have resulted in a greater emphasis on containment of 
refugees within the borders of their own country, leading to increases in IDPs and the 
shifting of refugee flows away from the most developed countries to those at lower levels 
of development (Chimni 1998). This trend is evidenced in the most recent Human 
Development Report from the United Nations Development Programme (2009) that finds 
78% of refugees living in countries at the middle level of development.  
 By contrast, others suggest the need to examine external forces that shape internal 
conditions that generate increased refugee flows. Proponents of this externalist position 
do not discount the role that conflict and other internal issues play in the development of 
forced migration, but claim that these internal issues must be understood in the light of 
15 
 
external conditions that impact their development. Adepoju (1994) asserts that four 
regimes must be considered in examinations of how refugee flows emerge – economic, 
demographic, political, and cultural. Without understanding the integration of these 
internal and external elements, the full picture of forced migration cannot be adequately 
grasped. An externalist approach to policy development would require the examination of 
economic and aid policies on the part of more developed countries who wish to better 
control refugee flows (Thorburn 1996). Resources allocated to dealing with “root causes” 
would focus not only on controlling borders, but also on promoting development within 
potential countries of origin to eliminate problems before they reach levels that initiate 
refugee flows (Widgren and Martin 2002). 
Previous empirical research in refugee studies 
Issues in refugee research 
Researchers in the field of refugee studies have noted a number of methodological 
issues inherent in examinations of these populations. Perhaps the greatest difficulties are 
attached to the nature of the population itself. Chief among these is the previous 
discussion about who should be counted as a refugee and what constitutes a refugee 
population. The problem of counting refugees is further exacerbated by the conditions 
that cause them to move (Whittaker 2006). Refugees tend to travel en masse as the result 
of crises which makes “counting heads” a difficult proposition (Rees 1960). Bloch (2007) 
has gone so far as to claim that it is impossible to quantify the total number of individuals 
who are refugees. This impossibility is the product of issues like the ongoing mobility of 
the population beyond the initial movement and the desire by many refugees to blend into 
the host population in order to avoid the stigma of the refugee label (Zetter 1991).  
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 Beyond the issue of defining and counting refugees, researchers have identified 
several other obstacles to studying refugees. Harrell-Bond and Voutira (2007) note that 
access to refugee populations is often restricted by governments or organizations tasked 
with addressing the needs of refugees. Additionally, the varied nature of the refugee 
population makes it difficult to identify the right questions to ask, particularly in studies 
that examine multiple populations (Zlotnik 1998). Further debate has developed around 
choices about in the appropriate direction of emphasis in refugee studies - the refugees as 
individuals or the processes that cause them to move and determine destinations and 
outcomes (Hathaway 2007).  
 A constant concern in refugee studies is the extent to which research frameworks 
and agendas are driven by policymakers and, as a result, reinforce policies that may or 
may not be in the best interests of the refugee population (Bakewell 2008). Bakewell 
claims that the quest for policy relevance among advocacy-oriented researchers has led 
them to adopt narrow definitions and frameworks that omit large numbers of individuals 
and circumstances and limit the questions asked in academic investigations. The tendency 
is to focus on those that fit the narrow categories while others fall through the cracks. 
While advocacy and scholarship can coexist (Voutira and Dona 2007), objectivity is 
often lost in the face of the difficult humanitarian circumstances observed by researchers 
as they interact with refugee populations (Bloch 2007). In his opening editorial of the 
first issue of The Journal of Refugee Studies, Zetter (1988) cautions that boundaries must 
be drawn between consultancy and research, and researchers need to be independent of 
institutions in order to best examine and meet the needs of refugees. Bakewell (2008) 
calls for “policy irrelevant research” that examines refugees as individuals experiencing 
17 
 
particular social, political, and historical situations rather than members of a pre-defined 
category.  
Previous research in refugee studies 
 In spite of these myriad methodological issues, refugee scholars have produced a 
body of work that is varied in both format and subject. Though some assert that work in 
the area of refugee studies is often performed in vain due to the lack of attention paid by 
policymakers to the findings that emerge (Black 2001), many non-state entities have 
benefited from this research as it has informed agenda-setting and the development of 
appropriate interventions. There are, however, clear limits to the kinds of research that 
have been done to date and the gaps left in the literature are, in many cases, important 
ones.  
 The types of research and writing produced in forced migration studies can be 
divided into a handful of categories. The literature is full of theoretical and policy-
oriented work that examines the state of research in the field or the status of the refugee 
population as a whole. These works provide evaluations of current policies and 
institutions (Martin 2003), as well as offer new models for addressing issues like how 
policy is created (Chimni 2001) and how resources should be distributed to assist refugee 
populations (Akokpari 1998). Methodological issues related to refugee studies are also 
addressed (Bloch 2007; Zlotnik 1998).  
 Moving beyond the strictly theoretical, a second category of study includes 
descriptive accounts of issues, such as refugee aid (Loescher 1993), flows (Zolberg et al. 
1989), and portrayals (Clark-Kazak 2009). Much of the work done by UNHCR and other 
large institutions (see United Nations Development Programme 2009) falls into this 
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category. These studies typically rely on raw numerical data and provide descriptions of 
trends in flows, sending and receiving countries, assistance, and repatriation (see Zlotnik 
1998). While offering insight into significant patterns and trends, these studies tend to fall 
short of offering statistical analysis beyond the presentation of descriptive numbers.  
 Case studies are another important category of the forced migration literature. 
These studies examine a variety of topics in specific detail. Koser (2007) presents a series 
of studies involving the interaction of refugees and transnational processes with an eye 
toward the outcomes that result. In her study of Mozambican refugees who settled along 
the rural South African border, Polzer (2008) provides an example of a very specific and 
detailed study of a single population. Similar to the descriptive studies, these case studies 
provide important insight into specific populations and issues, but do not present findings 
that can be generalized to the larger refugee population.  
 Taking a step beyond case studies, another branch of researchers have developed 
analyses of single issues related to specific populations of refugees. The scope of these 
studies is somewhat restricted, but the investigation of factors affecting a specific refugee 
population has made higher levels of analyses possible. Research in this vein has 
addressed issues, such as refugee health (Prothero 1994), labor market integration (Krahn 
et al. 2000), environmental impact (Jacobson 1997), resettlement (Lamba and Krahn 
2003), and acceptance by receiving countries (Gibney, Dalton, and Vockell 1992). These 
studies tend to focus on post-movement outcomes for refugees and the countries that 
receive them.  
 Large-scale cross-national studies are uncommon in refugee research. Often, 
those that exist are qualitative in nature, focusing on interviews (Havinga and Bocker 
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1999) or policy statements (van Selm 2003) that do not lend themselves to quantitative 
analysis. Dye (2007) provides a larger comparative study in his collection of research 
dealing with micro-nutrition in refugee populations, but this comparison does not move 
to the level of statistical analysis. The lack of cross-national analysis is acknowledged 
and lamented by a number of researchers (Agadjanian 2008; Dye 2007), but the challenge 
to rectify the situation has largely not been accepted by the refugee studies research 
community. Zetter (2007) claims that a lack of general empirical findings allows for a 
greater politicization of the refugee identity, resulting in more restrictive policies. While 
cross-national examinations of refugee issues are difficult due to the multiple contexts, 
definitions, and data issues involved (Bloch 2007), some studies of this nature do exist, 
and offer important insights into the nature of refugee flows and outcomes.  
 Moore and Shellman (2007) use directed dyads at multiple time points from 1965 
to 1995 to examine elements in potential host countries that might influence refugee 
decisions about destinations. They find that colonial ties, shared borders, refugee treaty 
participation, and a preexisting refugee population are all positively related to refugee 
destination choice while violence in the potential destination country and high relocation 
costs deter being chosen. In previous studies, these authors found that wages in the 
potential host country (Moore and Shellman 2004) and other economic and political 
conditions (Moore and Shellman 2006) also affect destination choices made by refugees. 
 Bocker and Havinga (1998) examine trends in destination countries for asylum 
seekers from 1985 to 1994. They also find evidence of the link between previously 
settled refugee populations and later refugee destination choices as well as a link between 
cultural ties (language, politics) and destinations. In examining connections between 
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refugees from specific countries and European destinations, they find that the vast 
majority of refugees demonstrate a preference for moves to former colonizers. This may 
be due to the previously mentioned cultural ties or to more readily available 
transportation between these countries.  
In a cross-national study of determinants of asylum migration to Western Europe, 
Neumayer (2005) finds that the stock of previous asylum seekers positively affects 
refugee decisions to migrate to these countries. Additionally, Neumayer finds that 
negative economic and political conditions in sending countries lead to higher flows of 
asylum seekers to this part of the world, but natural disasters and famine do not.  
A number of other studies have examined conditions linked to refugee outflows. 
Davenport, Moore, and Poe (2003) find that threats to personal integrity generate greater 
refugee flows and fledgling democracies tend to produce higher levels of refugees. Other 
studies link poverty, military-controlled governments (Hakovirta 1993), and human rights 
violations (Apodaca 1998) with greater flows of refugees. In her study of 103 countries 
from 1971 to 1990, Schmeidl (1997) finds that political conditions (i.e., genocide, civil 
war) are positively related to refugee outflows, while higher development in the form of 
energy consumption has a negative effect on refugee movements. Schmeidl also finds 
that foreign intervention in civil wars leads to greater refugee outflows, but that other 
intervening factors (e.g., geographic obstacles, number of possible borders) do not 
influence refugee movements.  
“Root causes” approach  
Schmeidl‟s (1997) work demonstrates an attempt to incorporate the “root causes” 
approach into refugee studies. This approach is an application of Lee‟s (1966) 
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neoclassical model of migration that focuses on push factors, intervening factors, and 
triggering events (Clark 1989) and represents a via media between the pure internalist 
and externalist approaches to refugee movements. In Clark‟s (1989) exposition of this 
approach, he identifies “root causes” as preexisting conditions within a country that 
create an environment from which refugee movement may be seen as a viable option, 
such as racial conflicts, degrading ecological conditions, and border disputes. The second 
category of elements, intervening factors, impact decisions made by potential refugees to 
move or stay when conditions escalate to a point of promoting refugee outflows. These 
factors include alternatives and obstacles to international movement, decision-making 
patterns, and seasonal conditions. Any of these might be enough to keep a potential 
refugee from moving or encourage a potential refugee to leave. The final category, 
triggering events, mark significant changes in current conditions that prompt the initiation 
of refugee flows. These could be anything from an expansion of violence or persecution 
to a change in perceptions about how refugees will be received in a host country.  
 The present study, examining the structure of the global refugee network, 
employs a modified version of Clark‟s (1989) approach that focuses on domestic 
conditions as root causes and vectors of international integration as potential intervening 
factors. Domestic conditions beyond political stability have the potential to impact 
refugee decision-making. More difficult conditions might make the decision to leave 
easier for potential refugees, while better development and welfare conditions might 
create higher potential costs for refugees, providing incentive to stay. Levels of 
integration in international systems like finance, trade, and civil society have the potential 
to impact conditions “on the ground” in potential sending countries and create 
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connections that facilitate movements when refugees decide to move. The following 
sections discuss the domestic conditions to be studied as root causes in this analysis, as 
well as the potential role of international integration in influencing refugee movements.  
Domestic conditions 
 A number of domestic factors have the potential to influence decisions made by 
potential refugees. For this project, four sets of elements will be examined: economic, 
political, demographic, and environmental. Many of these represent new variables in the 
refugee studies literature, while others have been included in previous cross-national 
studies with mixed results. Discovering the relationships between these variables and 
degree centrality scores stands to advance refugee studies through the identification of 
effects beyond those typically studied. The demonstration of these effects also has the 
potential to generate new areas of emphasis for policy work in the area of refugees.  
 Several measures of economic and modernization conditions have demonstrated 
relationships in previous research. Wages in receiving countries (Moore and Shellman 
2004), GNP per capita (Moore and Shellman 2006), and levels of wealth (Bocker and 
Havinga 1998) have all been associated with increased refugee receiving. Additionally, 
as half of the refugee population currently resides in urban areas (UNHCR 2009), it 
stands to reason that more urbanized countries may be more attractive hosts. 
Relationships between economic factors and refugee outflows have also been observed. 
Economic growth demonstrates a negative effect on sending, while average income has a 
curvilinear relationship with refugee movement (Vogler and Rotte 2000). Neumayer 
(2005) found that GDP per capita has a negative relationship with sending, while 
economic discrimination increases levels of asylum seekers leaving a country. Low 
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socioeconomic development (Edmondson 1993; Holzer, Schnieder and Casey 2002) and 
poverty (Hakovirta 1993) are associated with higher flows while higher development (as 
measured by energy consumption) yields reduced refugee movements (Schmeidl 1997). 
Based on these findings, I expect that the economic variables included in this study will 
demonstrate negative relationships with sending degree centrality scores and positive 
relationships with receiving centrality. That is, societies with better economic conditions 
will be less likely to send, but more likely to receive, refugees. 
 Measures of political instability make up the second set of models. Previous 
studies have consistently demonstrated the role of conflict (Schmeidl 1997), threatened 
violence (Edmondson 1993), and human rights violations (Apodaca 1998; Gibney, 
Apodaca, and McCann 1996; Neumayer 2005) in promoting higher refugee outflows. 
Moore and Shellman (2007) found that the presence of conflict and political terror 
(Moore and Shellman 2006) in potential host countries has a slightly negative 
relationship with levels of refugee receiving. These are the typical factors considered 
when examining refugee movements and these relationships have proven to be robust 
across most cross-sectional and longitudinal examinations. They represent key domestic 
conditions that promote outflows and potentially limit inflows. In light of this evidence, it 
is anticipated that the presence of political instability will increase sending centrality, but 
decrease receiving centrality in the refugee network.  
 Demographic and health conditions represent a largely unexplored area of 
potential root causes in refugee studies. While these conditions have been studied in 
refugee populations (Dye 2007), they are not typically included as predictors in refugee 
analyses. Holzer et al. (2002) found that countries with high infant mortality rates send 
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refugees at higher rates than other countries. Schmeidl (1997) included population 
density as a potential population-related root cause, but did not find a significant 
relationship for her sample and time period. If domestic conditions serve to propel 
potential refugees into movement, then demographic factors related to population and 
health might contribute to the decision-making process. For this study, infant mortality 
and population density are included to examine the relationships that emerge with this 
more recent time period and larger sample. In addition to these, life expectancy and 
fertility rate are also examined. It is anticipated that negative demographic conditions will 
be related to greater refugee-sending degree centrality. However, due to the wide 
variation in these conditions experienced by high-receiving countries, it is not expected 
that these will demonstrate a significant effect on receiving centrality.  
The inclusion of individuals who are forced to relocate due to environmental 
degradation among the refugee population is strongly espoused by many in forced 
migrant research (Meyer 2002). While this population is not specifically included in the 
UNHCR count of refugees, it is possible that many of those counted as political refugees 
are actually moving due to environmental issues, but using political conditions as a 
justification for entry into a host country. This is not an unheard of phenomenon, as 
Neumayer (2005) observed that many of those seeking political asylum in countries in 
Western Europe were actually economic migrants taking advantage of entry policies that 
favored refugees. CO2 per capita is included in this analysis to test for effects related to 
environmental harm that might indicate the presence of this population among current 
refugees. Environmental degradation clearly has the potential to act as a root cause in this 
framework. In addition, the percent of cropland under cultivation is also included to 
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measure a country‟s land use. It is possible that greater ties to the land (i.e., more land 
under cultivation) might encourage potential migrants to stay in the face of conditions 
that might otherwise promote movement. For these measures, it is expected that CO2 per 
capita will be positively related to sending centrality and have no effect on receiving 
centrality while cropland under cultivation will be negatively related to both sending and 
receiving centrality.  
International integration 
 Previous work in refugee studies has identified significant relationships between 
international variables and refugee movements. Schmeidl (1997) found that foreign 
intervention into civil wars increased sending levels. Neumayer (2005) included 
measures of foreign aid, trade, and tourism in his study of asylum seekers in Western 
Europe and found that aid and tourism had very slight negative effects on outflows, but 
trade did not. In his qualitative analysis of refugee movements in Southern Africa, Mazur 
(1989) notes a number of positive and negative effects on refugee movements and 
outcomes that he attributes to the intervention of global relief agencies. Iqbal and Zorn 
(2007) also predict these same kinds of effects, but fail to offer any empirical evidence.  
For this analysis, levels and vectors of integration in global systems will be 
considered intervening factors in the root causes typology. Interaction with other 
countries in finance, trade, and civil society has the potential to influence refugee 
decisions through the effects that these interactions have on conditions within the 
potential sending and host countries and the channels that are created that facilitate 
refugee movements. Measures of international integration reflecting neoclassical 
economic, dependency, world systems, and world polity theories will be included. Each 
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of these theoretical systems has clear ideas about the effects of participation in global 
systems, particularly for poor countries. While work in these areas has yet to include 
refugee movements as an outcome, the application of these ideas to this area provides 
another outlet for the examination of the efficacy of these theoretical systems. Not all of 
these vectors of international integration will affect all societies in the same way, but it is 
expected that clear patterns will develop that demonstrate the impact of participation in 
these systems on refugee movements.  
 Debates about the effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the developing 
world typically occur in contexts dealing with income inequality or economic 
development. In neoclassical economics, the goal of every developing country is thought 
to be the acquisition of as much foreign investment capital as possible (Firebaugh 1992). 
Because the source of investment money is not as important as its presence, it makes 
sense for countries to pursue foreign investment, as there are typically more funds 
available for developing countries from foreign sources compared to domestic. 
Researchers from this school have found positive effects of FDI on economic growth 
(Firebaugh 1992), health outcomes (Firebaugh and Beck 1994), education (Schofer and 
Meyer 2005), and domestic investment (de Soysa and Oneal 1999). These scholars 
acknowledge that growth in inequality may follow the growth brought by increased FDI, 
but this inequality is both acceptable and necessary as wages rise across the lower strata 
of the workforce (Firebaugh 2003).  
Neoclassical ideas about the effects of trade openness on poverty reduction are 
similar to those about FDI. Advocates of this position argue that freer trade maximizes 
the size of potential markets, which yields greater opportunities to trade and encourages 
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greater productivity and entrepreneurship (Weede 2008). Sachs and Warner (1995), 
among others (Wacziarg and Welch 2008), claim that expansion leads to greater 
economic growth and, as a result, a reduction in poverty. As economic growth is seen as 
a key to improved welfare outcomes (Firebaugh and Beck 1994), the expansion of trade 
is seen as a natural way to enhance growth and, by extension, human welfare. From this 
perspective, international integration in the forms of foreign investment and trade should 
decrease refugee outflows as economic and welfare conditions are improved in poor 
countries, thus reducing the potential impact of these root causes.  
Alternatively, scholars in the dependency school argue that gains identified by 
neoclassical scholars mask longer-term losses that often result in countries experiencing 
worse economic conditions than when they started (Kentor 1998). A number of studies 
from this perspective have found that FDI generates increased income inequality and 
slows economic growth (Bradshaw et al. 1993; Dixon and Boswell 1996; Kentor and 
Boswell 2003). Vijaya and Kaltani (2007) found that increased FDI flows have a negative 
impact on manufacturing wages in the developing world, particularly among female 
wage-earners, countering a central point of the neoclassical argument. These negative 
economic outcomes have also been linked to a number of negative health and welfare 
outcomes including food consumption (Wimberley and Bello 1992), quality of life 
(Bradshaw and Huang 1991), and infant mortality, child mortality, and calorie 
consumption among children (Bradshaw et al. 1993). Dependency scholars also caution 
against countries throwing open their borders to international trade, fearing that greater 
openness will result in exploitation by wealthier countries that are better able to dictate 
terms of trade to their advantage. 
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Extending the dependency argument, world systems scholars hold that negative 
outcomes emerge as economies in the developing world participate in inherently unequal 
relationships with more developed countries (Wallerstein 1974).  Through exploitation 
and the loss of resources through extraction, countries in the periphery of the world 
economy experience negative circumstances due to the economic constraints of their 
relative isolation (Kim and Shin 2003). These negative outcomes can extend into 
economic and political realms, potentially creating or exacerbating domestic conditions 
that yield higher refugee outflows. Based on these assumptions and findings related to the 
effects of integration on poor countries, both the dependency and world system 
perspectives would predict that greater participation in global finance and trade will be 
related to increased refugee outflows. 
The world polity perspective provides an alternative narrative to the neoclassical 
and dependency arguments. This school of thought credits the global rise in international 
non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and the subsequent development of a global 
civil society with many of the gains realized in development and welfare outcomes 
around the world. As countries become more connected to INGOs, world culture scripts 
are diffused that prompt governments to act in accordance to the norms of global society. 
In addition to the development of these global ideas, INGOs can act as a “global third 
sector” beyond economics or politics that works outside of constraints placed by 
economies or governments (Salamon 1994) to influence human development and welfare 
outcomes by providing services (Chabbott 1999), funds (Ndegwa 1996), technology 
(Shirin 2000), and human capital (Chabbott 1999). Previous research shows that INGOs 
have a positive effect on educational enrollment and persistence, health outcomes, 
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environmental outcomes, women‟s rights and a reduction in the negative effects of 
overurbanization (Soros 2004). Additionally, Jorgenson (2009) finds that the presence of 
environmentally-oriented INGOs is related to reductions in industrial organic water 
pollution intensity. Examining factors shaping overurbanization in the developing world, 
Bradshaw and Schafer (2000) provide evidence that the increased presence of INGOs 
ameliorate the negative consequences associated with overurbanization, and further, that 
INGO expansion is positively related to economic growth and access to clean water. 
Finally, the world culture ideas espoused by these organizations encourage the growth of 
grass roots organizations within developing countries (Salamon 1994), help standardize 
trade and professional practices (Boli and Thomas 1999), and lead to greater 
accountability of governments to their people and the international community (Bello 
2001).  
 Participation in global civil society through INGOs has the potential to affect both 
sending and receiving centrality. The positive effects of INGOs noted above, coupled 
with the diffusion of global scripts advocating for greater human rights adherence and 
eliminating ethnic and sectarian violence, should lead to a negative effect on refugee 
outflows as domestic conditions improve. However, it is also possible that the presence 
of INGOs in a sending country may increase outflows through organizations that focus 
on refugee relocation (e.g., the International Rescue Committee) and the development of 
new communication and transportation channels that facilitate movement between 
countries. 
Potential receiving countries may be affected by the presence of INGOs in two 
ways. First, the proliferation of world polity frames that view receiving refugees as a part 
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of good global citizenship could lead countries to develop more open receiving policies, 
potentially increasing the number of refugees received and the number of partners from 
which they come. Additionally, connections made between countries through INGOs can 
lead to the development of communication and transportation ties that make it easier for 
refugees to move to these countries, should the need arise. With these factors in mind, it 
is expected that greater INGO participation will lead to reduced sending centrality, but 
greater receiving centrality for countries in the global refugee network.  
Research Questions 
 The goal of this project is to examine the structure and evolution of the global 
refugee network by applying a variety of analytical techniques to the examination of 
degree centrality scores for the valued and dichotomized sending and receiving networks. 
This examination will address three refugee-related questions in an effort to understand 
the nature of the global refugee network and elements that affect sending and receiving 
centrality within that network. The application of descriptive, comparative, and analytic 
techniques to the study of these networks will increase understanding of the scope and 
structure of the network, identify differences between refugee and migrant networks, and 
examine relationships between centrality in the refugee networks and a variety of 
domestic and international factors. This project stands to make important contributions to 
refugee studies as well as other areas of analysis. 
 Central to this study will be the development of the refugee sending and receiving 
networks across five waves from 1990 to 2008. The development and examination of 
these networks addresses the first question of the study – what does the structure of the 
global refuge network look like and how has it changed over time? Analysis of refugee 
31 
 
sending and receiving degree centrality at the network level does not currently exist in the 
refugee literature. The development of these networks allows for a descriptive analysis of 
centrality within them and the observation of patterns that develop as the networks 
evolve. Additionally, the creation of degree centrality measures for each of these 
networks contributes a new variable that can be analyzed as a dependent variable (as it is 
in this project) or used as a predictor in future cross-national studies.  
 A second question to be examined involves the extent to which the migrant and 
refugee networks are different. For this question, the third wave of the refugee network 
will be compared to a simultaneous migrant sending or receiving network to examine 
similarities and differences between the networks in sources and destinations. Descriptive 
comparisons will take place, as well as a comparison of the effects of domestic conditions 
and levels of international integration on centrality in these networks. These variables 
will also be used to determine the extent to which they explain differences in the network 
through a series of OLS regression models with residual scores generated through the 
regression of each migrant network on its refugee counterpart. The identification of 
differences between these networks will provide groundwork for the further development 
of refugee-specific theory.  
 Finally, to address the third question in the study, degree centrality scores for all 
waves and permutations of the global refugee network will be used to examine factors 
that influence position in these networks. The root causes approach will be tested using 
random and fixed effects models to examine relationships between domestic conditions 
and international integration and centrality in the refugee network both cross-sectionally 
and longitudinally. The application of these variables to refugee movements explores 
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previously unexamined relationships in many of the included theoretical traditions. 
Additionally, the discovery of elements important to refugee sending and receiving 
centrality will develop directions for future international refugee policy and intervention 
strategy.  
 The examination of these questions addresses important gaps in the literature on 
refugee studies and in work across a number of other theoretical perspectives (e.g., world 
systems, world polity, dependency, economic development, health, demography). The 
inclusion of variables from these perspectives outside of refugee and migration studies 
contributes to those literatures through the examination of outcomes that have not been 
previously addressed by scholars in those fields. Additionally, the development of a 
systematic cross-national analysis of refugee movements contributes to an 
underdeveloped area of refugee studies. This study will also advance refugee studies by 
considering factors that have heretofore been unexamined in cross-national research 
projects, such as variables related to modernization, demography, and international 
integration. Comparison of migrant and refugee networks will inform future 
conversations about the similarities and differences between these populations. Finally, 
the discovery of patterns related to centrality in the refugee sending and receiving 
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 The questions for this study will be addressed using a variety of statistical 
techniques and presented in a number of formats to provide as broad an understanding of 
structure and centrality in the refugee network as possible. Each chapter will explore one 
of the three questions presented with the goal of developing answers from a variety of 
perspectives that shed light on the network from many angles. The techniques and 
perspectives to be used will be discussed in detail in this chapter, with some restatement 
in the introduction of the appropriate subsequent chapters. This chapter begins with a 
discussion of the refugee data used for the analysis, followed by detailed discussions of 
how the analyses of each substantive chapter will be conducted. Finally, the chapter ends 
with a discussion of two key issues related to the data and how these are addressed.  
Data 
 Data for the measures included in this study come from multiple sources that 
develop country-level data used in international comparisons, including: The United 
Nations, The World Bank, The Yearbook of International Organizations, The Freedom 
House Project, and others. A full list of data sources with operationalizations is presented 
in Appendix A.  While the data examined in this analysis are the best available for this 
type of research, limitations associated with cross-national research – particularly among 
poor or mobile populations – exist. The nature of refugee movement makes it a 
particularly difficult population to count (Bloch 2007), as groups often move en masse 
and are not always identified as refugees in host countries. Additionally, poor countries 
or those with limited central governments are often unable to generate data for many of 
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the measures used in this study. However, these poorest countries often receive the most 
attention from international organizations that generate country-level data, resulting in 
better data availability for some of these than for countries at slightly higher levels of 
development. To account for bias introduced by missing data, steps will be taken across 
the methodological procedures in this study to deal with any error that might enter the 
analyses as a result of these limitations. In spite of the challenges presented by the nature 
of these data, the efficacy of variables developed from these international sources has 
been demonstrated in research in the areas of refugee studies (Moore and Shellman 
2007), world-systems (Clark and Beckfield 2009), dependency (Kentor and Boswell 
2003), world polity (Meyer et al 1997), and human rights (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 
2005). 
 The UNHCR database includes refugee sending and receiving observations for 
242 countries and territories. These are stock data that include counts of all refugees 
living in a given country or from a given country each year. Refugee counts for each year 
from 1990 to 2008 were obtained from the database and used to construct period averages 
for five waves (1990-1993, 1994-1997, 1998-2001, 2002-2005, 2006-2008). Waves 1-4 
include four years, while Wave 5 includes only three. The development of observations 
over five waves expands the total possible sample size to 1210. However, due to 
differential availability of data for many of the included variables, some countries will 
not have observations for all of the waves of the study, resulting in pooled data that are 
unbalanced. The decision to use a different number of years in the final wave is driven by 
two issues related to the data and geopolitical reality. First, 2008 is a logical terminal 
point as it is the last year for which refugee data are available for the majority of the 
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countries and territories in the dataset. On the other end of the time period, going back 
beyond 1990 presents a challenge due to the number of new countries that emerge across 
Europe and Asia around this time as a result of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Many of these countries did not exist in 1989 and, 
therefore, do not have data. This means that pushing the waves back a year or more 
would result in the sample being more unbalanced as some counties would have data for 
only the earliest wave, while others would lack data for this wave, but have observations 
for the others. As the averages for most of the variables are somewhat stable across years 
and waves, it is not anticipated that the inclusion of a three-year wave will prove 
problematic in the analysis. To verify this stability, centrality scores for each network and 
each wave were correlated to determine how highly correlated the scores were across 
waves. The five waves of each network were significantly correlated with scores of .750 
or better. Interestingly, the first wave is the one that shows the lowest level of correlation, 
while Waves 2 through 5 are correlated at .900 or better for most networks.  
 Prior to statistical analysis, a number of operations and checks were performed on 
the variables in the study. Data were obtained from all sources and matched up by 
country and wave. Once all of the available information was compiled in the dataset, the 
full dataset was uploaded into UCINET (1999) (1999) or Stata as appropriate for the 
necessary statistical procedures. Each variable underwent a series of checks to examine 
the distribution of the data and to ensure that the data met appropriate regression 
assumptions with respect to collinearity, heteroskedasticity, and distribution issues. Some 
variables failed to meet these expectations and were excluded. These are discussed 
following the variable descriptions. Additionally, a number of variables were determined 
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to have skewed distributions, and were logged for inclusion in the analysis. These are 
noted in the variable descriptions below. A correlation matrix of all relevant measures is 
presented in Appendix B.  
 To investigate the research questions for this study, a number of variables are 
examined. Unless otherwise noted, these variables will be presented as period averages 
for the five waves of the study (1990-1993, 1994-1997, 1998-2001, 2002-2005, 2006-
2008). Period averages are used in order to reduce volatility that exists in some of the 
data, particularly the valued refugee data. Several of the included variables (infant 
mortality, life expectancy, and INGO membership ties) have limited available data, 
resulting in the use of a single year for each wave, rather than an average. The 
distribution of these scores shows a good deal of stability over time and it is not 
anticipated that the use of only one observation per wave will significantly affect the 
results. The world system measures also have limited data, as scores reflect a single 
observation. Again, world system position demonstrates a degree of stability over time 
(Babones 2005), and the use of a single score should not impact results. For periods in 
which there are fewer than four observations for a given country on a particular measure, 
whatever observations exist will be included in order to preserve the highest possible 
number of cases in the dataset.  
 All variables will occur in the analysis as simultaneous with the dependent 
variables. While it is possible that the effects of some of the variables in the analysis take 
time to manifest an effect on refugee movement, the stability of the distribution of 
averages of predictor variables across waves demonstrates the possibility of there being 
little, if any, difference in outcomes using simultaneous rather than lagged variables. 
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Additionally, the inclusion of fixed effects models allows for the examination of effects 
longitudinally, providing for the identification of relationships that manifest over time 
without having to use lagged predictors.   
 
ANALYSIS 
Development of the international refugee network 
 The first element to be examined in this study is the structure of the refugee 
sending and receiving networks. Identifying central and peripheral countries in the 
international refugee network and examining how countries in these positions have 
changed over time offers a number of advancements to the field of refugee studies. The 
development of a network census of countries that send and receive refugees provides a 
new way of examining refugee flows at the macro level and creates a variable that will 
prove useful in future studies of causes and effects of these flows. The network centrality 
variable may also be applicable to cross-national research in areas beyond refugee 
studies. Additionally, examining changes in the refugee sending and receiving networks 
over time will reveal patterns and trends that may validate or call into question current 
beliefs about the sources and destinations of refugees. The identification of these issues 
may foster the development of refugee-specific theory as the distinctiveness of this 
population is more clearly delineated. At the policy level, the identification of central 
sending and receiving countries will allow for the more efficient distribution of resources 
and the development of country or region-specific interventions that might serve to slow 
refugee outflows or pacify a situation within a potential sending country before 
conditions develop that lead to the initiation of refugee flows.  
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 Movement of refugees between countries represents the primary dependent 
variable in this study. The data for this measure come from the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) database that counts refugees based 
on the definition developed in the 1951 Convention. Only those identified by the 
UNHCR as individuals who have crossed an international border in order to “save their 
lives or preserve their freedom” are included in these counts (UNHCR 2010b).  
 Measures of valued and dichotomized network degree centrality were constructed 
to address the question of the nature of the refugee sending and receiving networks. 
Valued centrality highlights the volume of movement experienced by sending and 
receiving countries, while dichotomized centrality provides a picture of relationships 
within the global network. Valued networks are based on stock measures that include 
counts of total refugees living in a country during a given year. Counts from each year 
within a period were summed and divided by the number of years included in the period 
to construct period averages. Years with zero refugees are included in these averages 
unless they have been specifically identified as years of missing data by UNHCR. 
Matrices were developed for each wave and permutation of the refugee network. Once 
developed, the matrices for each wave were input into the UCINET (1999) software 
package and translated into valued degree centrality scores. This generated five sets of 
scores for each network that were then matched up by country and wave in the dataset, 
resulting in 1210 total observations.  
 The dichotomized networks are based on refugee sending / receiving dyads 
developed from the valued matrices. If a country sends refugees to another country, it is 
counted as a sending tie for the sending country and a receiving tie for the destination. 
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Counts of these sending and receiving partners were used to develop networks and 
generate degree centrality scores for every country for each wave. Centrality scores for 
these networks are based on the number of ties experienced by a particular country in the 
wave, with higher scores indicating greater network centrality. In other words, countries 
that receive refugees from a large number of other countries will be more central in the 
receiving network than a country that receives refugees from a single country. Once all 
valued and dichotomized networks are constructed, they will be analyzed using a number 
of procedures to identify patterns of central and peripheral actors in the networks and 
observe important temporal trends. Results of these analyses of the structure of this 
network will be presented in a series of maps, graphs, and tables in Chapter Three.  
Structure and centrality trends in the global refugee network  
UCINET (1999) reports a number of descriptive statistics for networks. Scores for 
total actors (i.e., refugees, ties, and countries), mean, minimum, maximum, and network 
centralization are available. Network centralization demonstrates the extent to which the 
network is monopolized by a small number of actors. Higher centralization indicates a 
greater level of domination by the highest sending or receiving actors. Additionally, 
network density scores were calculated in UCINET (1999). For valued networks, density 
is a measure of average value, presenting the total number of migrants or refugees 
divided by the total possible ties in the network. Network density is a more intuitive 
statistic for dichotomized networks, capturing the extent to which all possible ties in the 
network are realized. This score is generated by dividing the actual number of ties in the 
network by the total possible number of ties (UCINET (1999) 2010). All of these 
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statistics for each wave of each network are presented in Tables 3.2 through 3.5 to 
identify changes and trends in the networks over time.  
 In addition to descriptive statistics, I developed three other images of centrality 
and change over time in the networks. First, I divided total refugees and sending and 
receiving partners for each region by the total number of refugees or ties in the network 
to determine the percentage of refugees and / or ties sent and received during each wave, 
by region. These results are presented in Figures 3.1a through 3.1d. Regions included in 
this analysis are based on World Bank designations with the East Asia and Asia and 
Pacific categories collapsed together for a total of six regions: Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, 
Middle East / North Africa, Latin America / Caribbean, Eastern Europe / Central Asia, 
and Europe and the West. Appendix C (Table C.1) lists the regional assignment for all of 
the countries in this analysis.  
Following the identification of regional variation, maps were generated depicting 
centrality in the first and fifth waves of each network to provide a visual presentation of 
change over time. Centrality scores for each wave and network were matched with 
shapefiles in QuantumGIS (2010) and projected in geographic space using colors to 
identify countries at different levels of centrality in the networks. Map results are 
presented in Figures 3.2 through 3.9. These maps are intended to provide visual 
depictions of how countries and regions have differential experiences of centrality and 
demonstrate how structure and centrality have changed over the period of the study.  
 Finally, the top ten actors for each of the valued and receiving networks are 
identified for each wave of the analysis. The top actors in the valued and dichotomized 
sending networks are presented in Tables 3.6 through 3.10, with a summary in Table 
42 
 
3.11, while the top receiving actors are presented in Tables 3.12 through 3.16, with a 
summary in Table 3.17. These tables present total ties, refugee counts, and refugees per 
tie for the top actors in each wave. Clear changes over time and differences between top 
actors in the valued and dichotomized networks are noted and discussed in these results. 
A final table (3.18) presents the top ten fastest growing countries for valued and 
dichotomized centrality in sending and receiving networks.  
It is expected that the composition of these networks will change over time. Based 
on observations from the UNHCR about trends in refuge flows over the period under 
investigation, it is predicted that centrality in the refugee receiving network will change 
over the period from 1990 - 2008 (H1) with less-developed countries in Africa and Asia 
becoming more central (H2). The refugee-sending network is also expected to change 
over this time (H3) with centrality shifting from countries in former Soviet states and 
Central Europe to countries in the developing South - particularly Sub-Saharan Africa 
(H4). Finally, it is expected that the valued and dichotomized sending networks will be 
structurally similar (H5), while the receiving networks will demonstrate clear differences 
(H6). Predictions about this and all subsequent analyses flow from the theoretical 
discussions and general observations presented in Chapter One. While many of these 
theories do not specifically address refugee movements, the application of these ideas to 
refugee studies is consistent with previous work in this area. 
Comparisons of the refugee and migrant networks 
Analysis 
 The second question in this study involves comparing sending and receiving 
centrality in the refugee network to that of the migrant network. State governments and 
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other actors often attempt to characterize refugees as being identical to other migrants - 
particularly illegal migrants - allowing for the development of greater restrictions on the 
definition and rights of refugees. Scholars in the field of refugee studies assert that 
significant differences exist between migrants and refugees and that the two populations 
should not be considered equivalent (Hakovirta 1993). Nevertheless, migration theory is 
often borrowed and adapted to explain refugee movements (Black 2001). Comparing the 
migrant and refugee networks provides insight into similarities and differences that exist 
between these populations and has the potential to inform the construction of refugee-
specific theory and policy. These comparisons will extend the fields of both migration 
and refugee studies and shed important light on discussions related to policies geared 
toward dealing with refugees, particularly in receiving countries.  
 Comparisons were done between the migrant and refugee sending and receiving 
networks circa 2000. Each of the four refugee networks was compared to its migrant 
counterpart to understand differences across each specific permutation of the networks. 
The valued and dichotomized migrant networks were constructed following the same 
procedures used to develop the refugee networks. Migration data for 225 countries and 
territories were available from the World Bank (WDI 2010), requiring that the refugee 
networks be trimmed accordingly so that the samples for each network are identical. A 
list of countries included in this analysis is presented in Appendix C (Table C.2). Because 
the migrant network data reflect a single year, the refugee network and predictor 
variables from the wave that corresponds to this year (Wave 3) will be used in the 
comparative analyses. Results of these comparisons are presented in Chapter Four.  
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 Comparisons of the refugee and migrant networks will take place on multiple 
levels. First, centrality scores from all networks were developed in UCINET (1999) and 
matched to country shapefiles in QuantumGIS (2010), then reprojected into geographic 
space to develop maps of the networks for visual comparison. These maps are presented 
in Figures 4.1 through 4.8. Additionally, descriptive statistics for each network were 
obtained from UCINET (1999) and reported in Tables 4.1 through 4.4. As in the previous 
analysis, total partners or movers (i.e., migrants or refugees), mean, minimum, maximum, 
network centralization, and network density scores are presented and compared for each 
migrant and refugee network pair. To complete these descriptive comparisons, regional 
variation for each network is presented in Figures 4.9 through 4.12. The percentage of 
total migrants or refugees and total sending or receiving partners for ties for countries in 
each of the six regions was calculated and each figure presents side-by-side comparisons 
of these percentages by region for each network.  
Moving beyond descriptive comparisons, two procedures were performed to 
identify the extent to which each migrant / refugee network pair is correlated. First, 
Pearson‟s correlations were performed in UCINET (1999) to determine the degree of 
linear relationship between centrality scores for each pair of networks. The results of 
these bivariate correlations are presented in Table 4.5. Consistent with the assertion that 
migrant and refugee networks have similar structures, but are distinct from one another, it 
is expected that each network pair will be significantly correlated at the .05 level (H7), 
but that the coefficients for these correlations will be relatively low (H8), indicating 
significant, but weak, relationships between the two.  
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Following the Pearson‟s correlations, quadratic assignment procedure (QAP) 
correlations were performed. QAP correlations gauge the extent to which ties in one 
network are related to those in another when the actors in both networks are identical. As 
the valued networks are at the interval level, Pearson‟s Correlation and Hamming 
Distance statistics are presented for these correlations. The Pearson‟s correlation for this 
procedure differs from that calculated for the centrality scores as it identifies correlations 
between each pair of actors (in this case countries and territories) in the networks. The 
Hamming Distance captures the extent to which scores in one matrix would have to be 
changed to make them identical to those in the second matrix. For the dichotomized 
networks, Pearson‟s correlation and Hamming Distance are also presented, but the binary 
nature of these networks also allows for Simple Matching scores to be calculated. The 
Simple Matching coefficient captures the proportion of cells in the two matrices that are 
the same, essentially the inverse of the Hamming Distance presented as a proportion. It is 
expected that the results of the QAP correlations will demonstrate that the network pairs 
are significantly different (H9) and that those differences are large (H10), particularly in 
the comparisons of the valued networks.  
As it is expected that these networks are significantly different, it stands to reason 
that domestic conditions and levels of integration in international systems will affect 
centrality in these networks differently. Identifying these differences highlights areas in 
which theory and policy require modification to specifically address refugee movements. 
To examine the extent to which these measures differ in their relationships to centrality in 
migrant and refugee networks, results of a series of OLS regressions are presented that 
include sets of independent variables that reflect particular theoretical perspectives with 
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the centrality scores for each network. Variables providing measures of economic 
conditions, political stability, population dynamics, environmental and land use 
conditions, and international integration are included in a total of five models for each 
centrality score. In the analysis of each category of variables, individual models are 
presented that include a single predictor and the appropriate centrality score, net of 
regional variation. Network pairs for each set of models are presented together for 
comparison and discussion in Tables 4.8 through 4.47.  
Variables 
 The dependent variables for each of the analyses are the degree centrality scores 
for each network. Scores for the valued sending, valued receiving, dichotomized sending, 
and dichotomized receiving networks for both migrant and refugee movements circa 
2000 are examined, resulting in eight sets of models and four sets of comparisons. Due to 
the skewed nature of these centrality scores, the natural log of each is included in the 
regressions. In order to preserve countries with no ties or migrants / refugees in a 
network, 1 was added to each centrality score prior to these scores being logged. This 
manipulation resulted in logged scores of 0 for those countries that do not contribute to a 
given network, allowing them to be included in the analyses. Descriptive statistics for all 
included variables are presented in Appendix D.  
 Regional variation is a set of dummy variables indicating the global region in 
which the particular country is located. Categories are assigned based on World Bank 
divisions with the East Asia and Asia and Pacific regions collapsed into a single Asia and 
Pacific category. This results in the inclusion of six regions: Middle East / North Africa, 
Latin America / Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and Pacific, and Eastern Europe / 
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Central Asia. Europe and the West serves as the excluded category. These are included as 
a base model in Model 1 of each analysis and as controls in all subsequent models.  
The first set of models for comparisons of the networks include economic and 
modernization variables. Previous research in refugee studies has found that economic 
variables demonstrate significant relationships with both refugee flows (Neumayer 2005) 
and destination choices made by refugees (Bocker and Havinga 1998). As states 
modernize, they may become more attractive to refugees as potential destinations and the 
benefits of modernization may ameliorate some of the negative influences that produce 
refugee flows. While the variables included in this model do not, by themselves, reflect 
reasons for leaving that fit within the UNHCR definition, it is possible that lower levels 
of modernization and economic development might prove to be deciding factors for those 
making decisions to relocate in the face of violence or persecution. The elements 
included in this set of variables include measures of economic development and 
modernization common to cross-national analyses.  
 Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP per capita) is a measure of the wealth 
of a given economy. Data for this measure come from the World Bank‟s World 
Development Indicators (WDI 2010). The log of these averages will be used due to the 
skewed nature of the data.  
H11: GDP per capita will be positively related to centrality in both receiving networks, 
but negatively related to centrality in both the migrant and refugee sending networks. 
 State strength is a measure of the ability of a country‟s government to invest in 
meeting the needs of its population. Countries that are less able to meet these needs (i.e., 
less strong) may be more likely to experience conditions that lead to individuals leaving 
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as refugees or migrants. This measure is constructed by dividing total government 
consumption expenditure by GDP. Government expenditure data come from the UN 
Database (UNData 2010) while GDP data come from the WDI (2010).  
H12: Countries with lower strength levels will be more central in the sending networks 
while countries at higher levels will be more central in the receiving networks.  
 Economic growth is a measure of GDP growth rate. Countries with growing 
economies tend to demonstrate greater levels of political and economic stability that may 
preclude conditions that generate refugee flows. Data for this measure come from the 
WDI (2010) and are presented as annual percent change in GDP growth.  
H13: GDP growth will be negatively related to refugee and migrant sending, but 
positively related to both refugee and migrant receiving network centrality.  
 Urbanization measures the percentage of a country‟s population that lives in 
urban areas. As countries modernize, greater numbers of individuals migrate to urban 
areas to find work. Borrowing from migration theory, it is possible that individuals who 
make these moves are more likely to move again given sufficient reason. From this 
perspective, it is reasonable to expect that countries with higher levels of urbanization 
will generate greater numbers of migrants. Conversely, it is possible that urban dwellers 
have greater ties due to employment that might prevent them from becoming refugees. 
On the receiving end, countries with more urban populations may appear to present 
greater post-migration opportunities for refugees and, thus, be more attractive as 
destinations. Data for this measure come from the United Nations Database (UN Data 
2010) and are presented as the percent of population dwelling in urban areas.  
49 
 
H14: Countries with higher levels of urbanization will be less central in the refugee 
sending network, but more central in the migrant-sending network. Urbanization is also 
expected to be positively associated with centrality in both receiving networks. 
 Secondary school enrollment is another modernization variable that measures a 
country‟s level of formal education. Data are from the WDI (2010) and measure the 
percentage of the secondary school age population who are enrolled in school. While 
enrollment does not necessarily indicate attendance, higher enrollment levels should 
indicate higher levels of participation.  
H15: Countries with higher levels of enrollment will be less central in the refugee 
sending network, but more central in the migrant-sending network. Higher levels of 
enrollment will also be related to greater centrality in both the migrant and refugee 
receiving networks.  
 The second set of models examines the effects of political instability on migrant 
and refugee network centrality. Political conflict, violence, and oppression have been 
consistently linked to greater flows of refugees (Davenport et al. 2003; Schmeidl 2007). 
At the receiving end, Moore and Shellman (2007) found that conflict in potential host 
countries has a slightly negative effect on refugee destination choices. The measures 
included in this model capture different elements of conflict and oppression and should 
provide insight into relationships between these elements and the networks. Each variable 
for these models is coded so that higher scores indicate greater levels of instability.  
 Political repression is measured using data from the Freedom House Project. 
Freedom House analysts evaluate 193 countries on a checklist of 25 questions that 
address issues of political rights (electoral process, political pluralism and participation, 
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and government function) and civil liberties (freedom of expression and belief, 
associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and 
individual rights). Countries are rated on a scale of 1 to 7 for each of these categories 
with 1 representing the highest level of freedom and 7 the lowest. The two categories are 
then averaged to develop the country‟s “freedom score” (Freedom House 2009). These 
scores will be averaged for each period of the study and logged to account for skewed 
distribution.  
 Political terror reflects the extent to which government actors violate basic 
human rights. Data for this measure come from the Political Terror Scale (Gibney, 
Cornett, and Wood 2010) that codes countries on a scale of 1 to 5 based on previous year 
descriptions of human rights activities from Amnesty International and U.S. State 
Department Country Reports. Level 1 is considered the lowest level of political terror 
(highest human rights score) while level 5 is the highest level of political terror (Wood 
and Gibney 2010). The natural log of this variable is included to account for the skewed 
distribution of the data. 
H16, H17: Countries with greater levels of political repression and political terror will be 
more central in the refugee sending network, but less central in the migrant sending 
network. Greater levels of repression and terror will be related to lesser centrality in both 
receiving networks.  
 Collapse reflects political revolution, secession, or a total or near-total loss of 
central authority in a country (PTIF 2010). Data for this variable come from the Political 
Instability Task Force at George Mason University (PITF) and include observations for 
all of the years of the current study. This variable will be included as a dummy in the 
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analysis with “1” signifying state collapse during the particular four-year wave and “0” 
indicating a lack of collapse over the period.  
H18: Countries that experience government collapse will be more central in the refugee-
sending network, but less central in the migrant sending network. Experiencing collapse 
will be negatively related to both receiving networks.  
 Conflict is a dummy variable that measures whether or not a country was involved 
in an intrastate or interstate conflict during any years covered in the wave. Data come 
from the Uppsala Conflict Database (2010) and are coded “1” for the presence of conflict 
and “0” for the absence. The Uppsala Database comes from the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program (UCDP), a project of the Uppsala University in Uppsala, Sweden. The UCDP 
defines conflict as: 
a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the 
use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of 
a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year (UCDP 
2010, emphasis in original). 
 
These data provide observations for all of the countries and territories in the analysis and 
have been used in a number of academic (see Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008) 
and policy papers (see Brosche 2008).  
H19: Countries that experience conflict will have greater centrality in the refugee sending 
network and lower centrality in the migrant-sending network. Conflict will not affect 
centrality in the refugee receiving network, but will be negatively related to centrality in 
the migrant receiving network.  
 The effects of demographic and health conditions on centrality scores are 
examined in the third model. While measures of health have been included in refugee 
studies as an outcome variable (Dye 2007), researchers have not included these variables 
52 
 
as predictors in refugee studies. Although political conditions have proven to be the most 
consistent producers of refugees, it has been noted that these variables do not explain all 
of the variation between countries in their levels of refugee flows (Apodaca 1998). 
Demographic and health variables are included in this analysis to examine the possibility 
that issues of population pressure and health outcomes may impact relocation decisions 
made by potential migrants or refugees. Should differences in the effects of these 
variables be identified, they would provide another area for further study in investigations 
of refugee flows.  
 Fertility rate is an indicator of a country‟s level of fertility. It is measured in 
average births per female and expresses the expected number of children that a woman 
will have if she survives to the end of her reproductive age span and experiences the 
given age-specific rate. Countries with high fertility rates may experience population 
pressures that can lead to conflict or economic conditions that precipitate refugee flows. 
Countries with low fertility rates may be more welcoming of migrants and / or refugees 
in an effort to bolster flagging populations. Data for this measure come from the World 
Bank WDI (2010) and are logged to deal with skewness in the distribution.  
H20: Countries with high rates of fertility will be more central in both sending networks 
while countries with low levels of fertility will be more central in the receiving networks.  
 Population density is another variable designed to measure the level of population 
pressure in a country. Density is measured as population per square kilometer. This 
measure will be constructed using population and country size data from the UN 
(UNData 2010) and will be developed for a single year in this analysis and for each wave 
in the panel analysis. These data are logged due to their skewed distribution.  
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H21: Population density will be positively related to refugee and migrant sending 
centrality as well as refugee and migrant receiving centrality.  
 Infant mortality is a measure of the health of a population that captures the 
number of deaths to infants (children under 1 year of age) per 1,000 infants born in a 
given year.  Data for this measure come from the UN Statistics Division (UNData 2010) 
and are available for five years within the period of the study. These years correspond 
with years included in each of the five waves (1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2007). Data for 
the year 2000 are included in this comparative analysis. While the lack of data to 
construct period averages is unfortunate, these data demonstrate a level of stability that 
allows for the inclusion of only one year for each period without fear of outcomes being 
unduly influenced. This variable is logged to account for skewness in the distribution of 
the data.  
H22: Infant mortality will be positively related to both sending networks. However, it 
will not be significantly related to either receiving network.  
 Life expectancy is another measure of population health. This measure captures 
the average expected life span for a person born in a given year.  Like the population 
density variable, these data are available from the United Nations (UNData 2010) for a 
single year in each wave of the study (1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2007) and will be 
matched in the analysis accordingly. Data for the year 2000 are included in the 
comparative analysis and are logged to account for skewness.  
H23: Countries with higher life expectancies will be less central in the refugee-sending 
network. It is not expected that life expectancy will affect centrality in the migrant 
sending or either receiving network.  
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The next model includes measures capturing the effects of environmental 
degradation and land use on centrality scores. Recent scholarship on forced migration has 
identified a large population of environmental refugees that have moved due to changing 
environmental conditions, loss of water or arable land, or pollution (Meyers 2002). While 
this population is not counted by the UNHCR as a “refugee” movement, the element of 
forcible displacement applies. Environmental measures are included in this analysis to 
examine the role that they play in political refugee movements. It is possible that 
degrading environmental conditions create a tipping point that results in potential 
refugees choosing to move when they may have otherwise chosen to stay. If this is the 
case, many of the individuals counted as political refugees by the UNHCR may actually 
be environmental migrants. The identification of significant relationships might provide 
justification for future examinations of environmental refugees as part of the refugee 
population. This would include the collection of data on displacement and location of 
environmental forced migrants, data currently lacking in forced migration studies.  
 CO2 per capita is included in the analysis to determine the effects of ecological 
degradation on decisions to migrate as refugees. While environmental refugees are not 
included in the UNHCR numbers and are, therefore, not a part of the research population 
(UNHCR 2010b), it is possible that the negative effects of environmental harm may 
influence individuals who are contemplating movement for other causes. It is also 
possible that environmental migrants identify as political refugees, when possible, to take 
advantage of benefits available to refugees. For migrants, higher levels of CO2 may 
indicate the presence of job opportunities in industry, reducing the necessity of moving to 
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another country. This variable is measured in metric tons of CO2 emissions per capita. 
Data come from the UN Database (UNData 2010) and are logged for this analysis.  
H24: Levels of CO2 emissions will be positively related to refugee sending centrality, but 
be negatively related to migrant sending centrality. Additionally, these levels are 
expected to have a positive relationship with migrant receiving centrality, but no 
relationship with refugee receiving centrality.  
 Cropland under cultivation measures the percentage of total land area currently 
used for agriculture by the population of a country. Individuals that are closely tied to the 
land may be less inclined to leave it when conditions might otherwise prompt movement. 
On the receiving end, countries with little available land for cultivation may seem less 
attractive as destinations for migrants or refugees who plan to be involved in agriculture 
in their new host country. As this economic niche is filled, there is less possibility of 
these kinds of migrant or refugees moving to these countries. Data for this measure come 
from the WDI (2010) and are logged for this analysis.  
H25: It is expected that the percentage of cropland under cultivation will be negatively 
related to sending and receiving centrality in both networks. 
 The final set of models examines the effects of a variety of variables measuring 
different vectors of participation in global systems on network centrality. This set of 
variables reflects measures that are prominent in several internationally-oriented 
theoretical frameworks. These frameworks make predictions about outcomes for 
countries based on levels of interaction within global systems. Scholars in the 
dependency school claim that economic interaction in the forms of foreign investment 
and trade between developing and developed countries can create negative economic, 
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health, and political outcomes for developing countries as more advanced countries are 
able to tailor trade terms for their own benefit (Dixon and Boswell 1996; Kentor and 
Boswell 2003). Contrasting these positions, the neoclassical economics school argues that 
the goal of every developing country should be the acquisition of as much foreign 
investment capital as possible (Firebaugh 1992), as the source of the money is not as 
important as its presence. Scholars from this position indentify a number of positive 
welfare outcomes associated with elevated exposure to global financial and trade systems 
(see Firebaugh and Beck 1994; de Soysa and Oneal 1999). 
The world-systems framework attempts to sort countries into categories based on 
their role in production and economic ties to other countries. Countries in the “core” are 
those with high numbers of connections to other countries and economies that are based 
on capital-intensive production. “Peripheral” countries are those at the bottom end of the 
spectrum. Research in the world-systems framework predicts and demonstrates that being 
in the periphery has negative outcomes for inequality, economic, and well-being 
outcomes (Clark and Beckfield 2009; Nemeth and Smith 1985). Finally, the world polity 
framework credits participation in international organizations for distributing scripts to 
countries in the developing world that encourage positive changes in areas like human 
rights, education, and other well-being measures (Meyer et al. 1997). Each of these 
frameworks addresses the effects of cross-national interaction with distinct predictions 
about outcomes that have clear connections to refugee and migrant flows.  
 Foreign direct investment penetration (FDI penetration) measures the extent to 
which a country‟s economy is dependent on foreign investment. Researchers have found 
that countries with higher levels of FDI penetration experience long-term negative effects 
57 
 
from this level of investment (Kentor 1998; Kentor and Boswell 2003). These negative 
effects could extend to conditions that affect refugee flows. The measure is constructed 
using FDI stock divided by total GDP. Data for this measure come from the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD 2010) and are logged to 
account for skewness in the distribution.  
H26: The inclusion of advanced economies in the analysis that tend to avoid negative 
outcomes related to foreign investment leads to the prediction that FDI penetration will 
have a negative relationship with refugee and migrant sending centrality as well as 
refugee receiving centrality, but a positive relationship with migrant receiving centrality. 
Trade openness provides a measure of the level at which a particular nation 
participates in the world economy (Clark 2008). This variable includes all exports and 
imports and calculates the percentage of a country‟s total GDP accounted for by trade 
outside the country‟s borders. The measure is developed by summing total exports and 
imports as a share of total GDP. The data for each of the parts of this measure are from 
the WDI (2010). This variable will be logged to account for the skewed nature of the 
data. 
H27: As with FDI penetration, the inclusion of advanced economies will cause this 
variable to demonstrate a negative relationship with refugee and migrant sending 
centrality as well as refugee receiving centrality.  However, openness will demonstrate a 
positive relationship with migrant receiving network centrality. 
 Official development assistance (ODA) per capita is a measure of the foreign aid 
received from the World Bank Development Assistance committee, other global 
institutions, and other countries. This variable represents the total amount received 
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divided by the mid-year population of each receiving country. Data are from the WDI 
(2010) and are logged to account for skewness in the distribution.  
H28: Countries with higher levels of ODA are expected to be less central in all sending 
and receiving networks.  
 World system position reflects the position of a given country relative to others in 
the international trade network. Position in this network is related to a variety of 
development outcomes (Clark and Beckfield 2009; Nemeth and Smith 1985). Peripheral 
countries – those on the edges of the trade network – are more likely to suffer negative 
effects due to their limited bargaining position within the network. The potential then 
exists for these peripheral countries to experience outcomes that affect the initiation of 
outward refugee and migrant flows as well as the attractiveness of these countries as 
potential destinations. Data for this measure come from Clark and Beckfield‟s (2009) 
trichotomous measure of world system position (core, semi-periphery, and periphery) and 
will be included in the analysis as a series of dummy variables with “core” states as the 
excluded category. Because world system position has been found to remain fairly stable 
over time (Babones 2005), the 2009 position will be applied for each time period.  
H29: Countries in the periphery will be more central in the migrant and refugee sending 
networks but less central in the receiving networks. Countries in the semiperiphery will 
demonstrate greater centrality in both sending networks and the refugee receiving 
network, but reduced centrality in the migrant receiving network.  
INGO membership ties is a count of the conventional international non-
governmental organizations with which a country has membership ties. A country is 
credited with an INGO tie if one citizen participates in a given organization. Data for 
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these measures come from the Yearbook of International Organizations. As the 
distribution of these data demonstrates a degree of stability over time (Beckfield 2003), 
counts for a single year (2000), will be included in the analysis. This variable is logged to 
account for skewness in its distribution across countries.  
H30: Countries with higher levels of organizational ties at all levels will be less central in 
the refugee sending network, but more central in the migrant sending network. Higher 
organizational ties will also increase centrality in both receiving networks.  
A number of variables were considered, but ultimately rejected for these analyses 
due to either a lack of data or problems associated with regression assumptions that they 
presented in the models. Measures of inequality (Gini), internally displaced persons 
(IDPs), weapons imports, and debt service were excluded for one or both of these 
reasons. When analyzed in individual models, none of these measured demonstrated 
significant relationships with the centrality scores for any of the networks.  
Examination of residual scores 
Following the development of these comparisons of the effects of domestic 
conditions and international relationships on centrality in the networks, a final series of 
OLS regressions will be conducted to examine the efficacy of these variables in 
explaining the differences between the two networks. For this set of analyses, the degree 
centrality scores for each refugee network will be regressed on those of the appropriate 
migration network with the resultant residuals saved as a new variable. These residual 
scores will then be included as the dependent variable in a series of regression models to 
determine the ability of the variables examined in earlier analyses to explain differences 
in the networks. The analysis of the residual scores from each network will progress in 
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the same manner as that of the comparative analysis detailed above. Four sets of models 
will be run and presented in Tables 4.48 through 4.67. Significant positive relationships 
indicate conditions in which refugee centrality is higher than would be expected, given 
migrant centrality, while negative relationships indicate lower refugee centrality than 
would be expected, given a country‟s level of migrant centrality. These relationships 
identify variables that cause network centrality to differ, explaining some of the observed 
distinction between the networks.  
A number of significant relationships are anticipated in these analyses of residual 
scores. For the economic variables, it is anticipated that greater economic development 
will lead to reduced refugee sending centrality, relative to migrant sending centrality, but 
have no significant effect on receiving centrality (H31). Political instability will cause 
refugee-sending centrality to increase, relative to migrant centrality, but have no 
relationship with receiving centrality (H32). Analyses of the population (H33) and 
environmental (H34) models are not expected to reveal any significant effects between 
these measures and residual scores. For the international variables, mixed results are 
expected. FDI, trade openness, ODA, and INGO participation will not demonstrate 
significant relationships with the residual scores (H35). However, it is anticipated that 
world system position will demonstrate a significant effect (H36), with peripheral 
position leading to increased refugee sending centrality and decreased receiving 
centrality, relative to migrant scores. Semiperipheral position is expected to exhibit the 
opposite effect, with decreased sending and increased receiving centrality, relative to 
migrant centrality.  
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Effects of domestic conditions and international integration on refugee network 
centrality 
The final investigation in this study examines the question of centrality in the 
valued and dichotomized refugee sending and receiving networks from 1990 to 2008. 
This analysis will expand work in refugee studies by providing both longitudinal and 
cross-sectional analysis of elements affecting refugee sources and destinations as well as 
providing insights into changes in these networks over time. Additionally, this 
examination contributes to work in a number of theoretical frameworks by introducing an 
outcome variable that has heretofore not been studied.  
 Pooled time series data, such as those used in this study, have consistently 
demonstrated the tendency to violate the ordinary least squares (OLS) assumption of 
uncorrelated errors due to the likelihood of unmeasured heterogeneity in the panels (Lee, 
Nielsen, and Anderson 2007). The strong possibility exists that observations in the same 
country have correlated error. This correlation of error within panels due to time invariant 
unit specific effects may bias the parameter estimates (Greene 2000). The use of random 
and fixed effects models is a common strategy for accounting for this error (Mahutga and 
Bandelj 2008) as they adjust for error correlation through the inclusion of a panel-specific 
error term that is normally distributed. Models for these analyses also include a first-order 
autocorrelation correction.  
To examine factors that explain centrality in the refugee-receiving network, the 
dataset will be analyzed using random effects models (REMs) and fixed effects models 
(FEMs). REMs compare both between and within-country variation, allowing for the 
observation of changes in the effects of independent variables in both a cross-national 
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and historical perspective. This method is appropriate in studies where meaningful 
variation exists over time both within and between countries. The use of REMs also helps 
overcome potential omitted variable bias in models that examine variation across these 
vectors.  By contrast, FEMs examine longitudinal variation within countries and are 
useful when this kind of change is the primary variation of interest.  
 For the current study, variation in refugee flows occurs both over time and across 
countries, making REMs the more logical choice. However, including FEMs tests for 
robustness and makes possible the identification of elements that affect centrality 
longitudinally, regardless of cross-sectional variation. To this end, results of both random 
effects and fixed effects models are presented.  As FEMs only examine change over time, 
time-invariant variables (region, world-system position) cannot be included in these 
models. Results of these analyses of centrality in the global refugee network are 
presented in Chapter Five.  
 The analyses for this chapter progress in much the same manner as the OLS 
regressions of the comparative study in chapter four. A base model is included that 
examines regional and wave variables with each network centrality measure. Following 
this base model are each of the models outlined in the previous section - economic, 
political, demographic, environmental, and international. Each of these models includes 
an individual analysis with a single predictor and the centrality score, net of controls, and 
a full model that includes all of the variables for that section with the centrality measure 
and control variables. Additionally, a final model for each network that includes all of the 
significant variables from any of the models in that particular network analysis will be 
included. As the inclusion of all of these models creates a strong potential for collinearity, 
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a second final model will be run that excludes any variables from the initial final model 
that introduce collinearity into the analysis. This model is included to examine the 
independence and robustness of effect net of other significant relationships. REMs results 
are presented in Tables 5.1 through 5.25 and FEMs results are presented in Tables 5.26 
through 5.50. While a floating sample is used for these primary analyses, additional sets 
of models were performed using a standardized sample and a sample that excludes 
countries that contribute only one observation to the dataset. Outliers were also identified 
and removed, with new models run that excluded these observations to test for their 
effects. Results of these alternative analyses are reported following the presentation of the 
primary results with the floating samples.  
Models for REMs and FEMs   
 While most of the variables and models included in this analysis reflect those 
from Chapter Four, several key differences exist. Two of these are demonstrated in the 
control variables. First, measures of regional variation cannot be included in the fixed 
effects models as these measures are time-invariant. The second key change is the 
inclusion of a wave variable in these models. As REMs and FEMs examine relationships 
over time and observations are included over several waves, this measure allows for the 
identification of change over time and controls for longitudinal variation. The time period 
variable is an ordinal level variable for the five waves from which observations are 
presented for each country. Waves 1 – 5 will each correspond with a specific time period 
for which averages have been constructed. Wave 1 is 1990 – 1993, 2 is 1994 – 1997, 3 is 
1998 – 2001, 4 is 2002 – 2005, and 5 is 2006 – 2008.  
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H37: Based on trends identified in Chapter Three, it is expected that the dichotomized 
networks will demonstrate positive relationships with the time variable, while valued 
networks will have negative relationships.  
 For the economic models, the key change is the exclusion of the economic growth 
measure in the REMs and FEMs. As changes in GDP per capita over time represent 
economic growth, the specific growth measure becomes redundant and is, thus, removed. 
The hypotheses for the effects of economic variables on refugee network degree 
centrality closely parallel those developed for Chapter Four. Greater levels of GDP (H38) 
and state strength (H39) are expected to reduce sending centrality, but have no effect on 
receiving centrality. The modernization variables are expected to reduce sending 
centrality but increase receiving centrality (H40, H41).  
 While the variables are the same in this and the previous chapter for the political 
model, one important distinction for this analysis should be noted. As data for the 
political terror measure are only available through 2006, Wave 5 relationships will be 
based on a single observation rather than a period average. As these data demonstrate a 
good deal of stability over time, it is anticipated that the use of a single year in this case 
will not greatly influence the outcome. The political repression, collapse, and conflict 
measures all include observations for all of the years of the analysis.  For this model, it is 
expected that greater levels of political repression (H42) and political terror (H43) will be 
related to increased sending centrality, but reduced receiving centrality. The presence of 
state collapse (H44) or conflict (H45) will be related to greater levels of sending 
centrality and reduced receiving centrality. 
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 Like the political analyses, variables included in the demographic models do not 
change from those included in Chapter Four. As noted in the previous explanations of 
these variables, data for infant mortality and life expectancy are only available for a 
single year in each of the waves (1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2007). As scores for these 
variables demonstrate a good deal of stability over time, it is not anticipated that the use 
of a single observation per wave will create significant changes in the relationships 
demonstrated. Predictions for these variables follow those of the modernization variables. 
Greater health – higher life expectancy (H46) and lower infant mortality (H47) – will 
yield less sending centrality, but have no effect on receiving centrality. Greater levels of 
population pressure – higher fertility rates (H48) and population density (H49) - will 
generate higher levels of sending centrality, but will not affect receiving centrality.  
 The random and fixed effects analyses of the relationships between international 
integration and centrality in the refugee networks feature several differences from those 
presented in Chapter Four. For both REMs and FEMs, the ODA measure has been 
removed due to the loss of observations incurred by its inclusion. The presence of this 
variable in the full international caused almost 60% of the observations to be lost (N = 
504). In additional to this change, the fixed effects models exclude the world system and 
regional measures, as they are time invariant. Only FDI penetration, trade openness, and 
INGO membership ties are examined in these models. Foreign direct investment (H50) 
and trade openness (H51) are expected to demonstrate negative relationships with 
sending centrality due to the inclusion of advanced economies in the analysis as these 
countries have high levels of investment and openness, but low levels of refugee sending. 
It is also expected that inclusion of these countries will cause these measures to yield less 
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valued receiving centrality, as they are able to limit total numbers of refugee entrants, but 
greater dichotomized receiving centrality as they are connected to more potential 
partners. Greater levels of ties to the world polity through INGOs (H52) will also result in 
lower levels of sending centrality. However, these countries will have greater receiving 
centrality across both networks as high levels of participation in the world polity create 
ties and positive associations for potential host countries with potential refugees. In the 
random effects models, it is expected that peripheral status will be related to increased 
sending, but decreased receiving centrality (H53). By contrast, semiperipheral status will 
be related to lower sending and higher receiving centrality (H54).  
Potential problems inherent in cross-national studies  
The problem of missing data is one of the chief limitations to any cross-national 
study, particularly one that deals with marginalized populations or large numbers of 
developing countries where data may not be readily available. When running analyses 
with network and other variables, attention will be paid to the number of missing 
observations for the different variables. For robustness, a number of procedures will be 
employed to determine the extent to which missing data affect the outcomes of the 
analyses. For comparisons of refugee network measures, each wave of the refugee 
network will be examined to ensure that the sample of countries is standardized across 
the analysis. In the random and fixed effects analyses, two options for dealing with 
missing data were evaluated. Floating and unbalanced standardized samples were 
developed and compared in an effort to include as many observations as possible while 
preserving the integrity of the analysis.  
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 The first option for dealing with missing data was to develop a floating panel of 
observations for each model. This method retains all observations for which data exist in 
every model, resulting in a varying sample across models. While this method allows for 
the retention of more observations in some models, it can create problems with 
comparability across waves and may result in biased results that skew toward countries 
that are able to contribute observations across all variables and waves in the analysis.  
 A second procedure for dealing with missing data is the generation of a 
standardized unbalanced panel. In this analysis, the same number of observations is used 
for every model. To develop this sample, a model was run that included all of the 
predictor variables with one of the centrality scores. The sample for this model includes 
only observations that have data for every variable in the analysis. The sample for this 
model was then used as the standard for every model in the analysis, with only 
observations that have data for every variable included in each model. Models with more 
observations available than the baseline were trimmed to meet this standard. The 
resulting panel is unbalanced with some countries contributing observations for more 
waves than others. This method of dealing with missing data resulted in the loss of over 
half of the countries and observations in the dataset, resulting in skewed results that 
favored countries that were able to contribute observations for all of the variables across 
all of the waves. A list of countries included in the standardized sample is presented in 
Appendix C (Table C.3). While neither of the options presented is optimal, the use of a 
floating sample was chosen as the primary sample for the analysis due to the greater 
amount of countries and observations that were retained in most models. However, 
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results of the standardized analyses are discussed in Chapter Five in the “alternative 
analyses” section.  
 A second issue regarding the nature of the data involves differences that exist due 
to the use of multiple sources in compiling data. Because the data for this project come 
from a variety of sources, variation exists in definitions, methods of data collection, and 
data manipulations used to develop measures. Whatever variation may exist, two 
commonalities are present across the dataset that allow for comparisons using these 
disparate data to be made. First, all of the data included are at the country or nation-state 
level. Whatever decisions were made in producing these data, they all share the same unit 
of analysis, which allows for comparability. Secondly, each measure uses a common data 
source for all observations. Whatever flaws may exist in the data, they will be consistent 
across all of the observations in a particular measure. 
 This analysis of structure and centrality in the global refugee network employs a 
variety of statistical techniques and forms of presentation to study three important 
questions about the nature of this network. First, what does the structure of the network 
look like and how has it changed over time? Second, to what extent are the global 
migrant and refugee networks different? And finally, what factors affect a country‟s 
centrality in the refugee sending and receiving networks? Answers to these questions 
were developed using refugee sending and receiving data for 242 countries and territories 
across five waves covering the years 1990 to 2008. The results of these analyses have 
potential implications for refugee policymaking, the development of intervention 
strategies for both sending and receiving countries, and the development of theory in 
refugee studies that is specific to this population. Additionally, refugee and migrant 
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network centrality scores are examined with variables from a number of theoretical 
traditions, representing previously unexplored outcome variables in these systems. 
Finally, the development of refugee centrality scores presents a variable that is available 
for use as a dependent or predictor variable in further cross-national analyses in refugee 
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DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE GLOBAL REFUGEE NETWORK 
The goal of this chapter is to examine the structure and evolution of the global 
refugee network from 1990 to 2008. For this examination, degree centrality scores for 
each permutation of the network were constructed (valued sending, valued receiving, 
dichotomized sending, dichotomized receiving). To develop these networks, I obtained 
data on refugees sent and received for 242 countries and territories for each year from 
1990 to 2008 from the UNHCR database. I then calculated period averages for five 
waves and developed matrices for each wave and each network that included the total 
number of migrants and refugees sent and received by each country during that period. 
These matrices were input into the UCINET (1999) software package and translated into 
valued degree centrality scores. Following the development of the valued networks, each 
network was dichotomized, again using UCINET (1999). Every country that sent 
refugees to another country was given a sending tie to that country, while the destination 
country received a receiving tie. Finally, I calculated degree centrality in these networks 
using these dichotomized data. 
I used the UCINET (1999) software package to generate a number of descriptive 
statistics for each wave of these networks and identify the most central actors for each 
wave and each network. The examination of these data provides insight into primary 
sending and receiving regions, characteristics of high sending and receiving countries, 
changes in the network over the course of the study, and the scope of the refugee burden 
placed on high-receiving countries. 
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 The descriptive analyses in this chapter examine centrality in the global refugee 
network from a variety of angles. First, the scope of the overall network across the time 
period of the study is presented, including a discussion of general trends in total refugees 
and total ties. I then examine regional variation in sending and receiving centrality for 
both the valued and dichotomized networks. Next, descriptive statistics for each of the 
permutations of the refugee network are presented and analyzed to distinguish trends 
across these networks. Visualizations of these trends are presented in a series of maps 
that accompany each statistical discussion. Finally, the top ten actors for each network 
and each wave are identified and discussed, followed by an analysis of the trends that 
emerge.  
The picture developed through these analyses is of a network that is becoming 
more diffuse, but also more centralized. The total number of refugees in the network is 
shrinking and more countries are participating, but over time the most central actors in 
these networks represent a larger share of the total across the waves of the study. In both 
sending networks and the valued receiving network, these most central countries tend to 
be those at low to medium levels of development, while the most central countries in the 
dichotomized receiving network are exclusively wealthy Western countries. The 
identification of these trends and differences provides a number of insights related to 
refugee origins and destinations and how these have changed over the last two decades. 
These descriptive analyses generate a number of questions for further study to better 
understand centrality patterns in these networks both between countries and over time.  
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Table 3.1. Total refugees and sending / receiving ties by wave, 1990-2008 
Measure Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Growth Rate 
Total Ties 1406 2901 3796 4382 4639 230% 
Total Refugees 14,859,172 14,575,958 12,068,067 9,573,883 8,325,553 -44% 
N 242 242 242 242 242  
 
 Table 3.1 presents the total ties and refugees present in each wave of the global 
refugee network from 1990 to 2008. The percent change in each over the course of the 
study is also included. Two opposing trends are very clear. First, total ties held by 
countries in the network have increased more than twofold over the period of the study. 
Countries have become more active in the network, with more potential senders and 
receivers participating. The second clear trend is the reduction in the number of refugees 
in the network. While more countries participate in sending and receiving refugees over 
this period, total refugees sent by these countries have decreased by almost half. This 
may reflect a decrease in the presence of conditions that generate large numbers of 
refugees or it may be the product of more restrictive border controls, resulting in greater 
numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in countries that formerly would have 
sent high numbers of refugees. Interestingly, the total number of refugees identified by 
summing the raw numbers received from the UNHCR is just over half of the 15.2 million 
refugees reported by this agency in their 2008 Global Trends publication (UNHCR 
2009). A close reading of this publication reveals that the UNHCR figure is based on 
both refugees and “people in refugee-like situations” (UNHCR 2009, p.6), explaining 
some of this disparity.  
Regional variation 
While the global trends are clear, there is a good deal of variety across regions in 
refugee sending and receiving patterns. To examine these trends, I calculated the 
percentage of total refugees sent and received by each region and the percentage of 
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sending and receiving partners for each region by dividing the total refugees or ties 
contributed by region in each wave by the total refugees or ties for that wave. These 
percentages are presented in Figures 3.1a through 3.1d. Regions were assigned based on 
the World Bank‟s regional categories (World Bank 2010), with the East Asia and Asia 
and Pacific regions collapsed into a general Asia and Pacific category. For this analysis 
and all subsequent regional examinations, the included regions are: Sub-Saharan Africa, 
North Africa / Middle East, Latin America / Caribbean, Europe and the West, Asia and 
Pacific, and Eastern Europe / Central Asia. Each country‟s regional assignment is 
presented in Appendix C.  
Figure 3.1a presents the percentage of total refugees sent by countries in six 
regions across each of the waves of the study. Not surprisingly, countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Asia dominate this category, accounting for at least 70 percent of refugees 
sent during each wave. The Eastern Europe percentage is skewed heavily by the presence 
of Afghanistan in this region – the largest refugee-sending country across all waves of the 
study (see Tables 3.6 through 3.10). Equally unsurprising is the region with the fewest 
sent refugees - Western European countries and their counterparts in North America 
(Canada, United States). The highest percentage attained by this region in any wave is the 
.05 percent reached in Wave 5. While the highest-sending regions demonstrate a 
downward trend since Wave 3, the Middle East moved counter to this trend, experiencing 
a spike in Wave 5. This occurred due to increases in sent refugees by a number of 
countries in the region including: Iraq, Egypt, and Morocco. These increases, coupled 
with decreases in most other regions, led to this region‟s refugees representing a larger 
percentage of the total in this wave than in previous waves.  
75 
 
Figure 3.1a. Percentage of total refugees sent by region and wave, 1990-2008 
  
 
Figure 3.1b. Percentage of refugees received by region and wave, 1990-2008 
 
 Figure 3.1b shows the percentage of total refugees received by each region across 
the waves of the study. Interestingly, Latin American countries host the largest 
percentage of refugees across most of the waves. This may be a product of more open 
receiving policies in this region, relative to wealthier countries that tend to be more 
restrictive in granting access and asylum (Bakewell 2008). It may also be a product of 
































































































and 1990s. Refugees moved from unstable countries to safer destinations within the 
region during this time and many chose to remain in their new countries rather than 
repatriate when conditions stabilized.  
High levels of refugees received in Africa and the Middle East reflect the 
continued presence of movement due to conflict and political instability in those regions. 
Additionally, a spike is demonstrated for the Asia region in Wave 3 that correlates with 
the initiation of conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many of the refugees leaving these 
countries as a result of this war have gone to Pakistan, greatly inflating the receiving 
centrality of that country and the region since 2001. The spike demonstrated by Western 
European countries in Wave 3 is a product of the inclusion of additional countries due to 
a lack of data in earlier waves (1) and a reduction of received refugees in the Middle East 
and Latin America regions.  Even with this spike, this region remains among the lowest 
receivers of refugees, possibly demonstrating the role played by more restrictive entry 
policies and distance from conflict locations.  
The percentages of sending ties held by each region across the waves of the study 
are presented in Figure 3.1c. Of particular note is the relative stability of each region 
across waves of the study in terms of percentages sent. While the overall number of ties 
increases over the period of the study (see Table 3.1), regions seem to change at an 
almost uniform rate. Latin America shows a slight downward trend while Europe and the 
West demonstrates movement in the opposite direction. Countries in Africa hold the 
1. Data for Canada, Germany, and Australia are not included in Wave 1 due to a lack of 




highest percentage of sending ties, reflecting the potential for developing high numbers 
of partners presented by the high number of refugees sent by countries in this region (see 
Figure 3.1a). This is a particularly high refugee-sending region due to the levels of 
sustained conflict that have plagued the region for decades. Many refugees sent from this 
region in earlier periods of conflict moved to host countries that have since become more 
restrictive about receiving refugees, forcing newer refugees from this region to find new 
destinations rather than following established refugee paths (Betts 2008). This kind of 
shift generates new partnerships, causing the number of total ties held by the region to 
increase. Additionally, this region is served by a large number of organizations that 
perform aid work that often involves relocation of refugees (e.g., the International Rescue 
Committee, the UNHCR). The presence of these organizations increases the potential 
receiving partners held by countries in this area. This region, as well as Latin America, 
may also benefit in this category from having a high number of potential receiving 
partners in the region. At the other end of the sending spectrum, countries in the West 
have the fewest sending partners, as would be expected from a region that sends so few 
refugees (see Figure 3.1a).  
 Figure 3.1d presents the percentage of refugee-receiving ties held by countries in 
each region across the waves of the study. While countries the West receive a relatively 
low number of refugees compared to other regions (see Figure 3.1b), they hold the 
highest percentage of receiving ties across all waves of the study. This dichotomy 
portrays these countries as open to refugees from all parts of the world, but on a limited 
basis. These countries may be viewed as the most attractive destinations for refugees, but 
restrictive entry policies and high levels of repatriation common to these countries make 
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it difficult for large numbers of refugees from a given country to gain entrance (Betts 
2008). Refugees from all parts of the world attempt entry into these countries, but a 
relative few are received. The high level of ties may also be related to previous waves of 
immigration that have resulted in immigrant networks in these countries that may make it 
easier for some refugees to enter due to family ties or other connections.  
Figure 3.1c. Percentage of refugee sending ties held by region and wave, 1990-2008 
 
 






























































































Interestingly, some of the top regions in terms of refugees received are not among 
the leading regions in receiving ties. While the Middle East consistently accounts for the 
second highest level of valued receiving, this region has the fewest receiving partnerships 
(see Figures 3.1b and 3.1d). Countries in this and other high value-receiving regions tend 
to receive refugees from only a few other countries, often in the same region (see Tables 
3.12 through 3.16).  
Two important observations emerge from this examination of regional variation 
across the waves of the refugee network. First, primary sending regions are as would be 
expected. The presence of ongoing conflict and political instability in Africa and Asia, as 
well as the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc in Eastern Europe in the 1990‟s caused these 
regions to contribute refugees to the network at high levels. While Eastern Europe sends 
to relatively few partners, given their level of valued sending, Latin America 
demonstrates the opposite effect, with relatively fewer refugees going to a high number 
of partners.  
The receiving networks exhibit an interesting pattern. Regions dominated by less 
developed countries (i.e., Africa, Middle East, Latin America) receive the highest 
percentages of refugees, while more developed regions (i.e., Asia and the West) are less 
central in this network. However, Western countries receive refugees from a higher 
percentage of total partners than any other region. Countries in this region represent the 
most attractive destinations for refugees, thus increasing the potential partners from 
which refugees are received. These countries are also able to control inflows, thereby 
limiting the number of actual refugees allowed to enter from these partners. These 




Valued sending network 
Table 3.2. Descriptive Statistics for Sending Degree Centrality (Valued) 
Measure Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Growth 
Rate 
Total Refugees 14,859,172 14,575,958 12,068,067 9,573,883 8,325,553       -44% 
Mean 61,402      60,231        49,868         39,562        34,403        -44% 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0          0% 
Maximum 3,026,727 2,693,708 3,168,356 2,268,734 1,944,852       -36% 
Centralization 0.449% 0.747% 0.788% 0.786% 0.867%        93% 
N 242 242 242 242 242  
 
Table 3.2 presents statistics for the valued refugee-sending network. A number of 
measures reflect the consistent downward trend in the number of refugees sent over the 
course of the study (see Table 3.1). The total number of refugees and average sent per 
country declines by 44 percent over the period of the study. There are several possible 
explanations for this decline. It may be that many of those who would be inclined to 
move did so earlier in the period under investigation (or prior to the first wave), resulting 
in lighter flows toward the end of the study. It is also possible that fewer individuals 
needed to move due to lessened political violence or that many refugees returned home 
due to improved conditions or a change in refugee policy that caused them to leave their 
host country. The period of the study also marked a significant increase in IDP movement 
(UNHCR 2010), reducing the number of potential refugees that crossed an international 
border. Interestingly, the number sent by the highest sending country, reflected in the 
maximum score, increases and decreases across the waves of the study, ending down 36 
percent from the first wave. This fluctuation reflects periods of greater and lesser conflict 
and stability in the highest-sending country (Afghanistan) over the last two decades (see 
Tables 3.6 through 3.10).  
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 Although the general trend in refugee sending over this period is downward, the 
network becomes more centralized. This indicates that the top senders in the network 
send more refugees as a percentage of the total than more moderate senders. This is 
demonstrated by the difference in percent changes in the total number of sent refugees  
(- 44 percent) and the maximum sent by the highest sender (- 36 percent). This 
heightened concentration comes in spite of an increase in the number of sending 
countries participating in the network (see Table 3.4). A number of factors may be at 
work. The increase in IDPs over this period may have lessened the numbers of new 
refugees added to the network, limiting the sending strength of new contributors. 
Likewise, conditions over the period of the study may have caused fewer people to need 
to move. It is also possible that individuals from lesser sending countries identify (or are 
classified) as something other than political refugees more frequently than those who 
come from countries marked by political violence.  
Visualizations of Waves 1 and 5 of the valued refugee-sending network are 
presented in Figures 3.2 and 3.3. These maps present a clear picture of the domination of 
this network by a handful of key actors. While the identity of some of these central actors 
changes from the first wave to the last, this dynamic does not. Countries like Russia and 
Mozambique became less central as political conditions stabilized over time. The 
presence of Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, and Iraq as central actors in both waves is a 
function of the persistent conflict experienced by these countries over the last two 
decades. The presence of Vietnam as central in both waves reflects the high number of 





Figure 3.2. Valued Refugee-Sending Network, 1990-1993 
 
Figure 3.3. Valued Refugee-Sending Network, 2006-2008 
 
 
Valued receiving network 
 
Descriptive statistics for the valued refugee-receiving network are presented in 
Table 3.3. As this network is the reverse of the valued sending network, the total refugees 
and average number of refugees received are identical to the average number sent (see 
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Table 3.2). Reflecting the trend from the sending network, the number of refugees 
received by the highest receiving country declined steadily over the course of the study 
(down 75 percent overall).  
Table 3.3. Descriptive Statistics for Receiving Degree Centrality (Valued) 
Measure Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Percent Change 
Total Refugees 14,859,172 14,575,958 12,068,067 9,573,883 8,325,553       -44% 
Mean 61,402        60,231       49,868      39,562        34,403        -44% 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0          0% 
Maximum 3,806,318 2,087,311 1,875,756 1,181,869 970,691       -75% 
Centralization 0.567% 0.575% 0.461% 0.403% 0.425%       -25% 
N 242 242 242 242 242  
  
Of particular interest in this network is the centralization measure. Of the four 
networks examined, only the valued receiving network demonstrates a decrease in 
centralization over the waves of the study. This decline in network centralization reflects 
a reduced level of influence by the highest-receiving countries. This greater level of 
receiving parity may be a product of both the addition of new refugee destinations and 
the reduced number of refugees received by the network as a whole. As new destination 
countries emerge due to a shift in refugee-sending regions or the closing of more 
traditional refugee destinations due to policy changes or political violence, the dominance 
of key actors in the network lessens.  
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 present a visual depiction of the valued refugee-receiving 
network from Waves 1 and 5, respectively. Of particular interest in comparing these 
maps is the clear demonstration of the overall reduction in the number of refugees 
received over time. Many of the most central actors in Wave 1 (Sudan, Ethiopia, Guinea) 
show significant reductions in received refugees by Wave 5. Other countries show 
stability over time (Canada, Iran, the United States). Only a small number of countries 




Figure 3.4. Valued Refugee-Receiving Network, 1990-1993  
 
 
Figure 3.5. Valued Refugee-Receiving Network, 2006-2008 
 
 
The valued refugee network is marked by a clear decline in the number of 
refugees being sent. A number of elements may contribute to this trend, but the overall 
direction is clear. At the same time the number of refugees is decreasing, the network is 
becoming more diverse as new countries participate in both sending and receiving 
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refugees. Of particular interest in this network are the opposing directions of 
centralization scores observed between networks. While central sending actors become 
more important in the network, central receiving actors play a reduced role. 
Dichotomized sending network 
Table 3.4. Descriptive Statistics for Sending Degree Centrality (Dichotomized), 
1990-2008 
Measure Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Percent Change 
Total Ties 1406 2901 3796 4382 4639      230% 
Total Sending Countries 143 186 189 192 195        36% 
Mean 5.81 11.988 15.686 18.107 19.169      230% 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0          0% 
Maximum 54 83 97 97 103        91% 
Centralization 20.079% 29.588% 33.88% 32.871% 34.929%        74% 
Network Density .0241 .0497 .0651 .0751 .0795      230% 
N 242 242 242 242 242  
 
Table 3.4 presents statistics for the dichotomized refugee-sending network for all 
five waves of the analysis. Across the waves of the study, the total number of ties and 
average ties per sending country increase by 230 percent. These changes indicate that the 
network became more varied over the course of the study as sending countries sent 
refugees to more partners. Additionally, the total number of refugee-sending countries 
increased over the course of the study (143 to 195), further expanding the refugee 
sending network. A third indication of the expansion of the sending network is the 
increase in the number of countries to which the highest sending country had ties. The 
maximum number of ties increased by 91 percent over the five waves. It is possible that 
this expansion occurred because new countries became open as potential destinations or 
because fleeing refugees had more resources or options available in the later time period. 
It is also possible that this increase in sending ties reflects a need experienced by refugees 
to find new destinations as older, more traditional, destinations adopt restrictive entry 
policies. Earlier destinations would still have extant refugee populations, maintaining ties 
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to senders, while the addition of newer destinations would cause the number of ties to 
increase. The growth in the number of refugee-sending countries also increased over the 
period of study, further contributing to the expansion of the sending network.  
While these numbers describe the distribution of the network, the density and 
centralization scores present a better picture of its composition. Network density captures 
the extent to which all possible connections are made. The score is generated by dividing 
the actual number of ties in the network by the total possible number of ties (UCINET 
1999). Higher density scores represent greater numbers of possible ties being realized in 
the network. Table 3.4 presents an increase of 230 percent in density scores (.0241 to 
.0795), demonstrating the more integrated nature of the network as more countries 
became involved in sending (and receiving) refugees over time.  
Network centralization demonstrates the extent to which the network is 
monopolized by a small number of actors. Over the waves of the study, centralization 
scores increased. While the overall network expanded, generating greater numbers of 
senders and ties, it also became more centralized as a small number of core actors 
increased ties at a greater rate than the network as a whole. The centralization can be 
observed by comparing the top actors in the final wave of the valued sending network 
(Table 3.10) with the list of countries experiencing the greatest increase in refugees sent 
(Table 3.18). The presence of common countries on these lists demonstrates the 













Figure 3.7. Dichotomized Refugee-Sending Network, 2006-2008 
 
 
Visualizations of Waves 1 and 5 of the dichotomized refugee-sending network are 
presented in Figures 3.6 and 3.7. A comparison of these maps clearly demonstrates the 
increase in ties that occurred across the network from Wave 1 to Wave 5. These maps 
also depict the increasing concentration of sending ties in Africa, the Middle East, and 
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Central and Southern Asia. While these regions have been at the center of the 
dichotomized network across all waves of the study, the maps show that, over time, more 
countries in these areas have moved towards the center of the network, further solidifying 
the domination of these regions.  
Dichotomized receiving network 
Table 3.5. Descriptive Statistics for Receiving Degree Centrality (Dichotomized), 
1990-2008 
Measure Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5 Percent Change 
Total Ties 1406 2901 3796 4382 4639     230% 
Total Receiving Countries 128 150 155 152 156       23% 
Mean 5.81 11.988 15.686 18.107 19.169     230% 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0         0% 
Maximum 109 167 168 173 176       62% 
Network Density .0241 .0497 .0651 .0751 .0795     230% 
Centralization 42.995% 64.587% 63.463% 64.537% 65.345%       52% 
N 242 242 242 242 242  
 
Descriptive statistics for the dichotomized refugee-receiving network are 
presented in Table 3.5. The total number of countries with at least one receiving tie 
increased by 23 percent over the course of the study, providing further evidence that 
refugees found new destinations. By Wave 5, almost 75 percent of the countries in the 
study hosted refugees from at least one partner. The number of ties held by the country 
with the highest number of ties also increased (109 to 176), demonstrating that the most 
central actors continued to expand the scope of their partnerships. This growth parallels 
the increase in sending countries over the span of the study as more potential receiving 
ties became available.   
 Like the dichotomized sending network, the receiving network became slightly 
more centralized over the period of the investigation. While the network expanded in 
total receiving ties and countries that experienced at least one tie, centralization scores 
indicate that the growth in ties among countries at the center of the receiving network 
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grew at a faster rate than the network in general. This centralization indicates that 
countries at the top of the receiving network hosted refugees from the highest number of 
partners, but did not necessarily host the most refugees.  




Figure 3.9. Dichotomized Refugee-Receiving Network, 2006-2008 
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Figures 3.8 and 3.9 present visualizations of the dichotomized refugee-receiving 
network in Waves 1 and 5, respectively. While the network presented in Figure 3.8 is 
slightly distorted due to the lack of data for some of the heaviest receivers, the map 
clearly demonstrates the prevalence of the United States and countries in Western Europe 
at the center of the network. Comparing the two maps, a number of observations become 
clear. The increase in ties noted in Table 3.5 is demonstrated, with the greatest numbers 
of ties present in North America and Western Europe. Countries at middle levels of 
development in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia show marked increases 
in ties held, as do several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. This presents a clear picture of 
the increased density of the network over time and of the role played by these countries 
as new destinations for refugees.  
In examining the dichotomized network, three key features emerge. First, the 
network becomes more varied over time as more actors become involved in sending and 
receiving refugees. Secondly, this heightened activity caused the network to become 
denser as a higher percentage of potential ties were realized. Finally, the network 
becomes more centralized. In spite of the increased number of actors participating in 
sending and receiving refugees, those countries at the center of the network increase ties 
at a greater rate than the overall network, concentrating a greater percentage of the total 
ties in those nodes. 
Summary of descriptive statistics for valued and dichotomized refugee networks 
 In comparing the dichotomized and valued networks, an important trend emerges. 
Total refugees are on the decline, while the numbers of participants in the network are 
increasing. From a sending perspective, this may be a product of greater numbers of IDPs 
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staying within the borders of their home country and a number of smaller countries 
sending refugees due to political conflict. It may also be that fewer individuals are self-
identifying as refugees as receiving policies become more restrictive or focused on 
repatriation. On the receiving side, it may be that the greater dispersion of the network 
comes as a result of restrictive policy changes by more traditional refugee-receiving 
countries, necessitating the development of new destination countries for refugees. A 
second argument, that this dispersion of the network is due to shifts in high-volume 
refugee-sending regions, seems to be invalid. As Figures 3.1a and 3.1c demonstrate, there 
is a good deal of stability over the waves of the study in the regions from which refugees 
originate. The change in destinations does not appear to be a function of changes in 
regions of origin.  
Top ten senders and receivers  
Sending centrality 
The top ten actors in the dichotomized and valued refugee sending networks for 
each wave of the study are presented in Tables 3.6 through 3.10. Each table presents total 
ties and refugees for the top ten countries, as well as the average refugee per tie for each. 
Where ties occur in the dichotomized top ten, each country with that score is included, 
causing the dichotomized list to have more than ten actors in some cases. 
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1. Somalia 54 666,137 12,336 1. Afghanistan 3,026,727 29 104,370 
2. Iran 40 129,873 3,247 2. Iraq 1,158,240 38 30,480 
T3. Iraq 38 1,158,240 30,480 3. Somalia 666,137 54 12,336 
T3. DR Congo 38 62,678 1,649 4. Liberia 659,657 32 20,614 
5. Ethiopia 37 580,719 15,695 5. Ethiopia 580,719 37 15,695 
T6. Sudan 32 345,992 10,812 6. Vietnam 515,893 32 16,122 
T6. Liberia 32 659,657 20,614 7. Eritrea 478,419 9 53,158 
T6. Vietnam 32 515,893 16,122 8. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
404,439 23 17,584 
 
9. Afghanistan 29 3,026,727 104,370 9. Mozambique 400,274 13 30,790 
T10. Angola 27 104,208 3,860 10. Sudan 345,992 32 10,812 
T10. Serbia 27 85,024 3,149      
 

















1. Somalia 83 633,519 7,633 1. Afghanistan 2,693,708 59 45,656 
2. Iraq 77 729,547 9,475 2. Rwanda 1,155,344 69 16,744 
3. Iran 76 111,876 
 
1,472 3. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  
898,487 46 19,532 
4. Liberia 70 705,400 10,077 4. Iraq 729,547 77 9,475 
5. Rwanda 69 1,155,344 16,744 5. Liberia  705,400 70 10,077 
6. Sudan 68 423,836 6,233 6. Somalia  633,519 83 7,633 
7. DR Congo 66 131,535 1,993 7. Vietnam  530,396 40 13,260 
8. Ethiopia  63 128,559 2,041 8. Sudan 423,836 68 6,233 
9. Afghanistan  59 2,693,708 45,656 9. Burundi 423,009 56 7,554 
10. Burundi  56 423,009 7,554 10. Sierra Leone 342,435 40 8,561 
 

















1. Sudan  97 465,463 4,799 1. Afghanistan 3,168,356 78 40,620 
2. Iraq 94 594,517 6,325 2. Iraq  594,517 94 6,325 
3. Somalia  93 501,966 5,397 3. Burundi  538,198 68 7,915 
4. DR Congo  87 295,442 3,396 4. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
525,572 51 10,305 
5. Iran  80 88,662 1,108 5. Somalia  501,966 93 5,398 
6. Ethiopia 79 67,153 850 6. Sudan 465,463 80 5,818 
7. Afghanistan  78 3,168,356 40,620 7. Angola  394,547 64 6,165 
T8. Liberia 77 293,096 3,806 8. Sierra Leone 370,229 77 4,808 
T8. Sierra Leone 77 370,229 4,808 9. Eritrea 353,037 44 8,024 
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1. Somalia  97 404,956 4,175 1. Afghanistan 2,266,734 80 28,334 
2. Sudan  95 634,941 6,684 2. Sudan  634,941 95 6,684 
T3. Iraq  92 340,821 3,705 3. Burundi  507,615 76 6,679 
T3. DR Congo 92 442,349 4,808 4. DR Congo 442,349 92 4,808 
5. Ethiopia 85 63,191 743 5. Somalia  404,956 97 4,175 
6. Liberia 82 298,970 3,646 6. Palestine 369,969 64 5,781 
7. Iran 81 118,779 1,466 7. Vietnam  361,257 44 8,210 
T8. Afghanistan  80 2,266,734 28,334 8. Iraq  340,821 92 3,705 
T8. Sierra Leone 80 73,651 921 9. Angola  302,432 60 5,041 
10. Rwanda  78 78,564 1,007 10. Liberia 298,970 82 3,646 
 

















1. Somalia  103 492,961 4,786 1. Afghanistan 1,944,852 76 25,590 
2. Iraq  98 778,932 7,948 2. Iraq  778,932 98 7,948 
3. Ethiopia  96 69,013 719 3. Sudan  535,490 92 5,821 
T4. Sudan  92 535,490 5,821 4. Somalia  492,961 103 4,786 
T4. DR Congo 92 375,984 4,087 5. DR Congo 375,984 92 4,087 
6. Liberia 82 108,902 1,328 6. Burundi  351,292 75 4,684 
7. Iran 81 80,028 988 7. Vietnam  343,428 49 7,009 
8. Sierra Leone  78 35,713 458 8. Palestine 334,478 70 4,778 
9. Afghanistan  76 1,944,852 25,590 9. Turkey 221,187 45 4,915 
T10. Rwanda  75 82,173 1,096 10. Myanmar 193,865 46 4,215 
T10. Burundi 75 351,292 4,684      
 
 As noted in Figure 3.1c, the actors with the most ties in each wave tend to be from 
countries in Africa and the Middle East. These most central countries tend toward the 
lower middle to low levels of development. Additionally, these countries are frequently 
marked by conflict and political upheaval, a condition that would be expected of 
countries sending high volumes of individuals that are counted as refugees based on the 
1951 Convention definition. Movement in and out of the top ten closely parallels the 
initiation and cessation of military conflict. Additionally, the number of ties held by the 
top actors increases significantly over the waves of the study, with the most central 
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country sending refugees to almost twice the number of partners in Wave 5 as Wave 1 
and the 10
th
 place country holding over three times more ties in Wave 5 than Wave 1. 
This increase parallels the expansion of the overall dichotomized network demonstrated 
in the previous section. With the exception of retention between the first and second 
waves, the top ten actors demonstrate a high degree of stability across the waves of the 
study. Wave-to-wave retention from Waves 2 through 5 is between 90 and 100 percent.  
 Like the dichotomized network, the valued sending network is composed 
primarily of less-developed countries from Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East. In 
fact, there is a good deal of similarity in the composition of each network, with at least 
five of the top ten in common in each wave of the study (see Figure 3.17). A key 
characteristic of the sending network is the large gap between the top actor (i.e., 
Afghanistan) and the actors that comprise the rest of the top ten. In every wave, 
Afghanistan sends at least one million more refugees than the second place country. The 
largest difference occurs in Wave 3 where Afghanistan contributed over 2.5 million more 
refugees than the next closest country. The nearly 3.2 million refugees sent in this wave 
account for almost half of the total refugees sent by the top ten (see Table 3.11). This 
domination of the top position in the network across all waves of the study demonstrates 
the constant state of conflict experienced by Afghanistan across these two decades. 
Interestingly, wave-to-wave retention is lower in the valued network than the 
dichotomized network, varying from 60 to 80 percent across waves. Overall retention 
from Wave 1 to Wave 5 is also low, with only five of the original ten countries persisting 
from the beginning to the end of the study. This reflects the cessation of conflict in 
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countries over time and success in efforts toward repatriation of refugees following the 
end of hostilities.  
Table 3.11. Summary of Holdings of Top Ten Actors in Refugee-Sending Networks 
by Wave, 1990-2008 



























386 27.45 7,335,148 49.36 19,003 299 21.27 8,236,497 55.43 27,547 
687 23.68 7,136,333 48.96 10,388 608 20.96 8,535,681 58.56 14,039 
837 22.05 5,937,637 49.20 7,094 700 18.44 7,255,354 60.12 10,365 
862 19.67 4,722,956 49.33 5,479 782 17.85 5,930,044 61.94 7,583 
948 20.44 4,855,340 58.32 5,122 746 16.08 5,572,469 66.93 7,470 
 
 Table 3.11 summarizes the dichotomized and valued sending networks across all 
waves of the study. The total ties and refugees held by the top ten in each wave are 
presented. A key feature of the summary is the level of similarity that exists between the 
two networks. The similarities in composition have already been noted, but beyond this, 
there are clear parallels in the trends experienced by the two networks across the waves 
of the study. Both valued and dichotomized networks experience increases in the total 
number of ties held by the top actors in the networks from Wave 1 to Wave 5. While the 
number of ties in the dichotomized network is somewhat higher, both networks increase 
total ties by over 200% over the course of the investigation. However, the total ties held 
by the top ten in each network represent a lower percentage of the total ties held by all 
countries over time. In spite of this trend, these percentages reflect the greater 
centralization of the network over time as more actors enter the network and increase ties 
at a slower rate than the central actors (see Table 3.4).  
 The networks are also similar in the trajectory taken by the total number of 
refugees sent in each wave. A comparison of total refugees sent over Waves 1 through 5 
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shows that the valued network consistently sends more refugees than the dichotomized. 
The lists of top ten actors in both networks demonstrate a clear downward trend in the 
total number sent from wave-to-wave, but refugees from these countries represent an 
increasingly larger percentage of the total refugees sent in a given wave. This shift 
illustrates the greater level of centralization identified in Table 3.2.  
A final feature held in common by these networks is the trend in average refugee 
per tie score for the top ten actors across waves. While the valued network has slightly 
higher scores due to the presence of more refugees and fewer ties, both networks 
demonstrate a clear downward trend in the number of sent refugees per sending tie. This 
shows that refugees from these countries are going to more varied destinations over time, 
possibly as a result of a need for the development of new destinations as traditional 
hosting countries either close to refugees or in some other way become less attractive or 
attainable.  
Receiving centrality 
Tables 3.12 – 3.16 present the top ten actors in the dichotomized and valued 
refugee-receiving networks for each wave of the study. The total ties and refugees, as 
well as average refugee per tie, are presented for all countries in the top ten. Like the 





















1. Sweden 109 139,351 1,278 1. Iran 3,806,318 2 1,903,159 
2. Netherlands 89 44,892 504 2. Germany 1,072,875 -- -- 
3. USA 73 546,959 7,493 3. Sudan 926,912 6 154,485 
4. Denmark 72 40,287 560 4. USA 546,959 73 7,493 
5. Italy 63 20,009 318 5. Guinea 520,267 4 130,067 
6. UK 62 58,009 936 6. Ethiopia 502,060 8 62,758 
7. Spain  55 6,414 117 7. Serbia 496,616 11 45,147 
8. Greece 45 14,325 318 8. Croatia 403,000 -- -- 
9. Cote d‟Ivoire 31 232,556 7,502 9. Mexico 360,167 25 14,407 
10. Nigeria 26 4,448 171 10. Tanzania 353,108 6 58,851 
 
 

















1. Canada 167 149,975 898 1. Iran 2,087,311 -- -- 
2. USA 149 606,988 4,074 2. Germany 1,234,376 -- -- 
3. Netherlands 124 90,754 732 3. Pakistan 1,165,895 13 89,684 
4. Sweden 122 194,491 1,594 4. DR Congo 1,048,131 10 104,813 
5. France 114 195,798 1,718 5. Tanzania 695,538 6 115,923 
6. Australia 108 94,899 879 6. USA 606,988 149 4,074 
7. Norway 80 65,095 814 7. Guinea 581,180 11 52,834 
8. Denmark 79 62,255 788 8. Sudan 575,589 7 82,227 
9. Italy 77 74,944 973 9. Serbia 553,670 12 46,139 
10. Spain 76 5,643 74 10. Ethiopia 363,832 19 19,149 
 

















1. Canada 168 151,169 900 1. Iran 1,875,756 -- -- 
2. USA 167 520,099 3,114 2. Pakistan 1,651,203 22 75,055 
3. Sweden 129 162,819 1,262 3. Germany 933,425 -- -- 
4. Netherlands 124 176,897 1,427 4. Tanzania 623,463 5 124,693 
5. Australia 122 63,237 518 5. USA 520,099 167 3,114 
6. France 117 133,253 1,139 6. Serbia 471,862 11 42,897 
7. Switzerland 113 70,291 622 7. Guinea 397,420 19 20,917 
8. Belgium 108 16,202 150 8. Sudan 395,320 6 65,887 
9. Denmark 98 70,736 722 9. DR Congo 325,871 9 36,208 
























1. Germany 173 840,481 4,858 1. Pakistan 1,181,869 19 62,204 
2. Canada 171 131,309 768 2. Iran 1,077,987 5 21,559 
3. USA 168 435,194 2,590 3. Germany 840,481 173 4,858 
4. Sweden 132 104,431 791 4. Tanzania 622,514 4 155,629 
5. Netherlands 129 133,472 1,035 5. USA 435,194 168 2,590 
6. Australia 119 61,108 514 6. China 299,272 16 18,705 
7. Switzerland 114 46,326 406 7. UK 282,583 110 2,569 
8. UK 110 282,583 2,569 8. Serbia 267,696 15 17,846 
9. Belgium 103 13,493 131 9. DR Congo 242,671 7 34,667 
T10. Norway  102 45,938 450 10. Saudi Arabia 241,908 9 26,879 
T10. Ireland  102 6,208 61      
 

















1. Germany 176 580,805 3,300 1. Iran 970,691 8 121,336 
2. USA 174 467,973 2,690 2. Pakistan 899,156 18 49,953 
3. Canada 173 165,997 960 3. Germany 580,805 176 3,300 
4. Sweden 134 77,390 578 4. Jordan 500,316 20 25,016 
T5. Australia  121 36,234 299 5. USA 467,973 174 2,690 
T5. Netherlands  121 88,363 730 6. Tanzania 414,791 10 41,479 
7. UK 119 297,830 2,503 7. China 301,028 15 20,069 
8. Switzerland 116 46,773 403 8. UK 297,830 119 2,503 
T9. France  107 152,092 1,421 9. Chad 294,482 2 147,241 
T9. Norway  107 38,003 355 10. Kenya 286,289 13 22,022 
 
Across all waves, the top ten actors in the dichotomized network are 
predominantly wealthy, developed countries in Europe or North America. Countries at 
this level of development tend to be well-connected politically, diplomatically, 
economically, and culturally to large numbers of countries at every level of development. 
Additionally, these countries have highly developed transportation networks that connect 
to all parts of the world. With these multiple vectors of connectedness, it is little surprise 
that these countries would also play host to refugees from large numbers of senders. The 
top ten actors in this network display a high degree of stability across the waves of the 
study. Excluding the first wave due to issues related to reporting ties among some of the 
99 
 
most central actors (see footnote 1), wave-to-wave retention varies between 80 and 90 
percent. Retention from Wave 2 to Wave 5 is also high at 80 percent.  
Unlike the similarity displayed by the valued and dichotomized sending networks, 
the top ten actors in the valued receiving networks are quite different than those in the 
dichotomized networks. While the United States (and later, Germany and the United 
Kingdom) appear on both lists, countries at middle and lower levels of development 
constitute most of the valued receiving lists. These countries tend to be in close proximity 
to high-conflict areas and often demonstrate a tendency toward instability. Like the 
dichotomized network, wave-to-wave retention appears to be somewhat stable, holding 
between 70 to 90 percent. However, the structure of the network changes significantly 
over the full period of the study with only four of the top ten countries from Wave 1 
(Iran, Germany, United States, and United Republic of Tanzania) appearing in the top ten 
from Wave 5. This shift clearly demonstrates the role played by proximity to conflict in 
elevating refugee levels. Included in the top ten receiving countries in Wave 1 are Croatia 
and Serbia, who received refugees from Central European conflicts in the late 1980‟s and 
early 1990‟s, and Mexico, who received refugees from Latin American conflicts in the 
same period. By Wave 5, these countries have been replaced with actors from Sub-
Saharan Africa and the Middle East as these regions have experienced heightened levels 
of conflict in the early part of the 21
st
 century.  
 Table 3.17 summarizes the ties and total refugees received by the top ten 
receiving networks, both dichotomized and valued. In addition to the differences in 
stability over time and the kinds of countries on the lists noted previously, this table 
highlights the disparity between the top actors in the two networks with respect to ties 
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and refugees. While the top ten receivers in the dichotomized network account for around 
a third or more of all ties in each wave, they account for less than a fourth of total 
refugees at their highest receiving level (i.e., Wave 5). In fact, in Wave 1, these countries 
account for less than 10 percent of all refugees received in the period. The valued top ten 
demonstrate the opposite effect receiving around 60 percent of all refugees in any given 
wave, but holding only around 10 percent of ties. If the United States and Germany are 
excluded, the number of ties held by the remaining actors drops to around 5 percent. 
These observations portray a receiving network in which poor countries receive the brunt 
of refugee movements, while wealthy countries are better able to be selective in the 
extent to which they are impacted by refugee inflows.  
Table 3.17. Summary of Top Ten Actors in Refugee-Receiving Networks, 1990-2008 



























625 44.45 1,107,250 7.45 1,772 135 9.60 8,988,282 60.49 66,579 
1096 37.78 1,540,842 10.57 1,406 227 7.82 8,912,510 61.15 39,262 
1242 32.72 1,398,285 11.59 1,126 251 6.61 7,488,195 62.05 29,833 
1423 32.47 2,100,543 21.94 1,476 526 12.00 5,492,175 57.37 10,441 
1348 29.06 1,951,460 23.44 1,448 555 11.96 5,013,361 60.22 9,033 
 
 This difference in refugees received is highlighted by the average refugee per tie 
measure. Discounting Wave 1, the valued top ten received between 8.5 and 29 times 
more refugees per tie than the central actors in the dichotomized top ten. Clearly, 
countries in the developing world are receiving the brunt of refugee movements. Through 
connections at a variety of levels, highly developed countries receive refugees from large 
numbers of countries. However, through policy, distance, and tight border controls, these 
countries are able to limit refugee flows to manageable levels that do not significantly 
impact economic, political, or cultural life. On the other hand, countries at lower levels of 
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development appear to be less able to restrict refugee movements due to proximity to 
conflict areas, lack of policy-level restrictions, and lesser ability to control borders. These 
countries are far less able to absorb the economic, social, and political consequences that 
come with a heavy influx of refugees (Iqbal and Zorn 2007; Keller 1975). Many of the 
valued top ten receiving countries receive the bulk of their refugees from only a handful 
of partners, creating potential for political disruption as these refugees consolidate and 
settle.  
Trends in sending and receiving centrality 
Figure 3.17. Similarity of actors in the top ten of dichotomized and valued networks 
for the refugee sending and receiving networks across five waves, 1990-2008  
 
In comparing the refugee sending and receiving networks, a number of trends 
emerge. First, the difference in similarity in the top ten actors in the dichotomized and 
valued networks between the sending and receiving networks marks an issue with 
important implications. While the top ten actors in each wave of the dichotomized and 






























highest number of partners and those that receive the highest number of refugees are very 
different. Figure 3.17 depicts the extent of these differences. Countries that are central in 
the valued sending network tend to be central in the dichotomized sending network. 
However, most central countries in the dichotomized receiving network are not central in 
the valued network. Countries with the highest number of receiving ties are generally not 
the countries that receive the highest numbers of refugees.  
Secondly, differences exist in the actors that comprise the different networks. The 
top actors in both the dichotomized and the valued sending networks are primarily 
countries at low levels of development in Africa, Central and South Asia, and the Middle 
East. These countries are typically marked by political instability and conflict, either 
during the period being studied or in the recent past. In contrast, the top actors in the 
valued receiving network come from a variety of development levels, geographic regions, 
and levels of stability. Some countries are on these lists due to a history of openness to 
refugees while others appear due to their proximity to areas of conflict. 
Providing a stark contrast to both the central actors in the sending networks and 
those in the valued receiving network are the top actors in the dichotomized receiving 
network. The countries with the most refugee-receiving ties are almost exclusively those 
at the highest levels of economic development. With the exception of the first wave, 
which is somewhat misleading due to missing data (see footnote 1), all of the central 
actors in this network are members of the OECD and are considered “Western” countries. 
As has been previously noted, these countries are connected to the most sending partners, 
but generally do not host the highest numbers of refugees.  
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This disparity between the number of partners and number of refugees received 
by the dichotomized receiving network marks the third broad trend observed in 
comparing these networks. The average refugee per tie score of the central actors in the 
dichotomized receiving network is vastly different than those of the top actors in the 
valued receiving network or either of the sending networks (see Tables 3.11 and 3.17). 
Wealthy countries are clearly the most attractive destinations for refugees, but these 
countries seem to be best able to control the volume of the flow of refugees crossing their 
borders. Receiving fewer refugees from more partners creates a more diverse refugee 
population and may limit the potential problems associated with having large pockets of 
single-origin refugees within the society. These central actors in the dichotomized 
receiving network appear to have successfully limited the impact of receiving refugees on 
their country.   






















DR Congo 313,306 Sierra Leone 67 Pakistan 659,801 Switzerland 78 
Palestine 254,111 Congo 64 Jordan 499,627 UK 73 
Turkey 206,568 Eritrea (tie) 60 Chad 294,408 Belgium 71 
Sudan 189,498 Iraq (tie) 60 UK 239,821 Hungary 55 
Serbia 100,742 Sudan (tie) 60 Saudi Arabia 211,744 Brazil 49 
CAR 96,834 Ethiopia 59 Egypt 90,279 Argentina 48 
Angola 83,808 Cote d‟Ivoire 57 Yemen 79,828 Ecuador 46 
Columbia 72,528 Nigeria 56 Kenya 72,818 New Zealand 43 
China 54,538 DR Congo 54 Tanzania 61,683 Czech Republic 37 
Azerbaijan 52,767 Burundi (tie) 51 Netherlands 43,471 Costa Rica 35 
  Palestine (tie) 51     
* Only waves 2-5 are included for this measure due to a number of heavy receiving countries having no ties 
reported for Wave 1. 
 
 Table 3.18 presents the ten actors in each network that experienced the greatest 
numerical increase in centrality from Wave 1 to Wave 5 (see footnote 1). Each score is 
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developed by subtracting the Wave 1 centrality score for each country from the Wave 5 
score. The list of top movers in the valued sending network provides the most varied 
group of actors of any of the lists. Countries vary by region, development level, and 
conflict level. Of these movers, only three break into the top ten of the overall valued 
sending network. Like the receiving network lists, the composition of the list of countries 
with the greatest increases in ties is quite different than the list from the valued network. 
Only three countries appear on both lists. The top ten upwardly mobile actors in the 
dichotomized receiving network are almost exclusively from Africa and represent some 
of the least developed countries in the world. Most of these countries have experienced 
extended periods of conflict over the time period of the study and the proliferation of ties 
may reflect the need to find new receiving partners as flows develop due to heightened or 
renewed conflict. It may also be a product of more potential host countries becoming 
aware of conflict and humanitarian crises occurring in these sending countries, with a 
subsequent opening of borders to accommodate refugees. Possibly the most telling 
observation about this list is the number of actors that were in the top ten of the 
dichotomized sending network in both Wave 1 and Wave 5. This means that these 
countries started as the most central actors and then increased ties at a greater rate than 
other actors in the network, further demonstrating the increased centralization of this 
network over the period of study.  
 In the receiving networks, three of the top ten movers in the dichotomized 
network moved into the top ten of the overall network, while six of the top ten movers in 
the valued network did so. This reflects the greater levels of variation in the valued 
network as refugees move for a time and then move back after the cessation of hostilities, 
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leaving a remnant behind in the host country. This small group that does not return 
continues to be counted as a tie in the network, but may represent fewer refugees than 
during the initial movement period. For the receiving networks, it is noteworthy that only 
one of the actors that experienced the greatest increase in ties (United Kingdom) is on the 
list of actors that increased the most in total refugees. Upwardly mobile valued receivers 
are primarily countries at middle levels of development that are in close proximity to 
areas of conflicts that erupted during the time of the study. In contrast, countries that 
experienced the highest increases in ties are in the high to upper middle development 
categories, and are predominantly separated from regions experiencing conflict. 
Tellingly, none of the countries experiencing the greatest increases in receiving ties 
shares a region with the countries with the greatest increases in sending ties. The 
differences between these lists demonstrate again the ability of more developed nations to 
control the flows of refugees into their borders.  
General observations 
 A number of trends emerge across these examinations of the descriptive data of 
the refugee sending and receiving networks. Over the five waves of the study, the global 
refugee network becomes more diffuse, with fewer refugees moving to a greater number 
of destinations. This diffusion could be the result of reduced conflict around the world, 
generating fewer refugees. However, it is also possible that more potential refugees are 
remaining within their native borders, becoming IDPs rather than refugees. On the other 
side of the equation, the number of receiving countries has increased significantly over 
the two decades of the study. The emergence of new refugee destinations may be a by-
product of new areas of conflict developing, causing neighbors that were previously not 
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major refugee-receiving centers to become more involved in receiving due to proximity. 
The possibility also exists that new destinations have emerged as more traditional 
refugee-receiving countries in Europe and North America have developed more 
restrictive receiving policies for refugees, limiting their availability as potential 
destinations.  
 A second trend identified in these data is the burden placed on countries at middle 
and lower levels of development by refugee populations. If the diffusion of the network 
over time was uniform, there should be evidence of a reduced burden on all countries. 
However, this has not been the case. The countries that experienced the greatest increases 
in refugees are predominantly from these middle and lower tiers (see Table 3.18). 
Likewise, the majority of the highest overall receiving countries are at these development 
levels (see Tables 3.12 through 3.16). The data clearly demonstrate that many countries 
that are ill-equipped to absorb large refugee populations are finding themselves forced to 
do so. Whether due to proximity of conflict or changes to receiving policies by higher 
developed countries, these middle and lower development level countries are 
experiencing the bulk of the economic and population burden presented by refugees.  
 The clearest trend in these data is the extent to which the dichotomized receiving 
network differs from the other three networks. Clear differences emerge in the 
composition of the networks and the role played by top actors in the global refugee 
network. More than any other factor in these data, these network-level differences 
demonstrate the extent to which the refugee burden is passed from wealthy, developed 
nations to countries at lower levels of development.  
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 Of the four networks studied, only the top tens of the dichotomized receiving 
network consist exclusively of countries at the highest levels of development (see Tables 
3.12 – 3.16). Because of their positions in multiple global networks (communications, 
economic, transportation, etc.) these countries receive refugees from more countries than 
actors at lower development levels. However, these countries have demonstrated an 
ability to limit the number of refugees received even as they host refugees from large 
numbers of partners. Comparisons of actual refugees received by the top receivers on the 
valued list and those on the dichotomized list clearly show that the larger portion of the 
world‟s refugees are going to countries at low levels of development and with fewer 
overall receiving ties. This disparity is highlighted further when the statistics for the 
number of refugees per tie are compared. Countries that receive the highest number of 
refugees tend to be those that are least able to absorb the demands of these inflows on 
their resources and economies. 
 These trends and the evaluation of the global network in general leave a number 
of questions to be explored. Chief among these are questions related to the examination 
the dynamics involved in centrality in either the sending or receiving network. Is political 
violence the only element that matters in generating refugee flows or do other factors 
come into play as well? Why do some countries develop more sending ties than others? 
Do economic and other conditions in receiving countries impact refugee destination 
choices or is proximity the overwhelming factor? Are there differences in elements that 
impact centrality in the dichotomized and valued receiving networks? Do refugees make 
movement choices like other migrants, or are there differences in the elements that 
impact their destinations and decisions to leave?  
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 All of these questions require further study. In the following chapters, each of the 
networks will be examined and compared in analyses with variables from a number of 
different perspectives in order to investigate the different effects of domestic conditions 
and levels of international integration on centrality in these networks. These analyses will 
develop insight into the forces that shape the global refugee network and point to 
potential interventions that might alleviate some of the burden placed on high-receiving 
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COMPARING THE GLOBAL REFUGEE AND MIGRANT NETWORKS, CIRCA 
2000. 
 
 Most scholars in the fields of migration and refugee studies recognize that migrant 
and refugee movements represent different phenomena, driven by different issues and 
resulting in different types of decisions about destinations. However, a lack of theory in 
refugee studies often leads to the application of migration theories to refugee movements 
(Black 2001). Unfortunately, if migrants and refugees represent different types of 
movement, then the use of migrant theories to examine refugee movements is destined to 
miss important distinctions and subtleties unique to refugee outflows and destinations. In 
an effort to identify some of these distinctions and move toward the development of 
refugee-specific theory, the goal of this chapter is to develop and compare the valued and 
dichotomized migrant and refugee sending and receiving networks circa 2000. Each 
migrant network is compared to its refugee counterpart (e.g., valued migrant-sending 
with valued refugee-sending). Comparisons are made at a number of levels to examine 
differences and similarities in the networks to determine the extent to which these 
networks differ, identify key areas in which they are different, and examine what drives 
the composition of these networks, causing them to be different.  
 In order to compare migrant and refugee networks, degree centrality scores were 
calculated for each of the four possible networks of each type – valued sending, valued 
receiving, dichotomized sending, and dichotomized receiving. Data were included for 
225 countries and territories circa 2000. Migration data represent immigrants living 
abroad in 2000, while the refugee data are a period average from Wave 3 of the study 
(1998-2001).  Matrices were developed for each network that included the total number 
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of migrants and refugees sent and received by each country. As countries contribute and 
receive migrants and refugees at different levels, all of the networks are asymmetrical. 
These matrices were input into the UCINET (1999) software package and translated into 
centrality scores. Countries with high degree centrality in the valued networks send or 
receive higher numbers of migrants or refugees than countries with lower centrality 
scores.  
 Following the development of the valued networks, each network was 
dichotomized, again using UCINET (1999). Every country that sent migrants or refugees 
to another country was given a sending tie to that country, while the destination country 
received a receiving tie. Centrality scores in these dichotomized networks are based on 
the total number of sending or receiving ties held by countries in the respective networks. 
Countries that receive from a high number of other countries are considered central in the 
receiving network, while countries with many sending partners are high in the sending 
networks.  
 Once developed, I compared these networks at several levels to identify 
similarities and differences. First, descriptive statistics and geographical differences are 
examined. These measures are developed from UCINET (1999) and are presented in a 
series of tables and figures that compare the scope and structure of each network, 
including size, centrality, density, and regional distribution. Next, correlations of the 
networks are developed and examined. Both Pearson‟s Correlation and Quadratic 
Assignment Procedure (QAP) correlations and are performed and all results presented. 
Following these results, a series of OLS regressions are performed that examine the 
effects of variables from a number of perspectives on centrality in the networks. Results 
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for each network pair are reported and compared. Finally, a series of OLS regressions are 
conducted to examine the effects of these variables on residual scores obtained by the 
regression of each migrant network on its refugee counterpart. These analyses 
demonstrate elements that cause the networks to be different. Each of these sections 
includes a brief introduction, a presentation of the results, and a discussion of the relevant 
findings within the section.  
A number of outcomes are anticipated in this analysis. First, it is expected that the 
networks will prove to be significantly different along the various levels examined. Next, 
it is anticipated that a good deal of this difference will be based on regional variation. 
Countries in different regions participate in these networks at different levels and these 
differences should be reflected in the observed results. A third set of outcomes derives 
from the predicted results with respect to the effects of variables on centrality in the 
networks from Chapter Two. Generally, it is expected that most of the variables in each 
model will demonstrate some effect on centrality scores, with greater development 
yielding higher receiving centrality in both networks and greater instability and unrest 
yielding higher refugee-sending centrality. It is anticipated that migrant-sending 
centrality will be affected by both development and political variables, as well. Finally, 
while it is expected that these elements will demonstrate relationships with both migrant 
and refugee centrality, it is anticipated that these effects will be in different directions and 
a varying strengths. Therefore, these elements will also explain some of the difference 
between networks in the residual analyses. The identification of these areas of similarity 
and difference will provide insights that may inform both the development of theory in 
refugee studies and the development of policy interventions aimed at helping prevent 
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refugee movements and assisting host countries in preparing for and dealing with refugee 
flows as they occur.  
 
DESCRIPTIVE COMPARISONS OF MIGRANT AND REFUGEE NETWORKS 
 
Visualizations and descriptive statistic comparisons 
 
Figure 4.1. Valued Migrant-Sending Network, 2000 
 




• 0           •1,000,001 – 1,500,000 
•1 – 500,000 •1,500,001 – 2,000,000 
•500,001 – 1,000,000      •2,000,000 +  
Key 
• 0           •1,000,001 – 1,500,000 
•1 – 500,000 •1,500,001 – 2,000,000 
•500,001 – 1,000,000      •2,000,000 +  
114 
 
Visualizations of the valued migrant and refugee-sending networks are presented 
in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. These maps clearly portray a higher level of activity present in the 
migrant network. Only one country in the refugee network (Afghanistan) sends enough 
refugees to qualify for the highest category, while 18 countries in the migrant network 
reach this level. Most countries in the refugee network send far less than 500,000 
refugees, while more than half of the countries in the migrant network contribute more 
than this number of emigrants. The migrant network also demonstrates greater variation 
in sending levels with multiple countries contributing migrants at each of the levels 
delineated in these figures.  
Table 4.1. Descriptive Statistics for Sending Degree Centrality (Valued) 
Measure Migrant Refugee 
Total Ties 175,706,768 10,210,189 
Mean 780,919 45,379 
Minimum 171 0 
Maximum 12,098,610 3,168,352 
Centralization .544% .849% 
Network Density (Average Value) 3455 186 
N 225 225 
 
 Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics for the valued migrant and refugee-
sending networks. Several important differences are evident. Perhaps the most glaring of 
these differences is found in the scope of the two networks. The migrant network 
involves 17 times more actors than the refugee network, numbers reflected in the total 
ties and the means for each network. The greatest contributor to the migrant network 
(Mexico) contributed four times more migrants than the highest refugee sender 
(Afghanistan) contributed to the refugee network. In addition to being larger, the migrant 
network is also far more active than the refugee network. Every country in the migrant 
network contributed emigrants to the total while 38 countries did not participate in the 
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refugee network. This level of activity is also reflected in the network centralization 
scores. Network centralization demonstrates the extent to which the network is 
monopolized by a small number of actors. The refugee-sending network is more 
centralized, indicating that core actors in this network contribute a higher percentage of 
the total than core actors in the migrant network. The disparity in level of activity 
between the networks is further captured by differences in network density. For valued 
networks, density is a measure of average value, presenting the total number of migrants 
or refugees divided by the total possible ties in the network. In this network, the migrant 
density is much higher, reflecting the greater number of migrants involved in the 
network, relative to the number of refugees.  
 The valued migrant and refugee-receiving networks are presented in Figures 4.3 
and 4.4. Again, these visualizations clearly demonstrate a higher volume of activity in the 
migrant network, relative to the refugee network. Only 3 countries surpass the 500,000 
mark in refugees received, while 64 countries received more than this number of 
migrants. Northern countries and regions are the heaviest recipients of migrants; 
although, interestingly, not all of the highest-receiving countries have high levels of 
development. While a number of countries appear to be both heavy senders and heavy 
receivers of migrants, this is not the case with refugees. Instead, the highest refugee-
receiving country (Pakistan) is located next to the highest sending country (Afghanistan), 









Figure 4.3. Valued Migrant-Receiving Network, 2000 
 




 The descriptive statistics for the valued receiving networks are presented in Table 
4.2. As these networks involve the same numbers of actors as the receiving networks, 
differences in the scope of the networks are identical to those discussed previously. The 
most central actor in the migrant network (the United States) hosted around 18.5 times 
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more migrants than the number of refugees hosted by the most central receiver in the 
refugee network (Pakistan). While both networks have non-participant countries that 
receive 0 migrants / refugees, the migrant network is far more centralized than the 
refugee network, marking an important difference in the sending and receiving networks. 
In fact, the network centralization score for the migrant network (1.626 percent) portrays 
the highest degree of centralization of any of the four valued networks in this analysis.  
Table 4.2. Descriptive Statistics for Receiving Degree Centrality (Valued) 
Measure Migrant Refugee 
Total Ties 175,706,768 10,210,189 
Mean 780,919 45,379 
Minimum 0 0 
Maximum 34,634,800 1,875,756 
Centralization 1.626% .498% 
Network Density (Average Value) 3455 186 
N 225 225 
 
Visualizations of the dichotomized migrant and refugee-sending networks are 
presented in Figures 4.5 and 4.6. The map of the migrant network (Figure 4.5) clearly 
demonstrates a high level of activity, with most countries holding at least 121 sending 
ties. While many of these countries do not send large numbers of migrants into the 
network (see Figure 4.1), the migrants they do send move to a wide variety of 
destinations. In contrast, the dichotomized refugee network shows a high degree of 
regional variation in the number of sending ties held, highlighted by the volume of ties 
held by countries in Africa and the Middle East. At the other end of the spectrum, 
developed countries across Western Europe, North America, and the Pacific have few 
sending ties, reflecting the low numbers of refugees contributed by these countries (see 
Figure 4.2). This may also be the product of the ability of refugees from these more 
developed countries to choose destinations in similar countries. 
118 
 
Figure 4.5. Dichotomized Migrant Sending Network, 2000 
 
Figure 4.6. Dichotomized Refugee Sending Network, 2000 
 
Table 4.3 presents the descriptive statistics for the dichotomized migrant and 
refugee sending networks. As in the comparison of valued networks, the migrant network 
is much larger and more active than the refugee network. The total ties and mean of the 
refugee network is only about 10 percent of that of the migrant network. Every country in 
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the migrant network participates in sending people to another country, while 38 countries 
in the refugee network have no sending ties. Additionally, the most central actors in the 
migrant network (India and the United Kingdom) have more than twice the number of 
ties as the most central actor in the refugee network (Sudan). The greater dispersion of 
ties across the migrant network leads to this network being less centralized than the 
refugee network. The high level of activity in the migrant network also yields far higher 
density score than that of the less active refugee network (.737 to .065). 
Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics for Sending Degree Centrality (Dichotomized) 
Measure Migrant Refugee 
Total Ties 37,432 3775 
Mean 166.364 16.778 
Minimum 21 0 
Maximum 219 97 
Centralization 23.603% 35.973% 
Network Density 0.737 0.065 
N 225 225 
  
Figures 4.7 and 4.8 present visualizations of the dichotomized migrant and 
refugee receiving networks, respectively. Like the dichotomized migrant sending network 
(see Figure 4.5), Figure 4.7 portrays the high degree of parity that is present in the 
migrant network. Most countries receive migrants from at least 121 other countries. 
Many of the countries that fail to reach this threshold are small island nations (i.e., Niue, 
Tokelau) or are marked by long histories of conflict and political unrest (i.e., Sudan, 
Central African Republic). By contrast, the map of the dichotomized refugee-receiving 
network again shows clear variation in regional trends. Wealthy countries in Western 
Europe and North America receive refugees from the highest number of other countries. 
These countries generate high levels of receiving ties, as they are perceived as optimal 
destinations for refugees, but are often able to limit the number of refugees who are 
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allowed to enter. This disparity is discussed in depth in Chapter Three. A second level of 
receiving ties is demonstrated by a number of countries at the middle level of 
development (i.e., Brazil, South Africa). These countries may appear to be attractive 
destinations for refugees who are unable to enter the countries at the highest levels of 
development due to restrictive entry policies.   
Figure 4.7. Dichotomized Migrant Receiving Network, 2000 
Figure 4.8. Dichotomized Refugee Receiving Network, 2000 
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 Descriptive statistics for the migrant and refugee dichotomized receiving 
networks are presented in Table 4.4. As in the migrant sending network, the core actors 
demonstrate a high level of centrality. In fact, the most central actors in the network (i.e., 
Germany) receive migrants from every other country in the network. The most central 
actors in the refugee network (United States, Canada) receive refugees from only 167 
countries in the network, demonstrating a lower level of centrality. The most noticeable 
difference between the receiving networks presented in this table is the disparity in 
network centralization scores. The refugee network is highly centralized, with a score 
much higher than the migrant network or either of the dichotomized sending networks. 
This score demonstrates that, of the dichotomized networks, the refugee-receiving 
network is most dominated by a core group of actors accounting for the majority of total 
ties in the network.  
Table 4.4. Descriptive Statistics for Receiving Degree Centrality (Dichotomized) 
Measure Migrant Refugee 
Total Ties 37,432 3775 
Network Density 0.737 0.065 
Mean 166.364 16.778 
Minimum 0 0 
Maximum 224 167 
Centralization 25.845% 67.363% 
Network Density 0.737 0.065 
N 225 225 
  
 Several key distinctions between the migrant and refugee networks emerge from 
these descriptive comparisons. The migrant networks are more active than the refugee 
networks, while the refugee networks are generally more centralized than the migrant 
networks. The exception to this pattern of centralization is in the valued receiving 
networks. The volume of migrants received by the most central actors (particularly the 
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United States), causes this network to be far more centralized than its refugee 
counterpart. The high level of activity demonstrated by countries in the migrant networks 
also causes these networks to be denser than refugee networks. Density scores for both 
valued and dichotomized networks are much higher for migrant than refugee networks. 
These differences are clearly demonstrated by the visualizations of the networks in which 
far more countries in the migrant networks participate at the highest level, relative to 
countries in the refugee networks.  
Regional differences in the migrant and refugee networks 
 Figure 4.9 shows the percentage of all migrants and refugees sent by each region 
circa 2000. Regional percentages for the valued receiving networks are presented in 
Figure 4.10. These pictures of regional variation demonstrate clear differences between 
the migrant and refugee networks. The valued migrant-sending network has a relatively 
even distribution across regions, ranging from 27 percent (Eastern Europe) to around 9 
percent (Middle East and Africa). In contrast, there is a wide variance between regions in 
the valued refugee-sending network. The Middle East is the lowest sending region in this 
network, accounting for only around 0.5 percent of all refugees, while Eastern Europe 
accounts for almost 39 percent of all refugees – led by the contribution of Afghanistan. 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America all send a higher percentage of refugees than migrants, 
reflecting high levels of conflict and political instability among countries in these regions.  
 The migrant and refugee valued receiving networks – presented in Figure 4.10 – 
demonstrate very different patterns than those of the sending networks. The percentage of 
both migrants and refugees received by regions are widely varied, ranging from 3.5 
percent (Latin America) to 44.4 percent (Europe and the West) for migrants and from 5.2 
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percent (Middle East) to 39.5 percent (West) for refugees. These disparities portray clear 
preferences and a high degree of similarity in destination choices for both migrants and 
refugees. 
Figure 4.9. Percentage of Sent Migrants and Refugees by Region, 2000 
 
































































































Figure 4.11. Percentage of Sending Ties Held by Region, 2000 
 
 
Figure 4.12. Percentage of Receiving Ties Held by Region, 2000 
 
 
 Figures 4.11 and 4.12 show regional variation in the dichotomized sending and 
receiving networks. Like the valued migrant-sending network, the dichotomized migrant-
sending network displays a fairly even distribution. Middle Eastern countries hold the 
fewest ties at around 10 percent, while countries in Africa account for the highest 
percentage of ties at around 21.5 percent. This narrow dispersion reflects the high degree 























































































(see Table 4.3). In contrast, the dichotomized refugee-sending network demonstrates a 
wide variance, ranging from 4 percent (West) to over 36 percent (Africa). African 
countries contribute to sending ties at this level due to the high volume of refugees 
leaving these countries and the wide dispersion of African refugees across the world 
through global INGO networks and networks established through previous waves of 
migration. High levels of conflict and the availability of a wide range of potential 
destinations due to proximity also contribute to the higher levels of sending centrality 
demonstrated by countries in Asia, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe / Central Asia. 
Interestingly, while the Middle East contributes the fewest refugees of any region (see 
Figure 4.9), those refugees account for the second highest percentage of sending ties, 
demonstrating a very low concentration of refugees from this region in other regions of 
the world. Contrasting this pattern from the Middle East, Western countries hold few 
sending ties, indicating that refugees from these countries tend to settle in only a few 
other countries, presumably other Western nations or other countries at relatively high 
levels of development.  
 The pattern demonstrated by the dichotomized receiving networks mirrors that of 
the sending networks, only with different regions coming to the fore. The migrant 
network exhibits the most even distribution of any of the networks, ranging from 10 
percent (Middle East) to 21 percent (Africa). Africa, Latin America, and Asia hold the 
highest number of receiving ties in this network, partly due to the presence of high 
numbers of potential sending partners in these regions. Again contrasting the egalitarian 
nature of the migrant network, the dichotomized refugee network shows a high degree of 
regional variation, ranging from 6 percent (Asia) to 46 percent (West). Countries in 
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Western Europe and other highly developed democracies present the best possible 
destination options for refugees and, as such, receive refugees from the widest possible 
number of partners. While some of these countries receive large numbers of refugees, the 
refugee population is highly diversified. The most central countries in the dichotomized 
refugee-receiving network are primarily in this group (see Table 3.14). In contrast, more 
restrictive entry policies, lower levels of development, and fewer potential refugee 
sources within the region cause Asian countries to receive refugees from relatively few 
partners. However, there are some instances (i.e., Pakistan), where large numbers of 
refugees come from a single country, creating a highly concentrated refugee population, 
often in a small geographic area.  
Summary of descriptive comparisons 
 These various depictions of distinctions between the global migrant and refugee 
networks present clear differences in the two. Most clearly, the migrant networks are far 
more active than the refugee networks. The valued network includes over 175 million 
actors, more than 17 times more than the refugee network. Likewise, over ten times more 
potential ties are realized in the dichotomized migrant network than in the dichotomized 
refugee network. Almost 75 percent (37,342) of all possible ties (50,400) are realized in 
the migrant network. This difference in activity level is clearly seen in the differences in 
means, network density levels, and number of countries contributing to the network. This 
greater level of activity in the migrant network is also demonstrated by the visualizations 
presented in Figures 4.1 to 4.8, as most countries in the migrant networks reach the 
maximum level of participation while countries in the refugee networks tend to exhibit 
the lowest level of participation.  
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 The higher degree of activity in the migrant networks also causes them to be far 
more equally distributed than the refugee networks. The majority of countries in the 
migrant networks sends and receives migrants at high levels. In contrast, most countries 
participate sparingly in the refugee networks with only a few countries sending or 
receiving at a high level. This is reflected in higher centralization scores for most of the 
refugee networks relative to their migrant counterparts. The single exception to this 
pattern, the valued migrant-receiving network, is a product of the degree to which 
migrants move to highly developed countries in Western Europe and the West (see 
Figure 4.10), particularly the United States. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 clearly demonstrate that 
the wider variation in this network comes as a result of the higher levels of movers within 
it as most countries that receive refugees do so at the lowest level presented in these 
figures. The relatively narrower range of regional variation in the migrant networks 
compared to the comparable refugee networks further demonstrates the more egalitarian 
nature of the migrant networks (See Figures 4.9 to 4.12). As in the centrality 
comparisons, the valued migrant-sending network is the exception to this pattern, due to 
the domination of the network by countries in the West. 
 
CORRELATIONS OF THE MIGRANT AND REFUGEE NETWORKS 
 Examining correlations between the migrant and refugee networks provides a 
picture of the extent to which the networks are different. Higher degrees of correlation 
indicate a greater degree of similarity. In this section, the results of two types of 
correlations are presented. Pearson‟s Correlation results (Table 4.5) demonstrate the 
extent to which the centrality scores of each migrant network are related to those of its 
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refugee counterpart. These results were developed from a correlation analysis of 
centrality scores in STATA. QAP correlation results (Table 4.6 and 4.7) examine the 
extent to which the network matrices of both types of movement are related. These 
results were derived from comparisons of the networks in UCINET (1999). In these 
analyses and all subsequent regression analyses, the degree centrality scores for all 
networks are logged to account for their skewed distribution.  
Table 4.5 Bivariate Correlations for Migrant and Refugee Networks, 2000 
 Pearson’s Correlation 
Valued Sending  .098 
Valued Receiving  .256*** 
Dichotomized Sending  .422*** 
Dichotomized Receiving  .335*** 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
 
Table 4.5 presents the pairwise Pearson‟s Correlation coefficients for the 
centrality scores of the migrant and refugee networks. The key comparisons in this table 
are those between the paired sets of networks (i.e., migrant and refugee valued sending). 
These coefficients show the extent to which the centrality scores of each migrant network 
are correlated to those of its corresponding refugee network. Higher correlations indicate 
greater levels of similarity between the networks. Of the four pairs of networks, only the 
valued sending networks are not significantly correlated, demonstrating that there is no 
statistical similarity between centrality in these networks. Each of the other network pairs 
is significantly correlated, albeit at different levels. The dichotomized sending networks 
exhibit the highest degree of correlation at .422, indicating the strongest relationship 
between networks for any of the pairs. While relatively high, this coefficient indicates 
that these networks are still more dissimilar than alike. Although weaker than the 
dichotomized sending networks, the dichotomized receiving networks and valued 
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receiving networks also demonstrate significant relationships (.335 and .256, 
respectively). Centrality scores in these networks are correlated, but again at relatively 
low levels. 
Table 4.6. QAP Correlation Results for Valued Migrant and Refugee Networks, 
2000 
 Value Significance 
Pearson Correlation  .099  .000 
Hamming Distance 37,441.000 .000 
 
Table 4.6 presents QAP correlation results for the valued migrant and refugee 
networks. While this procedure can develop measures of association between matrices at 
nominal, ordinal, and interval levels, only Pearson Correlation and Hamming Distance 
statistics are presented as scores for these networks are both at the interval level. The 
Pearson Correlation score indicates that the network matrices are significantly related, but 
at a very low level (.099). The Hamming Distance score further supports this result. 
Hamming Distance captures the extent to which scores in one matrix would have to be 
changed to make them the same as the second matrix. The Hamming Distance of 37,441 
indicates that over 74 percent of the values in the refugee matrix would have to be 
changed to match their counterparts in the migrant network. These results clearly 
demonstrate a high degree of difference between the valued networks.  
Table 4.7. QAP Correlation Results for Dichotomized Migrant and Refugee 
Networks, 2000 
 Value Significance 
Pearson Correlation .159 .000 
Simple Matching .330 .000 
Hamming Distance 33,759.000 .000 
 
 Results of the QAP Correlation of the dichotomized migrant and refugee 
networks are presented in Table 4.7. As these networks are binary, Simple Matching 
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scores can be included along with the Pearson Correlation and Hamming Distance. The 
Pearson Correlation of the dichotomized network indicates a stronger relationship 
between these matrices, compared to those of the valued networks. This is to be expected 
as the only possible values in dichotomized networks are “1” or “0”, creating a stronger 
possibility of scores matching. This coefficient still indicates a fairly weak relationship 
between these networks. Reflecting the proportion of cells in the two matrices that are the 
same, the Simple Matching score of .330 indicates that 33 percent of the cells in the 
migrant and refugee networks have the same value. These represent countries that have 
either the presence or absence of ties in both networks. The Hamming Distance 
demonstrates this level of similarity in another way, showing that 33,759 cells (67 
percent) in the migrant matrix would have to change in order to match their counterparts 
in the refugee network. While this score shows that these matrices are more similar than 
the valued migrant and refugee matrices, the dichotomized networks are still quite 
different. 
 Correlation results show that the migrant and refugee networks are highly 
dissimilar. Pearson Correlation results show that while centrality scores for three of the 
four networks are correlated, it is at relative low levels. QAP results present a picture of 
network matrices that are quite different. This dualism of similarity and difference is a 
recurring theme across analyses, one that continues as the relationships of centrality 





EXAMINING THE EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC CONDITIONS AND 
INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION ON NETWORK CENTRALITY 
Understanding how centrality scores for the different networks are affected by 
domestic and global factors has the potential to shed further light on the degree to which 
these networks differ. This section provides comparisons of OLS regression results 
examining the effects of a series of variables representing different areas of domestic 
conditions and international integration on centrality scores for the different networks. 
For each of the four networks (valued sending, valued receiving, dichotomized sending, 
dichotomized receiving), results for migrant and refugee centrality are presented and 
compared across five models: economic, political, demographic, environmental, and 
international. Each set of models includes examination of individual relationships 
between a single variable and the appropriate centrality score, net of regional variation. 
As the primary goal of this chapter is the comparison of the individual effects of these 
variables, full models will not be presented. For these comparisons, a floating sample is 
used. While the samples are different for each model, they are the same across networks, 
allowing for comparisons to be made.  
It is expected that economic and development variables will generally be related 
to lower refugee sending but greater migrant sending and greater receiving centrality in 
both networks. Additionally, it is anticipated that political instability will be related to 
greater migrant and refugee sending and reduced receiving centrality across networks. A 





Comparison of the valued sending networks 
 OLS regression results for analyses of centrality in the valued migrant-sending 
and refugee-sending networks are compared in Tables 4.8 through 4.17. Each comparison 
is conducted in a separate examination of a particular model. The effects of economic 
variables on the networks are compared in Tables 4.8 and 4.9; political variables in 
Tables 4.10 and 4.11; demographic variables in Tables 4.12 and 4.13; environmental 
variables in Tables 4.14 and 4.15; and international integration variables in Tables 4.16 
and 4.17. Each table presents individual relationships for each variable and the 
appropriate network centrality scores, net of regional variation. Results are discussed 
with each set of tables and a full discussion of the comparisons is included at the end of 
each section.  
Economic model 
In the migrant results (Table 4.8), only state strength reaches significance, and 
only then at a marginal level. Stronger states contribute fewer migrants to the network. In 
the refugee analysis (Table 4.9), the same result for state strength is present at almost an 
identical level. Additionally, secondary enrollment demonstrates a strong negative 
relationship with refugee-sending centrality, indicating that countries with higher levels 
of secondary education contributed fewer refugees to the network.  
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Table 4.8. OLS Regression Results for Economic Conditions on Migrant Sending 
Centrality (Valued), 2000 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Economic Variables        
     GDP per capita  -.140 
(.094) 
 
    
     State strength   -.145† 
(.073) 
 
   








     Secondary school enrollment      -.118 
(.107) 
Region       



































































R2  .016  .018  .024  .013  .010  .013 
N 225 189 172 175 203 165 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
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Table 4.9. OLS Regression Results for Economic Conditions Refugee Sending 
Centrality (Valued), circa 2000 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Political model 
 In both tables political terror and the presence of conflict demonstrate significant 
positive relationships with centrality scores. Countries that were engaged in conflict 
during the period and had poor human rights regimes contributed more migrants and 
refugees to these global networks. Political repression also demonstrates a positive 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Economic Variables       
     GDP per capita  -.131 
(.100) 
 
    
     State strength   -.138† 
(.075) 
 
   








     Secondary school enrollment      -.339** 
(.109) 
 
Region       

































































       
R2 .007 .014  .026  .006  .006  .062 
N 225 189 172 175 203 165 
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relationship in both analyses, but it achieves only marginal significance in the migrant 
network analysis.  
Table 4.10. OLS Regression Results for Political Conditions Migrant Sending 
Centrality (Valued), 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Political Variables     
     Political repression  .158† 
(.086) 
 
   








     Conflict     .182* 
(.074) 
 
Region     













































R2 .021 .041 .017 .043 
N 185 177 225 225 
136 
 
Table 4.11. OLS Regression Results for Political Conditions on Refugee Sending 




† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Demographic model 
 None of the demographic variables examined in Table 4.12 demonstrate a 
significant relationship with migrant-sending centrality. These measures of demographic 
conditions within a country do not have any bearing on a country‟s level of emigration. In 
Table 4.13, only life expectancy exhibits a significant relationship with refugee-sending 
centrality. Countries with higher life expectancies contribute fewer refugees to the global 
network. This relationship achieves only marginal significance in the individual analysis. 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Political Variables     
     Political repression  .280** 
(.090) 
 
   








     Conflict     .214** 
(.074) 
 
Region     













































     
R2 .053 .080 .008 .044 
N 191 177 225 225 
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Demographic variables seem to have very little effect on sending levels of either migrants 
or refugees.  
Table 4.12. OLS Regression Results for Demographic Variables on Migrant Sending 
Centrality (Valued), 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Demographic Variables     
     Fertility rate  .003 
(.099) 
 
   








     Life expectancy    -.058 
(.106) 
 
Region     













































     
R2 .010 .010 .010 .013 
N 194 203 189 195 
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Table 4.13. OLS Regression Results for Demographic Variables on Refugee Sending 
Centrality (Valued), circa 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Environmental model 
 Like the results of the demographic model, environmental conditions demonstrate 
no significant effect on levels of migration in Table 4.14. In Table 4.15, cropland under 
cultivation demonstrates a marginally significant negative effect on refugee-sending 
centrality. Countries with more land under cultivation send fewer refugees. This may be 
because potential refugees in rural areas have stronger ties to the land and are less likely 
to leave it behind.  
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Demographic Variables     
     Fertility rate  .097 
(.104) 
 
   








     Life expectancy    -.217† 
(.111) 
 
Region     













































     
R2 .007 .011 .012 .022 
N 194 203 189 195 
139 
 
Table 4.14. OLS Regression Results for Environmental Conditions on Migrant 
Sending Centrality (Valued), 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 Model 15 Model 16 
Environmental Variables   




     Cropland under cultivation  -.057 
(.074) 
 
Region   

























   
R2 .019 .023 
N 194 191 
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Table 4.15. OLS Regression Results for Environmental Conditions on Refugee 
Sending Centrality (Valued), circa 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
International model 
 Of all of the analyses of the valued sending networks, the results presented in 
Tables 4.16 and 4.17 demonstrate the highest degree of difference between the two 
networks. For the migrant network (Table 4.16), trade openness, foreign aid (ODA), and 
peripheral status all have significant negative relationships with migrant-sending 
centrality. Countries that are more open to trade may have more opportunities for 
employment, reducing the need for economic emigration. By the same token, greater 
levels of foreign aid may also contribute to greater economic opportunities at home. For 
peripheral countries, potential emigrants may not have the resources necessary to leave 
 Model 15 Model 16 
Environmental Variables   




     Cropland under cultivation  -.129† 
(.076) 
 
Region   

























   
R2 .017 .024 
N 194 191 
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the country or may not see the potential for economic opportunity in surrounding 
countries. Providing contrast to these negative relationships, INGO participation 
demonstrates a significant positive relationship with emigration. Countries that are more 
connected to the global polity through INGOs contribute more migrants to the global 
network than countries that hold fewer INGO membership ties. 
Table 4.16. OLS Regression Results for International Integration on Migrant 
Sending Centrality (Valued), 2000 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
International Variables      
     FDI penetration  .031 
(.071) 
 
    
     Trade openness  -.185* 
(.071) 
 
   












     INGO membership ties      .402*** 
(.070) 
Region      























































R2 .014 .034 .109 .191 .139 
N 193 173 149 144 223 
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Table 4.17. OLS Regression Results for International Integration on Refugee 
Sending Centrality (Valued), circa 2000 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Several noteworthy differences are presented in the refugee-sending network 
analysis (Table 4.17). FDI penetration and trade openness do not demonstrate significant 
effects on levels of refugee sending. Like the migrant network analysis, ODA has a 
significant negative effect on the levels of refugees sent and INGO participation has a 
 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
International Variables      
     FDI penetration  .009 
(.072) 
 
    
     Trade openness  -.097 
(.076) 
 
   












     INGO membership ties      .240** 
(.074) 
 
Region      























































      
R2 .010 .013 .062 .087 .051 
N 194 173 149 144 223 
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significant positive relationship. Perhaps the most important difference between the two 
networks is the effect of world system position. While non-significant in the migrant 
network model, semiperipheral status demonstrates a significant positive effect on 
refugee-sending centrality. Peripheral status also has a positive effect, a reversal of the 
relationship demonstrated in the migrant analysis. Countries in both the semiperiphery 
and the periphery contribute refugees at higher levels than countries in the core, with 
peripheral countries contributing slightly more than semiperipheral.  
Discussion of valued sending network comparisons 
 The analyses of the valued migrant and refugee-sending networks highlight a 
number of similarities between the networks. The economic models show that centrality 
in both networks is lessened by a country‟s level of internal investment. Additionally, the 
presence of political repression, political terror, and conflict all increase centrality in both 
networks, although at higher levels for refugees than migrants. Finally, both demographic 
variables and environmental conditions have very little effect on centrality in either 
network. The marginal significance of life expectancy and cropland under cultivation in 
refugee analyses are the only exceptions to these results. The international model also 
presents some similarities. FDI penetration fails to achieve significance in either analysis 
and ODA and INGO participation demonstrate significant effects on both networks, the 
former having a negative relationship with centrality and the latter a positive one.  
 While a number of results in the international models are similar between the 
networks, the discovery of differential effects of some of the measures of international 
integration on centrality in the respective networks is a key finding from these 
comparisons. Trade openness reduces migrant-sending centrality, but demonstrates no 
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effect on refugee-sending centrality. Greater trade may create internal conditions that 
present greater economic opportunities for potential emigrants, reducing the perceived 
benefit of moving to another country. It may be that these domestic economic 
opportunities are not enough to keep potential refugees from moving when internal 
conditions call for refugee movements or that countries with higher potential for refugee 
outflows do not attract levels of trade that would generate sufficient economic 
opportunities to dissuade potential refugees from moving. Whatever the case, this 
presents a clear difference between the networks.  
 The final difference observed between the networks is the effect of world system 
position on sending centrality. For the migration network, semiperipheral status fails to 
reach significance, while peripheral status has a significant negative relationship with 
migrant-sending centrality. Countries in the semiperiphery are not significantly different 
from core countries in their levels of emigration, and peripheral countries send fewer 
emigrants than those in the core. Residents of peripheral countries may be constrained by 
a lack of economic or social resources necessary for an economic migration (Piore 1979). 
In contrast to their effect on migrant-sending centrality, the world system measures both 
demonstrate significant positive relationships with refugee-sending centrality. Both 
semiperipheral and periphery countries send more refugees, relative to countries in the 
core. Of these, peripheral countries send at the highest level. This result is largely a 
function of a very low level of refugee sending among core countries coupled with high 
levels of refugees contributed by a handful of countries in the semiperiphery and 
periphery (see Figures 4.2 and 4.9).  
145 
 
 These findings present a mixed bag with respect to the predictions offered in 
Chapter Two. Many of the predicted relationships failed to materialize in these analyses 
(economic growth, urban population, demographic variables, FDI penetration) or failed 
to emerge in both networks as predicted (secondary enrollment, state collapse, 
environmental conditions). Of the relationships that did emerge, several demonstrated the 
opposite of the predicted effect. State strength reduces centrality in both networks; 
conflict increases centrality in both networks; and INGO participation increases centrality 
across networks. While peripheral status performs in the expected direction with refugee-
sending centrality, showing a positive relationship, the negative relationship it 
demonstrates with migrant-sending centrality is the opposite of the predicted effect. Of 
the two variables that were not expected to have an effect on centrality scores in these 
networks, only GDP per capita acted as predicted. While semiperipheral status did not 
demonstrate a significant effect on migrant-sending centrality (as predicted), it did have a 
significant effect on refugee-sending centrality, an unexpected finding. Of the hypotheses 
generated for the comparisons of these networks, only trade openness had the exact 
relationships predicted earlier.  
Comparison of the valued receiving networks 
 Analyses of the valued migrant-receiving and refugee-receiving networks are 
presented in Tables 4.18 through 4.27. Each table progresses like those in the previous 
comparisons with individual models for each variable estimated net of regional variation. 
Like the comparisons of the valued network, tables are presented in pairs for comparison 
with the migrant network analyses followed by the refugee. The effects of economic 
variables on network centrality are presented in Tables 4.18 and 4.19; political variables 
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in Tables 4.20 and 4.21; demographic in Tables 4.22 and 4.23; environmental in Tables 
4.24 and 4.25; and, finally, variables examining the effects of international integration in 
tables 4.26 and 4.27. Each comparison includes a brief presentation of the results, with an 
expanded discussion following the full set of comparisons.  
Economic model 
 Table 4.18 presents the effects of regional variation (Model 1) and economic 
variables on centrality in the migrant-receiving network. Among the regions, Latin 
America, Africa, and Asia exhibit significant negative relationships with migrant-
receiving centrality. These regions receive fewer migrants than the advanced countries in 
Western Europe and North America (see Figure 4.10). These relationships are robust, 
maintaining significance across all of the models in this analysis. Among the economic 
variables, only state strength gains a measure (albeit marginal) of significance. Stronger 
states receive fewer migrants. This relationship persists at a slightly stronger level in the 
full model. GDP per capita, economic growth, urban population, and secondary education 
all fail to reach significance. 
 Many of the same patterns are present in the economic analysis of the refugee-
receiving network (Table 4.19). In the regional model, Latin America, Africa, and Asia 
all demonstrate significant negative relationships, reflecting their status as low receivers 
relative to the West and other regions (see Figure 4.10). These relationships are less 








Table 4.18. OLS Regression Results for Economic Conditions on Migrant Receiving 
Centrality (Valued), 2000 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Economic Variables       
     GDP per capita  -.087 
(.094) 
 
    
     State strength   -.149† 
(.070) 
 
   








     Secondary enrollment      -.077 
(.102) 
 
Region       



































































       
R2 .052 .049 .071 .052 .042 .085 
N 225 189 172 175 203 165 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 




Table 4.19. OLS Regression Results for Economic Conditions on Refugee Receiving 
Centrality (Valued), circa 2000 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 Reflecting the results of the analysis of the refugee valued sending network, state 
strength is the only economic variable to achieve significance, demonstrating a strong 
negative effect on refugee-receiving centrality. As in the analysis of the migrant valued 
sending network, GDP per capita, economic growth, urban population, and secondary 
enrollment all fail to exhibit significant independent effects on refugee receiving 
centrality.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Economic Variables       
    GDP per capita  -.147 
(.101) 
 
    
     State strength   -.235** 
(.077) 
 
   








     Secondary enrollment      -.160 
(.113) 
 
Region       

































































       
R2 .028 .041 .076 .021 .019 .042 




Table 4.20. OLS Regression Results for Political Conditions on Migrant Receiving 
Centrality (Valued), 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Political Variables     
     Political repression  .138 
(.086) 
 
   








     Conflict     .168* 
(.073) 
 
Region     













































     
R2 .061 .064 .052 .075 
N 191 177 225 225 
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Table 4.21. OLS Regression Results for Political Conditions on Refugee Receiving 
Centrality (Valued), circa 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 Results for the analysis of the effects of political conditions on receiving 
centrality are presented in Tables 4.20 and 4.21. Both networks show very similar 
patterns with respect to these variables. Repression and collapse fail to demonstrate 
significant effects on receiving centrality in either network. However, conflict has a 
significant positive relationship with centrality in both analyses. Countries engaged in 
conflict have more immigrants and more refugees than those without conflict. The lone 
difference between these networks is in the effect of political terror. This measure 
achieves marginal significance in the refugee analysis, demonstrating that countries with 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Political Variables     
     Political repression  .107 
(.093) 
   
Political terror   .139† 
(.081) 
  
     Collapse   -.038 
(.068) 
 
     Conflict     .207** 
(.074) 
 
Region     













































     
R2 .030 .043 .029 .062 
N 191 177 225 225 
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higher levels of political terror are more central in the refugee-receiving network. The 
presence of this relationship provides evidence that refugees may have a reduced ability 
to choose a destination, relative to migrants, thus moving from one difficult human rights 
situation into another.  
Demographic model 
Table 4.22. OLS Regression Results for Demographic Variables on Migrant 
Receiving Centrality (Valued), 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 




 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Demographic Variables     
     Fertility rate -.155 
(.093) 
 
   








     Life expectancy     .055 
(.101) 
 
Region     













































     
R2 .078 .052 .056 .069 
N 194 203 189 195 
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Table 4.23. OLS Regression Results for Demographic Variables on Refugee 
Receiving Centrality (Valued), circa 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 Tables 4.22 and 4.23 present the effects of demographic variables on centrality 
scores for the migrant and refugee-receiving networks, respectively. Neither analysis 
includes a significant effect for a demographic variable with receiving centrality in either 
network, demonstrating a clear lack of connection between population issues and receipt 
of immigrants or refugees.  
 
 
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Demographic Variables     
     Fertility rate -.005 
(.103) 
 
   








     Life expectancy    -.014 
(.111) 
 
Region     













































     
R2 .033 .028 .028 .033 




 In Table 4.24, neither CO2 per capita nor cropland under cultivation demonstrates 
a significant relationship with migrant-receiving centrality. In contrast, both achieve 
marginal significance with the refugee-receiving network, demonstrating negative 
relationships with refugee-receiving centrality. It is possible that these variables are 
serving as proxies for level of development, which could explain the significance and 
direction of the effects exhibited in these models.  
Table 4.24. OLS Regression Results for Environmental Conditions on Migrant 
Receiving Centrality (Valued), 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 
 Model 15 Model 16 
Environmental Variables   




     Cropland under cultivation  -.093 
(.073) 
 
Region   

























   
R2 .061 .096 
N 194 191 
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Table 4.25. OLS Regression Results for Environmental Conditions on Refugee 
Receiving Centrality (Valued), circa 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
International model 
 The international integration models, presented in Tables 4.26 and 4.27, 
demonstrate a number of similarities between the two networks. Neither FDI penetration 
nor trade openness manages to reach significance with centrality in either network. ODA 
has a significant negative relationship with both migrant and refugee receiving centrality, 
at similar levels. INGO participation has a significant positive relationship with centrality 
in both networks, with a stronger effect on migrant-receiving centrality than refugee 
centrality (.443 and .334, respectively). The key difference among these relationships is 
again found in the effects of world system position on centrality. For the migrant-
 Model 15 Model 16 
Environmental Variables    




     Cropland under cultivation  -.126† 
(.074) 
 
Region   

























   
R2 .044 .063 
N 194 191 
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receiving network (Table 4.26), countries in the semiperiphery and the periphery receive 
fewer migrants than the core, with the periphery showing the stronger negative 
relationship of the two. In the refugee analysis, only the periphery demonstrates a 
significant relationship with centrality. While peripheral countries receive fewer refugees 
than the core, the level of refugees received by countries in the semiperiphery is not 
significantly different than that of the core.  
Table 4.26. OLS Regression Results for International Integration on Migrant 
Receiving Centrality (Valued), 2000 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
International Variables      
     FDI penetration  .032 
(.067) 
    
     Trade openness  -.118 
(.072) 
 
   








     Periphery    -.611*** 
(.065) 
 
     INGO membership ties      .443*** 
(.068) 
Region      


























































 .071 .064 .066 .316 .205 
N 194 173 149 144 223 
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Table 4.27. OLS Regression Results for International Integration on Refugee 
Receiving Centrality (Valued), circa 2000 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Discussion of valued receiving network comparisons 
 This comparison of the effects of factors on centrality in the valued migrant-
receiving and refugee-receiving networks shows a high degree of similarity between the 
two. In the economic analysis, centrality in both networks is reduced by state strength, 
 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
International Variables       
     FDI penetration  .034 
(.073) 
 
    
     Trade openness  -.130 
(.078) 
 
   












     INGO membership ties      .334*** 
(.072) 
 
Region      























































      
R2 .034 .041 .069 .122 .113 
N 194 173 149 144 223 
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while GDP, growth, and other development measures fail to exert independent effects. 
Similarities also present themselves in the political model, where conflict is positively 
related to centrality in both models and political repression and collapse fail to 
demonstrate relationships. The lack of effect demonstrated by demographic variables on 
either network is another key area of similarity. Finally, in the international model, FDI 
penetration, trade openness, ODA, peripheral status, and INGO participation all 
demonstrate similar effects across both analyses.  
 While a good deal of the effects of variables (or lack thereof) in these analyses is 
similar across networks, a number of differences do occur. In the political analyses, the 
political terror measure demonstrates a marginally significant positive relationship with 
refugee-receiving centrality that does not exist in the migrant analysis. Countries with 
poor human rights records receive more refugees than more positive human rights 
regimes. This finding may provide evidence for the importance of proximity in refugee 
destination choices or may indicate that refugees have less time and ability to evaluate 
potential destinations based on these kinds of elements than migrants.  
 The negative effects on refugee-receiving centrality demonstrated by 
environmental variables are another area of difference. These variables fail to reach 
significance in the migrant analysis, but have marginally significant negative 
relationships in the refugee analysis. The effect of CO2 persists into the full 
environmental model. While it is difficult to discern a theoretical reason for these 
relationships, their presence in these models indicates a clear distinction between 
migrants and refugees in conditions within destination countries. 
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 The effects of semiperipheral status on receiving centrality differ across networks, 
as well. Countries in the semiperiphery receive fewer migrants, relative to the core, but 
show no difference in refugees received. Most countries participate in the migrant-
receiving network, but core (primarily Western) countries receive a much higher 
percentage of migrants than those in the semiperiphery or periphery (see Figures 4.3 and 
4.10). This distinction, however, is less clear in the refugee-receiving network, partially 
due to lower levels of participation by core countries. As core countries become more 
selective about refugee-receiving policies, the overflows from these countries often find 
their way to less-developed countries in the semiperiphery that are more open (Betts 
2008). The difference presented in these analyses provides evidence for this scenario.  
 Like the valued sending analysis, a number of predicted relationships in the 
valued receiving analysis failed to emerge. GDP per capita, economic growth, 
enrollment, urbanization, political repression, collapse, fertility, density, CO2, and FDI 
penetration all fail to demonstrate relationships of any kind in these models. While state 
strength does have significant relationships with both networks, they are negative, the 
opposite of the predicted direction. The opposite of predicted effects are also observed for 
conflict in the migrant model, ODA in the refugee model, and semiperipheral status in the 
migrant model. This analysis also demonstrates a number of correct predictions, with 
conflict and trade acting as expected in the refugee models and INGO participation and 
peripheral status demonstrating predicted relationships in both models.  
Comparison of the dichotomized sending networks 
Analyses of the dichotomized migrant-sending and refugee-sending networks are 
presented in Tables 4.28 through 4.37. Each table progresses in a similar fashion to those 
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in the previous comparisons with individual models for each variable, net of regional 
variation. Like the comparisons of the valued networks, tables are presented in pairs for 
comparison with the migrant network analyses followed by the refugee. The effects of 
economic variables on network centrality are presented in Tables 4.28 and 4.29; political 
variables in Tables 4.30 and 4.31; demographic in Tables 4.32 and 4.33; environmental in 
Tables 4.34 and 4.35; and, finally, variables examining the effects of international 
integration in tables 4.36 and 4.37. Each comparison includes a brief discussion of the 
results, with an expanded discussion following the full set of comparisons.  
Economic Model 
 The effects of regional variation (Model 1) and economic variables on the 
dichotomized migrant-sending network are presented in Table 4.28. The regional 
variables are consistently non-significant in the base model and across all economic 
models. This reflects the lack of regional variation demonstrated in Figure 4.11. Among 
the economic variables, this lack of significant effect persists. None of the economic 
variables demonstrates a significant relationship with dichotomized migrant-sending 
centrality. Generally, economic conditions do not influence centrality in this network.  
The effects of these variables on the dichotomized refugee-sending network, 
presented in Table 4.29, tell a different tale. While the regional variables fail to reach 
significance in any of these models, relationships are present among the economic 
variables. State strength and secondary enrollment both have significant negative 
relationships with centrality in the dichotomized refugee-sending network. Strong states 
and countries with higher levels of secondary enrollment send refugees to fewer partners 
than countries with lower scores for these variables. In the full model, the effect of state 
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strength does not persist; however, education remains (marginally) significant and urban 
population becomes marginally significant. The significant effects of these economic 
variables mark an important difference between the migrant and refugee networks.  
Table 4.28. OLS Regression Results for Economic Conditions on Migrant Sending 
Centrality (Dichotomized), 2000 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Economic Variables       
     GDP per capita  -.112 
(.087) 
 
    
     State strength   -.085 
(.068) 
 
   








     Secondary enrollment      -.092 
(.097) 
 
Region       

































































       
R2 .027 .020 .019 .020 .015 .019 
N 225 189 172 175 203 165 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 




Table 4.29. OLS Regression Results for Economic Conditions on Refugee Sending 
Centrality (Dichotomized), circa 2000 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Political model 
 Table 4.30 presents results for analyses of the effects of political variables on 
dichotomized migrant-sending centrality. Like the migrant results of the economic 
models, relationships are largely non-significant. Only conflict demonstrates a marginally 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Economic Variables       
     GDP per capita  -.095 
(.099) 
 
    
     State strength   -.160* 
(.073) 
 
   








     Secondary enrollment      -.304** 
(.109) 
 
Region       

































































       
R2 .027 .022 .026 .021 .021 .047 
N 225 189 172 175 203 165 
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significant positive relationship with sending centrality. Countries that experienced 
conflict in 2000 sent migrants to more partners than those that did not. 
Table 4.30. OLS Regression Results for Political Conditions on Migrant Sending 
Centrality (Dichotomized), 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Political Variables     
     Political repression  .117 
(.077) 
 
   








     Conflict     .131† 
(.074) 
 
Region     













































R2 .021 .018 .030 .041 
N 191 177 225 225 
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Table 4.31. OLS Regression Results for Political Conditions on Refugee Sending 
Centrality (Dichotomized), circa 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 In contrast to the migrant results, political variables demonstrate a number of 
significant relationships with centrality in the dichotomized refugee-sending network. 
These results are presented in Table 4.31. Countries that experience higher levels of 
political repression, political terror, and conflict send refugees to more partners than those 
with greater freedom, better human rights records, and no conflict. These effects are 
similar in strength with political terror as the strongest (.260), followed by political 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Political Variables     
     Political repression  .205* 
(.089) 
 
   








     Conflict     .174* 
(.074) 
 
Region     













































     
R2 .031 .055 .027 .051 
N 191 177 225 225 
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repression (.205), and conflict (.174). Collapse does not demonstrate a significant effect 
on refugee-sending centrality.  
Demographic model 
Table 4.32. OLS Regression Results for Demographic Variables on Migrant Sending 
Centrality (Dichotomized), 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Demographic Variables     
     Fertility rate -.006 
(.092) 
   
     Population density   .000 
(.065) 
  
Infant mortality   -.004 
(.091) 
 
     Life expectancy    -.039 
(.099) 
Region     













































R2 .015 .015 .015 .017 
N 194 202 189 195 
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Table 4.33. OLS Regression Results for Demographic Variables on Refugee Sending 
Centrality (Dichotomized), circa 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 The results of examination of demographic variables on centrality in the 
dichotomized migrant and refuge-receiving networks are presented in Tables 4.32 and 
4.33, respectively. Both tables clearly demonstrate a lack of relationship between these 
variables and centrality in either network. Demographic factors do not influence the 
number of partners to which countries send migrants or refugees.  
 
 
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Demographic Variables     
     Fertility rate -.018 
(.103) 
 
   








     Life expectancy    -.130 
(.110) 
 
Region     













































     
R2 .011 .020 .009 .020 




 As in the examination of the effects of Demographic Variables, the results of 
examining environmental effects on dichotomized sending centrality (presented in Tables 
4.34 and 4.35) show that these factors do not influence levels of sending in either 
network. A country‟s number of migrant or refugee destinations is not affected by 
environmental conditions within the sending country.  
Table 4.34. OLS Regression Results for Environmental Conditions on Migrant 
Sending Centrality (Dichotomized), 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 
 Model 15 Model 16 
Environmental Variables   




     Cropland under cultivation  -.071 
(.071) 
 
Region   

























   
R2 .021 .030 
N 194 191 
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Table 4.35. OLS Regression Results for Environmental Conditions on Refugee 
Sending Centrality (Dichotomized), circa 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
International model 
 Tables 4.36 and 4.37 present a number of similarities between the effects of 
international integration on centrality in the migrant and refugee networks. Neither FDI 
penetration nor trade openness demonstrates a significant effect on centrality scores. 
Regional variation also fails to achieve significance in any of these models. ODA has a 
significant negative effect on centrality in both networks, demonstrating that foreign aid 
reduces the number of partners to which countries send migrants and refugees. Potential 
migrants or refugees in these countries may not have the means to make international 
moves or aid may create conditions within potential high-sending countries that make it 
 Model 15 Model 16 
Environmental Variables   




     Cropland under cultivation  -.094 
(.074) 
 
Region   

























   
R2 .024 .030 
N 194 191 
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more favorable for potential migrants or refugees to stay, rather than emigrate. 
Contrasting the effect of ODA, INGO participation demonstrates a significant positive 
effect on both sets of centrality scores. Higher levels of integration in the world polity 
may create networks that increase potential destinations for migrants or refugees.  
 The effect of world system position on centrality is the most interesting difference 
between networks presented in these results. For the dichotomized migrant-sending 
network (Table 4.36), semiperipheral status is not significant, while peripheral status has 
a significant negative relationship with centrality. Countries in the semiperiphery send 
migrants to partners at a similar rate to countries in the core, while peripheral countries 
send to fewer partners. The effects of world system position on centrality in the 
dichotomized refugee-sending network (Table 4.37) are quite different. Both 
semiperipheral and peripheral status demonstrate significant positive relationships with 
refugee-sending centrality. Countries at these positions send refugee to more partners 
than their counterparts in the core, with peripheral countries having more partners than 
those in the semiperiphery.  
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Table 4.36. OLS Regression Results for International Integration on Migrant 
Sending Centrality (Dichotomized), 2000 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
  
 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
International Variables       
     FDI penetration  .096 
(.066) 
 
    
     Trade openness  -.124 
(.064) 
 
   












     INGO membership ties      .410*** 
(.068) 
 
Region      























































R2 .027 .021 .103 .132 .152 
N 194 173 149 144 223 
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Table 4.37. OLS Regression Results for International Integration on Refugee 
Sending Centrality (Dichotomized), circa 2000 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Discussion of dichotomized sending network comparisons 
 The comparison of these networks is marked by both similarities and important 
differences. Demographic and environmental factors in sending countries do not affect 
sending centrality in either network. Regional variation shows very little effect on either 
 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
International Variables       
     FDI penetration  .038 
(.071) 
 
    
     Trade openness  -.096 
(.075) 
 
   












     INGO membership ties      .306*** 
(.072) 
 
Region      























































      
R2 .021 .017 .101 .097 .096 
N 194 173 149 144 223 
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network across most models. Additionally, GDP per capita, economic growth, urban 
population, state collapse, FDI penetration, and trade openness fail to demonstrate 
significant relationships with dichotomized sending centrality. Many of the variables that 
do have effects on centrality affect both networks in similar ways, particularly in the 
international model. ODA and INGO participation demonstrate similar relationships with 
centrality in both networks. 
 While a number of similarities exist between these networks, the comparisons 
reveal a number of ways in which centrality scores are affected differently by variables in 
these models. In the economic model, state strength and education both reduce sending 
centrality in the refugee network, while demonstrating no effect on migrant centrality. 
While strong states are associated with fewer sent refugees (Table 4.9), they also send 
fewer migrants (Table 4.8). However, as there are far fewer refugees in the global 
network compared to migrants (see Table 4.3), there are also fewer potential sending ties. 
This reduced level of activity may allow for elements like state strength to demonstrate a 
significant effect in this less active network. It may also be that residents of stronger 
states who choose to move as refugees have more ability to choose their host, thus 
eliminating less desirable destination options. The effect of enrollment levels may reflect 
the presence of a more educated population or greater levels of stability that allow for 
more students to participate in school. Either of these could lead to reduced refugee 
flows.  
 The political models demonstrate the greatest level of difference between the 
networks. While the migrant analysis (Table 4.30) shows that only conflict has a 
significant effect on sending centrality, political repression, political terror, and conflict 
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all have significant relationships with refugee-sending centrality (Table 4.31). These are 
not surprising findings, but they mark important differences between the networks. 
Refugee sending ties are affected by internal political conditions in the sending country, 
while migrant ties are largely not. Many of the countries that experience these conditions 
have done so for an extended period of time, creating opportunities for refugees to move 
to more varied destinations as potential hosts become more or less receptive to refugees 
or as refugees move from one location to another.  
 The differential effects of world system position on centrality are a final important 
difference between these networks. Countries in the periphery send migrants to fewer 
partners than countries in the core. It may be that migrants from these countries have 
fewer resources to migrate across long distances or that there are fewer established 
networks through which migrants from poor countries move. In contrast, peripheral 
countries have more refugee-sending ties than core countries. This is largely a product of 
the volume of refugees sent by poor countries, relative to their wealthier counterparts. It 
may also reflect the ability of refugees from core countries to choose destinations in other 
core countries while refugees from the periphery tend to reach destinations based on 
proximity, placement by INGOs or other organizations, family networks, or limits placed 
by receiving policies. These factors result in the potential for greater dispersion.  
 Differences in the effect of semiperipheral status also emerge between these 
networks. While being in the semiperiphery has no effect on migrant-sending centrality, 
semiperipheral countries are more central in the dichotomized refugee-sending network 
than their counterparts in the core. Core countries contribute very few refugees to the 
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network and, therefore, hold very few ties. As semiperipheral countries contribute more 
refugees, they have greater potential for sending ties, potential that appears to be realized.  
 Many of the predicted relationships for these analyses are realized in these results. 
GDP per capita and state strength; enrollment, political repression, political terror, and 
conflict in the refugee models; ODA and INGO participation in the migrant models; and 
peripheral status all demonstrate significant relationships in the predicted directions. Like 
previous analyses, a number of variables operate in the opposite of the predicted 
direction. In refugee models, the effects ODA, and INGO participation are the reverse of 
predictions, as is that of conflict in the migrant model. While semiperiphery was not 
expected to affect these centrality scores, it demonstrates a positive effect on refugee-
sending centrality. Economic growth, urbanization, collapse, demographic variables, 
environmental conditions, FDI penetration and trade openness all fail to achieve 
predicted relationships across these models.  
Comparison of the dichotomized receiving networks. 
 The final set of comparisons examines effects on centrality in the dichotomized 
migrant-receiving and refugee-receiving networks. Results of these analyses are 
presented in Tables 4.38 through 4.47. Each table progresses like those in the previous 
comparisons with individual models for each variable, net of regional variation. Like the 
comparisons of the valued network, tables are presented in pairs for comparison with the 
migrant network analyses followed by the refugee. The effects of economic variables on 
network centrality are presented in Tables 4.38 and 4.39; political variables in Tables 
4.40 and 4.41; demographic in Tables 4.42 and 4.43; environmental in Tables 4.44 and 
4.45; and, finally, variables examining the effects of international integration in Tables 
174 
 
4.46 and 4.47. Each comparison includes a brief discussion of the results, with an 
expanded discussion following the full set of comparisons.  
Economic model 
Table 4.38. OLS Regression Results for Economic Conditions on Migrant Receiving 
Centrality (Dichotomized), 2000 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Economic Variables        
     GDP per capita  -.062 
(.089) 
 
    
     State strength   -.115 
(.051) 
 
   








     Secondary enrollment      -.018 
(.084) 
 
Region       

































































       
R2 .011 .012 .028 .016 .014 .020 
N 224 188 171 174 202 164 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 




Table 4.39. OLS Regression Results for Economic Conditions on Refugee Receiving 
Centrality (Dichotomized), circa 2000 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 Results of analyses examining the effects of economic variables on dichotomized 
migrant and refugee-receiving centrality are presented in Tables 4.38 and 4.39, 
respectively. The migrant results show that there are no significant effects of regional 
variation or economic conditions on migrant-receiving centrality. The results with 
refugee-receiving centrality fare little better. Among the regional variables, Latin 
America and Asia have marginally significant negative relationships with centrality, 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Economic Variables       
     GDP per capita  -.138 
(.101) 
 
    
     State strength   -.149† 
(.078) 
 
   








     Secondary enrollment      -.080 
(.113) 
 
Region       

































































       
R2 .028 .032 .039 .032 .019 .040 
N 225 189 172 175 203 165 
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confirming that these regions hold fewer receiving ties relative to countries in the more 
developed West (see Figure 4.12). The significance of regional variation comes and goes 
across models, occasionally including Sub-Saharan Africa (Models 2 and 3), but rarely 
reaches significance at the .05 level. Among the economic variables, only state strength 
demonstrates any level of significance, and then only at a marginal level. GDP per capita, 
economic growth, urban population, and secondary enrollment do not influence refugee-
receiving ties in individual models.  
Political models 
 Results of analyses of the effects of political variables on dichotomized migrant 
and refugee receiving centrality show a high degree of similarity between the networks. 
In individual models, political repression, political terror, and collapse all fail to reach 
significance with either centrality measure. However, conflict demonstrates a significant 
positive effect on receiving centrality for both networks. Countries that experienced 
conflict during this period received more migrants and refugees than those that did not. 
Beyond these similarities, regional variation presents a key difference. As in the 
economic model, none of the regional variables have significant relationships with 
migrant centrality, while Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe 
all move in and out of significance in different models of the refugee analysis. Each of 
these receives refugees from fewer partners than the West.  
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Table 4.40. OLS Regression Results for Political Conditions on Migrant Receiving 
Centrality (Dichotomized), 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Political Variables     
     Political repression  .054 
(.069) 
 
   








     Conflict     .141† 
(.075) 
 
Region     













































R2 .013 .016 .014 .027 
N 190 176 224 224 
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Table 4.41. OLS Regression Results for Political Conditions on Refugee Receiving 
Centrality (Dichotomized), circa 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Demographic models 
As in the analyses of centrality in the dichotomized migrant and refugee-sending 
networks, demographic variables consistently fail to demonstrate significant relationships 
with centrality in the dichotomized migrant-receiving and refugee-receiving networks. 
Results of these analyses – presented in Tables 4.42 and 4.43 – show that the only 
significant effects are those of regional variation that have been observed in previous 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Political Variables     
     Political repression  .095 
(.092) 
 
   








     Conflict     .133† 
(.074) 
 
Region     













































     
R2 .024 .037 .037 .042 
N 191 177 225 225 
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analyses of the refugee-receiving network. Fertility, population density, infant mortality, 
and life expectancy do not affect centrality in these networks. 
Table 4.42. OLS Regression Results for Demographic Variables on Migrant 
Receiving Centrality (Dichotomized), 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Demographic Variables     
     Fertility rate -.031 
(.090) 
 
   








     Life expectancy     .030 
(.096) 
 
Region     













































     
R2 .012 .012 .017 .012 
N 193 202 188 194 
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Table 4.43. OLS Regression Results for Demographic Variables on Refugee 
Receiving Centrality (Dichotomized), circa 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Environmental model 
 Tables 4.44 and 4.45 present the results of examinations of the effects of 
environmental variables on receiving centrality in the dichotomized migrant and refugee 
networks. In the migrant analysis (Table 4.44), neither CO2per capita nor cropland under 
cultivation demonstrates a significant effect on receiving centrality. These environmental 
conditions do not influence the number of migrant-receiving partners held by countries.  
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Demographic Variables     
     Fertility rate -.032 
(.103) 
 
   








     Life expectancy     .013 
(.110) 
 
Region     













































     
R2 .029 .029 .022 .031 
N 194 203 189 195 
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 In contrast, the refugee analysis (Table 4.45) demonstrates that these variables do 
affect levels of refugee-receiving ties held by countries. Both CO2per capita and cropland 
under cultivation have significant negative relationships with refugee-receiving 
centrality, although CO2per capita is only marginally significant. Both of these 
environmental conditions reduce the number of receiving ties held by refugee-receiving 
countries.  
Table 4.44. OLS Regression Results for Environmental Conditions on Migrant 
Receiving Centrality (Dichotomized), 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 Model 15 Model 16 
Environmental Variables   




     Cropland under cultivation  -.072 
(.078) 
 
Region   

























   
R2 .010 .022 
N 193 190 
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Table 4.45. OLS Regression Results for Environmental Conditions on Refugee 
Receiving Centrality (Dichotomized), circa 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
International model 
 The effects of international variables on centrality in the respective receiving 
networks exhibit a number of differences between the two. As in previous models, 
regional variation is only significant in the refugee analysis, with several regions moving 
in and out of significance in different models. When comparing models, several 
differences emerge. Trade openness and ODA are not significant in the migrant analysis, 
but both demonstrate significant (marginally so for trade openness) negative relationships 
with centrality in the dichotomized refugee-receiving network. Global trade integration 
and receipt of development assistance reduce the number of refugee receiving ties held 
 Model 15 Model 16 
Environmental Variables   




     Cropland under cultivation  -.177* 
(.074) 
 
Region   

























   
R2 .049 .068 
N 194 191 
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by countries. As in comparisons of the dichotomized sending networks, world system 
position demonstrates different effects on migrant and refugee-receiving centrality. In the 
migrant analysis, only peripheral status has a significant effect on receiving centrality; 
countries in the periphery have fewer receiving ties than countries in the core. By 
contrast, both peripheral and semiperipheral status have a significant negative effect on 
levels of refugee-receiving ties.  
Table 4.46. OLS Regression Results for International Integration on Migrant 
Receiving Centrality (Dichotomized), 2000 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
International Variables      
     FDI penetration -.068 
(.051) 
 
    
     Trade openness  -.019 
(.071) 
 
   
     ODA   -.072 
(.065) 
  








     INGO membership ties      .342*** 
(.073) 
Region      























































R2 .018 .016 .030 .077 .104 
N 193 172 149 143 222 
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Table 4.47. OLS Regression Results for International Integration on Refugee 
Receiving Centrality (Dichotomized), circa 2000 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
While differences occur across models, similarities exist as well. As in previous 
comparisons, FDI penetration fails to demonstrate a significant effect in either analysis. 
Additionally, INGO participation has a significant positive relationship with centrality in 
both networks.  
 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
International Variables      
     FDI penetration  .038 
(.073) 
 
    
     Trade openness  -.136† 
(.078) 
 
   












     INGO membership ties      .355*** 
(.071) 
 
Region      























































      
R2 .027 .039 .104 .251 .125 
N 194 173 149 144 223 
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Discussion of dichotomized receiving network comparisons 
 The comparison of the effects of domestic conditions and international integration 
on centrality in the dichotomized migrant-receiving and refugee-receiving networks 
reveals a number of similarities and differences between the two. Among the economic 
variables, GDP per capita, economic growth, urban population, and secondary enrollment 
all fail to reach significance with centrality in either network. Political models in these 
analyses are also identical across networks. Political repression, political terror, and 
collapse all fail to achieve significance, but conflict demonstrates a marginally significant 
relationship with both migrant and refugee-receiving centrality. The demographic models 
are also identical, demonstrating no significant effects of demographic variables on 
dichotomized receiving centrality in either network. Finally, FDI penetration and INGO 
participation affect centrality similarly in the international model with the former having 
no effect and the latter increasing centrality in both networks. Greater participation in the 
global polity through INGOs may create larger potential receiving networks as countries 
connect through participation in organizations. It is also possible that scripts are dispersed 
through these institutions that value openness to migration from as many partners as 
possible, potentially increasing the willingness of countries to receive both migrants and 
refugees more widely. Interestingly, findings in Chapter Three demonstrate that this 
willingness to receive refugees from many partners does not necessary indicate a 
willingness to receive large numbers of refugees (see Table 3.17). 
 While there are many similarities between effects on centrality in these networks, 
key differences emerge as well. Regional variation is consistently different between the 
networks. Regional variables fail to reach significance with dichotomized migrant-
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receiving centrality in almost every model. This reflects the lack of regional variation in 
this network depicted in Figure 4.12. By contrast, several of the regional variables move 
in and out of significance across models in all of the analyses. While the Middle East is 
not significant in any of the models, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and 
Eastern Europe all demonstrate significant negative relationships with dichotomized 
refugee-receiving centrality at different points in the analysis.  
 While relatively minor, the differential effect of state strength in the economic 
model represents a clear difference between the networks. Stronger states receive 
refugees from fewer partners, perhaps indicating a greater level of control over the 
receiving process in these countries. Whatever the case, these results differentiate the 
refugee network from the migrant network.  
 One of the clearest differences between these networks is presented in the 
environmental models. While neither of the variables has a significant effect on migrant-
receiving centrality, both CO2per capita levels and cropland under cultivation yield fewer 
refuge-receiving partners. There is no clear theoretical connection that accounts for this 
result, but it is possible that these variables are serving as proxies for levels of 
development, as many of the countries at the highest levels for these variables are smaller 
countries at medium-low to low levels of development.  
 The final key difference between the networks identified in this comparison is in 
the effects of international integration variables on centrality in the networks. While 
similarities exist in the effects of FDI and INGOs on the networks, key differences also 
present themselves. Trade openness and ODA exhibit significant negative effects on 
refugee-receiving centrality that are not present in the migrant models. Greater trade 
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participation and the receipt of foreign aid yield fewer refugee-receiving ties. The aid 
finding is more easily interpreted, as countries that need to receive foreign aid are less 
attractive destinations for refugees and may, therefore, only attract refugees from 
countries in close proximity who have little autonomy in destination decisions. The trade 
finding is more difficult to interpret. Countries that participate at higher levels in the 
global trade network receive refugees from fewer partners. While some of the most active 
countries in global trade receive refugees at high levels (see Table 3.14), many countries 
at high and medium levels of activity are less active in receiving refugees. This finding is 
consistent with these realities as the volume of lesser receiving countries may negate the 
influence of high-trade, high-receiving countries.  
 In addition to trade and ODA, the networks differ in the effects of world system 
position on centrality. In the migrant network, only peripheral status has a significant 
relationship. Countries in the periphery hold fewer receiving ties relative to the core. 
These countries would be less attractive destinations to migrants, who tend to move for 
education or economic opportunities. In contrast, both semiperipheral and peripheral 
status are negatively related to dichotomized refugee-receiving centrality. This finding 
reflects the finding in Chapter Three that the top countries in receiving centrality tend to 
be wealthier, developed countries (see Table 3.14). 
 Like the analysis of the dichotomized sending networks, a number of relationships 
emerge as predicted in these results. The lack of effect of GDP per capita, infant 
mortality, and life expectancy are all as predicted. The negative effect of peripheral status 
and the positive effects of INGO participation on centrality in both networks also follow 
predicted patterns. Additionally, the effects of collapse, trade openness, and ODA on 
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refugee-receiving centrality follow predictions for these variables. Conversely, predicted 
relationships (or lack of relationship) for economic growth, urbanization, secondary 
enrollment, repression, political terror, fertility, population density, cropland under 
cultivation, and FDI penetration all proved to be incorrect in both models while 
predictions about state strength, urbanization, collapse, CO2 per capita, trade openness, 
and ODA were incorrect in the migrant models. A number of relationships presented 
themselves in the opposite of the expected direction. State strength and semiperipheral 
status had opposite relationships with refugee centrality, while conflict did so with 
migrant centrality. Two unexpected relationships emerged from the environmental 
analysis as CO2 per capita and cropland under cultivation demonstrated significant effects 
on refugee-receiving centrality.  
Comparing effects on centrality in the migrant and refugee networks 
 Tables 4.48 and 4.49 summarize the observed relationships between domestic and 
international variables and the various permutations of the migrant and refugee networks. 
Valued results are presented in Table 4.48, and dichotomized results in Table 4.49. 
Significant relationships are indicated by a + (positive relationship) or – (negative 
relationship). Models in which no significant relationship occurred are left blank. 
Looking at the differential effects of variables on centrality in the various migrant and 
refugee networks yields mixed conclusions about the extent to which these networks are 
different. While many of the effects of variables are almost identical, even to the strength 
of the effect, key differences emerge that indicate that centrality in the networks is shaped 
by different forces, making them clearly different.  
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Table 4.48. Summary of Relationships for Valued Sending and Receiving Networks 












Economic Variables     
     GDP per capita      
     State strength - - - - 
     Economic growth     
     Urban population     
     Secondary enrollment  -   
Political Variables      
     Political repression + +   
Political terror + +  + 
     Collapse     
     Conflict + + + + 
Demographic Variables     
     Fertility rate     
     Population density     
     Infant mortality     
     Life expectancy  -   
Environmental Variables     
     CO2 per capita    - 
     Cropland under cultivation  -  - 
International Variables     
     FDI penetration     
     Trade openness -    
     ODA - - - - 
Semiperiphery  + -  
     Periphery - + - - 
     INGO membership ties + + + + 
Region     
     Middle East / North Africa     
     Latin America / Caribbean   - - 
     Sub-Saharan Africa   - - 
     Asia and Pacific   - - 




Table 4.49. Summary of Relationships for Dichotomized Sending and Receiving 
Networks 












Economic Variables     
     GDP per capita      
     State strength  -  - 
     Economic growth     
     Urban population     
     Secondary enrollment  -   
Political Variables      
     Political repression  +   
Political terror  +   
     Collapse     
     Conflict + + + + 
Demographic Variables     
     Fertility rate     
     Population density     
     Infant mortality     
     Life expectancy     
Environmental Variables     
     CO2 per capita    - 
     Cropland under cultivation    - 
International Variables     
     FDI penetration     
     Trade openness    - 
     ODA - -  - 
Semiperiphery  +  - 
     Periphery - + - - 
     INGO membership ties + + + + 
Region     
     Middle East / North Africa     
     Latin America / Caribbean    - 
     Sub-Saharan Africa     
     Asia and Pacific - -  - 
     Eastern Europe / Central Asia     
 
Regional variation demonstrates different effects on the migrant and refugee 
networks based on whether the network is sending or receiving. Many of the relationships 
exhibited in these results reflect relationships portrayed in Figures 4.9 through 4.12. 
Regional variables have almost no significant relationships with centrality in the migrant 
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and refugee sending networks, whether valued or dichotomized. Levels of outward flows 
and ties are not determined by region. However, centrality in the receiving networks is 
affected, to different degrees, by regional variation. In the valued migrant-receiving 
network, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia demonstrate consistent significant 
negative relationships with centrality across models. These regions receive fewer 
migrants than the West and the relationships tend to persist in spite of the presence of 
economic, political, demographic, environmental, and international variables. While 
regional variables also have some significant effect on valued refugee-receiving network 
centrality, the significance is typically to a lesser degree and is less consistent across 
models.  
 The dichotomized receiving networks exhibit the opposite results of the valued 
networks. Regional variables demonstrate no significant relationships with the 
dichotomized migrant-receiving network. Migrant-receiving ties are not influenced by 
region. In contrast, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and (to a lesser extent) 
Eastern Europe demonstrate significant negative relationships with dichotomized 
refugee-sending centrality. In many models, these regions hold fewer refugee-receiving 
ties than the West. These relationships are less consistent across models than those in the 
valued migrant-receiving network, but occur frequently enough for this to be a noticeable 
difference between the migrant and refugee networks in these analyses.  
 The economic and development models demonstrate both similarities and 
differences between networks. State strength is significant across most of the analyses, at 
least at a marginal level. Countries with higher spending levels are less central in all of 
the refugee networks and in the valued migrant networks. Strength is not significant in 
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either of the dichotomized migrant networks, indicating that this measure impacts the 
total migrants sent and received, but not the number of partners with which they are 
traded. Another similarity in the economic models is the consistent lack of effect of GDP 
per capita or economic growth. The effect of secondary education provides a point of 
difference between migrant and refugee networks, as greater secondary enrollment has a 
significant negative relationship with refugee-sending centrality in both the valued and 
dichotomized networks, but has no significant effect on sending or receiving centrality in 
the migrant networks.  
 Like the economic models, the political models demonstrate both similarities and 
differences between migrant and refugee networks in the effects of political variables on 
centrality. The clearest similarity in the networks is in the consistent significant positive 
effect of conflict on centrality. This relationship exists in all eight networks, representing 
one of the few findings in any model that does so. Beyond the effect of conflict, the 
valued sending networks demonstrate a high degree of similarity in the effects for all of 
the political variables. Repression, political terror, and conflict all increase valued 
sending centrality in both the migrant and refugee networks. While the strength of these 
effects is somewhat higher in the refugee analysis, the relationships are the same for both. 
A final area of similarity between these networks is the consistent lack of effect of state 
collapse on centrality.  
 The clearest difference between migrant and refugee networks in these models is 
the importance of human rights in the refugee models. Political terror is significantly 
associated with centrality in three of the four refugee networks, with only the 
dichotomized sending network showing no effect. While political terror scores are 
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positively associated with valued migrant-sending centrality, this measure does not affect 
centrality in any of the other migrant networks. As the definition of refugee includes a 
fear of persecution, reflecting the potential for human rights violations, it stands to reason 
that countries with poor human rights records would contribute more refugees and ties to 
the networks. Interestingly, political terror also demonstrates a marginally significant 
positive effect on valued refugee-receiving centrality, possibly showing the lack of choice 
presented to many refugees as they move to host countries.  
 While the effects of economic and political variables have both similar and 
different effects on migrant and refugee network centrality, the effects of demographic 
variables on the networks are almost identical across all eight networks. Demographic 
variables consistently demonstrate no significant effects on centrality. The only exception 
to this finding is a marginally significant effect of life expectancy in the valued refugee-
sending network. Variation in these factors may be captured in the regional variables, or 
they may have no effect. Whatever the case, this lack of effect is a clear similarity 
between the networks.  
 The environmental models demonstrate a high degree of dissimilarity between the 
networks. While both the dichotomized migrant and refugee-sending networks fail to 
have any significant relationships with either CO2 per capita or cropland under 
cultivation, one or both of these variables are significantly related to centrality in each of 
the other refugee networks, but not in the remaining migrant networks. When significant, 
environmental conditions are negatively related to sending and receiving centrality, 
demonstrating that these factors decrease valued outflows and ties in both directions.  
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 The analyses of international models are marked by a number of similarities 
between centrality in the migrant and refugee networks, with one key difference. Across 
all networks, FDI penetration fails to reach significance and INGO participation is 
consistently significant. These variables affect centrality in each network in the same 
way, if not always at the same level. While not identical in effects, generally the network 
pairs demonstrate similar relationships with trade openness and ODA. ODA is significant 
and negative in seven of the eight models. Trade openness acts in an opposite fashion, 
becoming significant in only two of the eight models.  
 The differential effects of world system position mark the primary difference in 
effects of international variables on centrality in the migrant and refugee networks. These 
differences manifest themselves in two ways. First, semiperipheral status demonstrates 
different effects in each of the network comparisons. For the valued sending and both 
dichotomized network comparisons, semiperipheral status affects only refugee network 
centrality. In each of these networks, being in the semiperiphery increases refugee-
sending centrality and decreases refugee-receiving centrality, but has no effect on 
centrality in the migrant networks. The opposite is true of the valued receiving networks 
in which semiperipheral status demonstrates a significant relationship with migrant 
centrality but not refugee. Semiperipheral countries receive fewer migrants than the core, 
but do not differ from the core in levels of refugees received.  
 The second difference between the networks is in the direction of the effect of 
peripheral status. The periphery measure is significant in every model in the analysis. 
Peripheral status is an important contributing factor to both migrant and refugee network 
centrality. However, the effects of peripheral status differ across the migrant and refugee 
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networks in analyses of sending centrality. In models examining centrality in both the 
valued and dichotomized sending networks, peripheral status is negatively related to 
migrant-sending centrality but positively related to refugee-sending centrality. In other 
words, peripheral countries contribute fewer migrants and ties to the sending networks, 
while contributing greater numbers of refugees and sending ties. This marks perhaps the 
most critical distinction between these networks and an important area for further 
examination.  
 In evaluating the success of the hypotheses presented in Chapter Two to predict 
outcomes in this analysis, three trends emerge. First, the prediction that clear differences 
between the networks would be identified in these analyses proved to be true. Each 
pairing of the migrant and refugee networks demonstrated differences in relationships 
between variables. While some pairs showed more similarity than others, all were 
different. Second, a number of predicted relationships failed to achieve significance in 
these models. Predictions of centrality in the migrant networks failed to emerge at a 
particularly high frequency. Additionally, several predicted relationships emerged in the 
opposite direction of expectations. Upon evaluation of the descriptive and geographic 
analyses presented earlier in the chapter, most of these relationships make sense, given 
the nature of the networks involved. The final trend is that, in general, predicted 
relationships occurred as would be expected. Positive economic and development 
variables increased centrality in the receiving networks while variables capturing 
negative development outcomes (i.e., peripheral status) were associated with decreased 
centrality. Sending centrality was influenced positively by political instability and poor 
development outcomes and reduced by positive economic conditions. The key exception 
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to these expectations is the findings with respect to conflict and receiving centrality. 
Countries that experienced conflict around the year 2000 had higher receiving centrality 
across all networks relative to those that were not engaged in conflict. It is possible that 
this finding reflects high levels of migrants and refugees that moved in previous time 
periods to countries that experienced conflict, as well as the positive conflict status of 
many of the highest migrant-receiving countries during this time period (i.e., the United 
States).  
 
EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES IN THE MIGRANT AND REFUGEE NETWORKS 
 To this point, a number of differences between the migrant and refugee networks 
have been identified. However, the question remains, why are these networks different? 
Understanding elements that explain differences in centrality in these networks may shed 
light on policy and humanitarian interventions that can help countries better control flows 
of both migrants and refugees across their borders.  
 To examine the efficacy of variables in explaining differences between the 
migrant and refugee network, a final series of ordinary least squares regressions was 
performed. For each of the four networks (valued sending and receiving, dichotomized 
sending and receiving), the refugee network was regressed on the migrant network with 
the residual from each regression saved as a new variable. This residual represents the 
unexplained difference between the two networks. Each set of residual scores was then 
used as the dependent variable in a series of regressions designed to examine 
relationships between economic, political, demographic, environmental, and international 
variables and these residuals. Significant relationships indicate areas in which the refugee 
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centrality scores for a country are different than what would be expected, given the 
migrant centrality score for that country. Models proceed as they did in the previous 
analyses with each table presenting individual relationships, net of regional variation.  
It is expected that a number of variables will demonstrate significant relationships 
with these residual scores. Specifically, regional variation is expected to be significant, 
particularly among the receiving networks. Additionally, it is expected that positive 
economic and development variables will lead to lower than expected refugee-sending 
centrality while instability and poor development outcomes will lead to greater refugee-
sending centrality. The opposite pattern is expected to hold true for the receiving 
network, with positive economic conditions generating greater than expected refugee-
receiving centrality and negative economic conditions and instability yielding lower than 
expected centrality.  
Analysis of valued sending residuals 
 Tables 4.50 through 4.54 present results of analyses of the effects of variables on 
the residuals of the valued sending networks. Each table presents individual relationships, 
net of regional variation. A regional base model and economic variables are included in 
Table 4.50, political variables in Table 4.51,demographic variables in Table 4.52, 
environmental variables in Table 4.53, and international variables in Table 4.54.  
Economic Model 
 The results of analyses of the effects of economic variables on the valued-sending 
residuals are presented in Table 4.50. None of the regional variables have a significant 
effect on the residual, indicating that regional variation does not explain differences in 
these networks. Of the examined economic variables, only secondary enrollment 
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demonstrates a significant effect on the residual scores. This negative relationship 
indicates that countries with high levels of secondary enrollment send fewer refugees 
than would be expected, given their position in the migrant network. In other words, 
secondary enrollment provides one explanation of difference between the networks. GDP 
per capita, state strength, economic growth, and urban population fail to demonstrate 
significant relationships in this analysis.  
Table 4.50. OLS Regression Results for Economic Conditions on Sending Centrality 
(Valued) Residuals, circa 2000 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Economic Variables        
     GDP per capita   .049 
(.046) 
 
    
     State strength    .003 
(.034) 
 
   








     Secondary enrollment      -.355** 
(.127) 
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 .015 .018 .030 .024 .027 .087 
N 225 189 172 175 203 165 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 




Table 4.51. OLS Regression Results for Political Conditions on Sending Centrality 
(Valued) Residuals, circa 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
The results of political variables on the valued sending residual are presented in 
Table 4.51. Political repression, political terror, and state collapse all demonstrate 
positive significant relationships with the residual scores, with collapse showing the 
strongest effect. Countries with greater levels of repression, poor human rights scores, 
and the experience of state collapse send refugees at higher rates than would be expected, 
given the extent to which they send migrants. This finding makes sense, as countries that 
- Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Political Variables      
     Political repression  .174† 
(.100) 
 
   








     Conflict     .084 
(.075) 
 
Region     













































     
R2 .042 .051 .082 .021 
N 191 177 225 225 
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experience these political conditions would be relatively low senders of migrants, while 
these conditions would generate large numbers of refugees. Interestingly, conflict does 
not demonstrate a significant effect in this model, reflecting findings from the previous 
section that conflict influences both migrant and refugee centrality in this network.  
Demographic model 
Table 4.52. OLS Regression Results for Demographic Variables on Sending 
Centrality (Valued) Residuals, circa 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 While demographic variables consistently failed to produce an effect on centrality 
in either the migrant or refugee networks in the previous section, the results of analyzing 
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Demographic Variables     
     Fertility rate  .258* 
(.110) 
 
   








     Life expectancy    -.465*** 
(.114) 
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R2 .054 .022 .048 .111 
N 194 203 .189 195 
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the effects of these variables on the valued sending residual present a different picture. 
Table 4.52 shows that fertility rates, infant mortality levels, and life expectancy all have 
significant relationships with the residual scores, while population density does not. 
Countries with higher fertility rates and infant mortality send refugees beyond what 
would be expected, while countries with higher life expectancies send fewer refugees.  
Environmental model 
Table 4.53. OLS Regression Results for Environmental Conditions on Sending 
Centrality (Valued) Residuals, circa 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Results of the environmental analyses, presented in Table 4.53, show that CO2 per 
capita has a significant negative relationship with the residual, while cropland under 
cultivation does not. Countries with higher levels of CO2 per capita send fewer refugees 
 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 
Environmental Variables    
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R2 .047 .034 .062 
N 194 191 181 
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than would be expected, given their level of migrants sent. These countries tend to be 
newly developing economies (i.e., China) that send high levels of migrants (see Figure 
4.1), but have high levels of internal stability that limit levels of refugee outflows.  
International model 
Table 4.54. OLS Regression Results for International Integration on Sending 
Centrality (Valued) Residuals, circa 2000 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 
International Variables      
     FDI penetration -.132† 
(.078) 
 
    
     Trade openness  -.060 
(.032) 
 
   












     INGO membership ties     -.057 
(.076) 
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R2 .039 .016 .023 .053 .019 
N 194 173 149 144 223 
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The final table in the valued sending analysis, Table 4.54, presents the results of 
international variables on the residual scores. In the individual analyses, only FDI 
penetration and peripheral status demonstrate significant effects. Higher levels of foreign 
investment yield fewer refugees sent, given the amount of migrants sent, while countries 
in the periphery send more refugees than would be expected. Both findings make 
intuitive sense. Sanderson and Kentor (2008) found that countries with higher levels of 
investment have more mobile populations. These countries also tend to be more stable, 
yielding fewer refugees. Peripheral countries tend to contribute fewer migrants to the 
global network, causing them to be relatively low in migrant-sending centrality. 
However, these countries contribute the bulk of refugees to the global network, creating 
the disparity observed in this finding.  
Discussion of analysis of valued sending residual 
 The models in this analysis tell a fairly consistent and expected story: countries 
that experience difficult economic and political conditions send more refugees than 
would be expected, while countries at higher levels of development and economic 
opportunity send fewer. Political repression, political terror, state collapse, high fertility 
and infant mortality rates, and peripheral status all contribute to higher than expected 
refugee outflows. Countries high in these areas are typically poorer states that do not send 
large numbers of migrants and are, therefore, low in migrant-sending centrality. The 
presence of these conditions contributes to high levels of refugee sending, creating the 
disparity identified in these analyses. On the other hand, education, high life expectancy, 
CO2 per capita, and foreign investment each yields lower refugee flows than would be 
expected. Countries with these positive elements tend to send high levels of migrants, but 
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are more stable, reducing the potential for the development of conditions that would yield 
refugee outflows. These findings demonstrate clear differences in valued sending 
centrality between the networks.  
Analysis of valued receiving residuals 
Tables 4.55 through 4.59 present results of analyses of the effects of variables on 
the residual scores of the valued receiving networks. Each table presents individual 
relationships, net of regional variation. A regional base model and economic variables are 
included in Table 4.55, political variables in Table 4.56,demographic variables in Table 
4.57, environmental variables in Table 4.58, and international variables in Table 4.59. 
Economic model 
 Table 4.55 presents the results of the regional base model and economic variables 
with the valued receiving residual. In the regional model (Model 1), only Eastern Europe 
reaches significance at a marginal level. Countries in this region receive fewer refugees 
than would be expected, given their level of migrants received. Unlike the analysis of the 
valued sending residual, some significant regional variation occurs across models in this 
analysis, with regions moving in and out of significance, depending on the other included 
variables. In all of these instances, regions receive fewer refugees than would be 
expected.  
 Of the economic variables, none demonstrates a significant relationship with the 
valued receiving residuals. These factors do not influence a country‟s level of refugee 
inflows to an extent that it becomes different than would be expected, given its level of 




Table 4.55. OLS Regression Results for Economic Conditions on Valued Receiving 
Residuals, circa 2000 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Economic Variables       
     GDP per capita  -.086 
(.111) 
 
    
     State strength   -.076 
(.090) 
 
   








     Secondary enrollment      -.064 
(.106) 
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R2 .020 .028 .033 .021 .021 .039 
N 225 189 172 175 203 165 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 






Table 4.56. OLS Regression Results for Political Conditions on Valued Receiving 
Residuals, circa 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 Results from the examination of the effects of political variables on the valued 
receiving residual are presented in Table 4.54. As has been previously noted, some 
regional variables move in and out of significance across the models, but Sub-Saharan 
Africa and Eastern Europe maintain significant negative effects across each model in this 
analysis. These regions consistently receive fewer refugees than would be expected. Of 
the political variables, only collapse has a significant effect. Collapsed states received 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Political Variables     
     Political repression  .077 
(.100) 
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R2 .026 .031 .046 .023 
N 191 177 225 225 
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more refugees than would be expected, given their level of migrants received. Several 
elements contribute to this finding. First, collapsed states are not attractive destinations 
for migrants, causing these countries to have low migrant-receiving centrality. 
Additionally, these states are not able to adequately control their borders, making refugee 
entrance relatively easy. Finally, these states are often in close proximity to other 
countries that are experiencing conditions that generate refugee flows. These low levels 
of migrant receiving, coupled with high levels of refugee receipt, create the disparity 
reflected in this finding.  
Demographic model 
 
While demographic elements demonstrated significant effects on the valued 
sending residual, the opposite occurs in regressions with the valued receiving residual. 
Table 4.55 shows that the demographic variables do not have a significant effect on the 
receiving residual. In other words, none of these elements create a disparity between 
refugee and migrant centrality. 
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Table 4.57. OLS Regression Results for Demographic Variables on Valued 
Receiving Residuals, circa 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Environmental model 
 Like the demographic model, the environmental model fails to yield any 
significant results with the valued receiving residual. While the significant negative 
relationships of Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe persist in these models and the 
Middle East shows some significance, neither of the environmental variables 
demonstrates a relationship with the residual scores.  
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Demographic Variables     
     Fertility rate  .033 
(.112) 
 
   








     Life expectancy     .010 
(.120) 
Region     













































R2 .024 .025 .029 .024 
N 194 203 189 195 
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Table 4.58. OLS Regression Results for Environmental Conditions on Valued 
Receiving Residuals, circa 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
International model 
In results for the international variables, presented in Table 4.57, only the world 
system variables demonstrate any significant effect on the valued receiving residual. In a 
somewhat surprising finding, both semiperipheral and peripheral status are negatively 
related to the residual scores. Countries with these statuses are less central in the refugee-
receiving network than would be predicted by their position in the migrant-receiving 
network.  
 Model 15 Model 16 
Environmental Variables    




     Cropland under cultivation   .037 
(.082) 
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R2 .026 .027 
N 194 191 
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Table 4.59. OLS Regression Results for International Integration on Valued 
Receiving Residuals, circa 2000 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Discussion of analysis of the valued receiving residual 
 OLS regressions with the valued receiving residual reveal few significant effects. 
There is a regional effect in this analysis that does not exist in the valued sending 
analysis. Countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, and – to a lesser extent – the 
 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
International Variables       
     FDI penetration -.041 
(.078) 
 
    
     Trade openness  -.094 
(.090) 
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R2 .032 .035 .018 .071 .032 
N 194 173 149 144 223 
211 
 
Middle East are less central in the refugee network than would be expected, given their 
position in the migrant network. This may again be the result of the domination of the 
refugee-receiving network by a handful of key actors. Most of the countries in these 
regions receive migrants, but many may not receive any refugees, creating a disparity in 
centrality between the networks.  
 Of the other variables, only collapse and world system position reach significance 
with the receiving residual. While both of these findings seem to be in counter-intuitive 
directions, both can be explained in terms of disparities created by levels at which 
migrants are received. Collapsed states receive few migrants, as they are decidedly 
unattractive destination choices for those who have the ability to choose. Refugees often 
do not have this degree of autonomy and enter whatever country they can reach, without 
regard to the political conditions of the potential host. Additionally, collapsed states tend 
to be in politically unstable regions, often in close proximity to other countries with the 
potential for refugee outflows. This proximity makes these states more likely hosts than 
countries across the world. The combination of low migrant-receiving centrality and any 
appreciable level of refugee-receiving centrality would generate the disparity seen in the 
significant finding.  
 As for the world system findings, these may be the result of the extent to which 
the refugee-receiving network is dominated by only a handful of countries (see Table 
3.17), leaving other countries at these world system positions with greater migrant than 
refugee inflows. If most countries in semiperipheral or peripheral positions receive few or 
no refugees, then any level of migrant-receiving centrality would create an appreciable 
gap between the expected level of refugees and the reality.  
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Analysis of dichotomized sending residuals 
Tables 4.60 through 4.64 present results of analyses of the effects of variables on 
the residual scores for the dichotomized sending networks. Each table presents individual 
relationships, net of regional variation. A regional base model and economic variables are 
included in Table 4.60, political variables in Table 4.61, demographic variables in Table 
4.62, environmental variables in Table 4.63, and international variables in Table 4.64. 
Economic model 
Table 4.60. OLS Regression Results for Economic Conditions on Dichotomized 
Sending Residuals, circa 2000 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Economic Variables        
     GDP per capita   .041 
(.103) 
    
     State strength   -.032 
(.079) 
 
   








     Secondary enrollment      -.254* 
(.112) 
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R2 .016 .015 .016 .029 .012 .050 
N 225 189 172 175 203 165 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
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Table 4.60 presents the results of regressions with the regional base model and 
economic variables on the dichotomized sending residual scores. Among the regional 
variables, there are no significant relationships. This result holds across most of the 
models throughout the analysis of this network‟s residuals. Each region holds refugee-
sending ties at the level that would be expected, given its level of migrant-sending 
centrality. The economic variables provide little more in the way of relationships. Of 
these, only secondary enrollment demonstrates a significant negative effect on the 
residual scores. Countries with higher levels of enrollment send refugees to fewer 
partners than would be expected given the levels at which they hold migrant-sending ties. 
Political model 
 Like the variables in the economic model, the political variables demonstrate very 
limited effects on the sending residuals. In Table 4.61, only the political terror measure 
reaches significance, and then only at a marginal level. The positive relationship shows 
that countries with worse human rights scores are more central in the dichotomized 
refugee-sending network than would be expected based on their centrality in the 
dichotomized migrant-sending network. These countries tend to send large amounts of 
refugees, increasing the potential pool of movers to create ties with host countries. 
Interestingly, repression, collapse, and conflict do not demonstrate significant effects. For 




Table 4.61. OLS Regression Results for Political Conditions on Dichotomized 
Sending Residuals, circa 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Demographic model 
 As in previous analyses, the demographic model fails to demonstrate any 
significant relationships with the residual scores. Table 4.62 shows that none of the 
measures of demographic conditions causes refugee-sending centrality to differ from 
what would be expected, based on migrant-sending centrality.  
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Political Variables     
     Political repression  .117 
(.096) 
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R2 .018 .032 .016 .016 
N 191 177 225 225 
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Table 4.62. OLS Regression Results for Demographic Variables on Dichotomized 
Sending Residuals, circa 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Environmental model 
 Like the demographic model, the environmental model (presented in Table 4.63) 
shows no significant effects on the dichotomized sending residuals. Refugee-sending 
centrality does not differ from expectations in models that include these measures of 
environmental conditions.  
 
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Demographic Variables     
     Fertility rate -.005 
(.105) 
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R2 .010 .012 .012 .016 
N 194 203 189 195 
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Table 4.63. OLS Regression Results for Environmental Conditions on Dichotomized 
Sending Residuals, circa 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
International model 
 Table 4.64 presents regression results from models that examine the effects of 
international variables on the dichotomized sending network residual scores. These 
results show two clear effects. Trade openness has a significant negative relationship with 
the residual measure, indicating that countries that are more active in global trade send 
refugees to fewer partners than would be expected, given their centrality in the 
dichotomized migrant-sending network. Participation in trade opens channels to other 
countries through which migrants can more readily flow, increasing centrality in this 
network. Additionally, countries with high levels of trade tend to be more stable, 
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Environmental Variables    




     Cropland under cultivation  -.051 
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R2 .010 .014 
N 194 191 
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reducing the possibility of refugee outflows. Taken together, these factors demonstrate 
the potential for differences in centrality in the respective networks observed in this 
finding.  
Table 4.64. OLS Regression Results for International Integration on Dichotomized 
Sending Residuals, circa 2000 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
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International Variables      
     FDI penetration  .054 
(.071) 
 
    
     Trade openness  -.157* 
(.075) 
 
   












    INGO memberships ties      .004 
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R2 .018 .035 .016 .095 .016 
N 194 173 149 144 223 
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 The second significant finding in these results is the relationship of world system 
position to the residual scores. Both semiperipheral and peripheral status have significant 
positive relationships with the dichotomized sending residual. Countries at both of these 
levels have refugee-sending ties to more countries than would be expected based on their 
dichotomized migrant-sending centrality. While the effect of being in the periphery is 
stronger, both findings are robust. This finding may reflect the extent to which migrants 
from countries at these levels tend to move to countries in which networks are already 
established, limiting the number of migrant ties, while refugees leaving these countries 
settle wherever they can. It is also possible that many countries at these levels have 
longer histories of sending refugees than they do of sending migrants, which creates 
greater potential for developing partners over time in the refugee network than the 
migrant.  
Discussion of analysis of the dichotomized sending residual 
 The results of examining the effects of variables on the dichotomized sending 
network residual scores demonstrate few significant relationships. Centrality in the 
migrant and refugee networks is affected similarly by most of these factors. Regional 
variation, demographic variables, and environmental conditions show no effect on the 
residuals scores. However, in spite of this high level of similarity, clear differences 
present themselves.  
 Two variables demonstrate significant negative relationships with the residual 
scores. These cause countries to have lower than expected refugee-sending centrality, 
given their level of migrant-sending centrality. Countries with higher levels of secondary 
enrollment have more educated populations, making potential migrants more attractive to 
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potential host countries and increasing sending centrality in this network. Additionally, 
countries that are able to enroll children in secondary education at high levels tend to be 
more stable, limiting the potential for refugee outflows that might elevate the number of 
sending ties. The combination of these elements yields the disparity identified by this 
result.  
 Like secondary education, trade openness is related to disparities in network 
centrality through higher migrant sending and lower refugee sending. Countries that are 
active in global trade have more connections and networks through which migrants can 
move. Increased trade may also generate economic conditions in sending countries that 
yield income levels for potential migrants that make it possible for them to emigrate. 
These same economic conditions typically create stability that limits the number of 
refugees sent by these countries and gives those that do leave as refugees the ability to 
choose destination countries, eliminating potential hosts that are less attractive to those 
who are moving.  
 Political terror and world system position demonstrate significant positive 
relationships with the residual scores. Both lead to higher levels of refugee-sending 
centrality than would be anticipated based on migrant-sending centrality. This typically 
happens through a combination of few migrant-sending ties and many refugee-sending 
ties. Countries with poor human rights records tend to generate refugee outflows as 
populations try to move away from abusive regimes. As these refugees often differ in 
their economic status, different host countries may more or less readily accept them. 
Additionally, those with fewer economic resources have limited options in terms of 
potential destinations. These refugees tend to cross the nearest border, rather than make a 
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longer move. This potential dispersion of refugees over more countries would lead to 
high sending centrality. These same countries often have large populations that are poor 
and less educated, making them less likely prospects to become emigrants.  
 The world system findings also depend on countries having high levels of refugee 
centrality with relatively low migrant centrality. While semiperipheral countries tend to 
send migrants at a high level, these migrants typically move to a handful of countries 
where networks and labor patterns are already established (i.e., Mexican migrants to the 
United States). For peripheral countries, emigration is constrained by limited economic 
and educational resources among the population. Without a population with the means to 
migrate or education levels that make migrants attractive to potential hosts as workers, 
these countries stay low in dichotomized migrant-sending centrality.  
 High dichotomized refugee-sending centrality may be a product of long histories 
of refugee sending by many countries in the semiperiphery and periphery. While some 
countries at both world system positions continue to send refugees at high levels, many 
have high centrality in this network due to outflows that took place earlier in their history. 
Countries like Vietnam and Russia are stable semiperipheral countries that contributed 
very few refugees to the global network in 2000, but have high centrality due to refugee 
movements that took place during past conflicts. Many peripheral countries have been 
sending refugees for decades (e.g., Afghanistan, Sudan) and some of these waves of 
refugees have been forced to find new destinations as previous channels closed. This 





Analysis of dichotomized receiving residuals 
Tables 4.65 through 4.69 present results of analyses of the effects of variables on 
the residual scores of the dichotomized receiving networks. As in the previous analyses, 
each table presents individual relationships, net of regional variation. A regional base 
model and economic variables are included in Table 4.65, political variables in Table 
4.66, demographic variables in Table 4.67, environmental variables in Table 4.68, and 
international variables in Table 4.69. 
Economic model 
 Table 4.65 presents the results of regressions examining regional and economic 
variables with the dichotomized receiving network residual scores. Unlike the 
dichotomized sending analyses, regional variables demonstrate a number of significant 
relationships with the residual scores. Latin America shows a consistent negative effect 
on residuals, demonstrating that these countries have fewer refugee-receiving ties than 
would be expected with their level of migrant-receiving centrality. Other regions move in 
and out of significance across models, depending on the other variables involved. Of 
these, the Middle East shows the lowest level of significance, only demonstrating an 
effect in the international analysis (Table 4.69). In every instance where regional 
variables reach significance, the relationship is negative.  
 Of the economic variables presented in Table 4.65, only state strength 
demonstrates a marginally significant negative relationship with the residual scores. 
Stronger states hold refugee-receiving ties at lower levels than would be expected based 
on their level of migrant-receiving ties. These countries are typically attractive 
destinations for migrants and are able to choose who is allowed to enter. This creates 
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disparate migrant populations, but allows the country to place limits on refugee entry. All 
other measures fail to reach significance. 
Table 4.65. OLS Regression Results for Economic Conditions on Dichotomized 
Receiving Residuals, circa 2000 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Economic Variables       
     GDP per capita  -.094 
(.107) 
 
    
     State strength   -.138† 
(.085) 
 
   








     Secondary enrollment       .074 
(.123) 
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R2 .027 .037 .055 .024 .029 .048 
N 225 189 172 175 203 165 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Political model 
 Domestic political conditions show no significant effects on the dichotomized 
receiving residuals. The results of these regressions, presented in Table 4.66, represent 
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the only network of the four in which no political variables affect the residual scores. 
When political conditions are considered, dichotomized refugee-receiving centrality is in 
line with expectations based on dichotomized migrant-receiving centrality.  
Table 4.66. OLS Regression Results for Political Conditions on Dichotomized 
Receiving Residuals, circa 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Demographic model 
 In the demographic model, presented in Table 4.67, none of the included variables 
demonstrate significant relationships with the residual scores. Like those observed in the 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Political Variables     
     Political repression -.051 
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R2 .031 .049 .036 .028 
N 191 177 225 225 
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political model, demographic conditions do not seem to explain any of the difference 
between centrality in the dichotomized migrant and refugee receiving networks.  
Table 4.67. OLS Regression Results for Demographic Variables on Dichotomized 
Receiving Residuals, circa 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Environmental model 
 Presented in Table 4.68, results from the analysis of the effects of environmental 
conditions on the dichotomized receiving residual scores show no significant 
relationships. Like those in the previous two models, these elements do not explain any 
difference between the refugee and migrant networks.  
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Demographic Variables     
     Fertility rate -.025 
(.108) 
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R2 .038 .031 .030 .048 
N 194 203 189 195 
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Table 4.68. OLS Regression Results for Environmental Conditions on Dichotomized 
Receiving Residuals, circa 2000 
 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: Each cell reports the standardized coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
International model 
 Models that include international variables, presented in Table 4.69, include two 
significant negative relationships. Trade openness and the world system position 
measures are negatively related to the dichotomized receiving residual scores. In these 
models, countries that are more involved in international trade or that are located in the 
semiperiphery or periphery have lower refugee-receiving centrality than would be 
expected given their level of migrant-receiving centrality. The world system findings are 
particularly robust, representing the strongest results in the analysis of this network. 
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Environmental Variables   
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R2 .045 .048 
N 194 191 
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These results also reach the highest level of significance of any in the analyses of any of 
the four networks (p < .001). 
Table 4.69. OLS Regression Results for International Integration on Dichotomized 
Receiving Residuals, circa 2000 
 
† p< .1          * p< .05          ** p< .01          *** p< .001 (two-tailed tests) 
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International Variables      
     FDI penetration  .005 
(.075) 
 
    
     Trade openness  -.140† 
(.085) 
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R2 .030 .057 .059 .361 .034 
N 194 173 149 144 223 
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Discussion of analysis of the dichotomized receiving residual scores 
 Like the analyses of other residual scores, this examination of the effects of 
variables on the residual scores from the dichotomized sending networks presents a 
number of areas that explain differences between centrality in the migrant and refugee 
networks. While political, demographic, and environmental variables fail to demonstrate 
any relationships with the residual scores, variables in the economic and international 
models affect these scores.  
 Regional variation has a consistent effect on the residual scores across most of the 
models in the analysis. The negative relationship with Latin American status is 
particularly robust, persisting across almost every model. Latin American countries 
consistently hold fewer refugee-receiving ties than would be expected at their level of 
migrant-receiving ties. These countries may be less available as targets for refugee entry 
due to their distance and relative isolation from high refugee-sending areas. In addition to 
Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia show fairly consistent negative 
relationships with the residuals scores. Finally, Eastern Europe and the Middle East 
demonstrate significant relationships in relatively few models. Interestingly, all regional 
relationships are negative, indicating that each region receives fewer ties than would be 
expected. This demonstrates the central role played by more advanced Western countries 
in the dichotomized refugee-receiving network.  
 State strength and trade openness both demonstrate marginally significant 
negative relationships with the residual scores in this analysis. Countries with high scores 
on these variables have lower dichotomized refugee-receiving centrality than would be 
anticipated at their levels of migrant-receiving centrality. Strong states may be able to 
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better control refugee flows into their borders, reducing their level of refugee ties, while 
also being attractive to migrants due to the potential for economic opportunity, increasing 
potential refugee ties. These same issues may explain the finding with respect to trade 
openness. Countries that are highly active in global trade may be better able to control 
refugee inflows. Additionally, the presence of global trade routes increases the likelihood 
of labor migration following those routes (Massey et al. 1993), making active trading 
countries more likely migrant destinations. High migrant-receiving centrality coupled 
with relatively low refugee-receiving centrality would account for the variation 
demonstrated in these results.  
 The strongest finding in this analysis is the effect of world system position on the 
residuals. Countries in the semiperiphery and periphery receive refugee ties from fewer 
partners than would be expected based on the number of ties they receive from migration 
partners. These findings represent the most robust (p < .001) and strongest (-.334 and -
.629 in the full model) in any of the analyses of residual scores. Countries in the 
semiperiphery are relatively new destinations for refugees, becoming more open as entry 
policies in core countries become more restrictive. As these countries have a limited 
history of receiving refugees, they have few ties to countries that sent refugees in 
previous eras, but do so no longer (i.e., Vietnam). Having only ties to the most recent 
refugee-sending countries would generate relatively low centrality in this network. 
Peripheral countries typically receive refugees from surrounding sending partners, but are 
not attractive as destinations for refugees who are able to travel. While some of these 
countries receive refugees at high levels, they do so from a limited number of partners 
(see Table 3.14), giving them low dichotomized receiving centrality. Peripheral countries 
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are not high in migrant-receiving centrality; however, there is clearly enough difference 
between centrality in the two networks to generate the strong finding demonstrated in this 
analysis.   
Summary of examining residuals to determine differences between centrality in the 
migrant and refugee networks 
 This attempt to understand differences between the migrant and refugee networks 
generates important insights into distinctions between the two. The analysis of residuals 
created from regressions of the migrant and refugee networks with variables from a 
number of perspectives identifies key elements that explain differences between 
centrality scores in the two networks. While many of the variables in the analyses fail to 
demonstrate significant relationships with the residual scores, those that do reveal 
important areas of explanation about differences in how centrality in the networks is 
developed. Table 4.70 presents a summary of relationships observed in these analyses. 
Significant relationships are indicated by a + (positive relationship) or – (negative 
relationship). Models in which no significant relationship occurred are left blank. 
 In the examination of the valued-sending residual scores, political instability, 
infant mortality, and peripheral status demonstrated positive relationships. These factors 
are associated with elevated refugee-sending centrality. All make intuitive sense as 
countries that experience political instability or high levels of infant mortality, as well as 
countries in the periphery tend to be unattractive destinations for migrants, but generate 
disproportionately high refugee flows. Alternatively, secondary enrollment, life 
expectancy, levels of CO2 per capita, and FDI penetration demonstrate significant 
negative relationships with residual scores. Countries that are high in these areas are 
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relatively low refugee-sending countries. With the exception of FDI, these variables may 
be serving as proxies for development level in this analysis. More developed countries 
tend to send fewer refugees, but often contribute migrants at high levels. High levels of 
foreign investment may contribute to this economic development, providing stronger 
economic incentive for potential refugees to stay and generating a pool of potential 
migrants with more resources and education to make a move. Regional variation shows 
no significant relationship in these models.  
The valued-receiving residual analysis yielded few significant results. Unlike the 
valued-sending analysis, regional variation showed some significant relationships, 
particularly among the Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe regions. Across this 
analysis, when regions demonstrate significant relationships with the residual scores, they 
are consistently negative. This indicates that these regions receive refugees at lower than 
expected levels based on the extent to which they receive migrants. The only positively 
signed variable in this analysis is state collapse. Collapsed states receive refugees at 
higher levels than would be expected given their level of migrant receiving. While 
counter-intuitive, this finding is the product of the extremely low level at which collapsed 
states receive migrants. These states may receive refugees from neighboring countries 
that are experiencing turmoil, but almost universally fail to receive migrants. This 
disparity would yield the observed result.  
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Economic Variables     
     GDP per capita      
     State strength    - 
     Economic growth     
     Urban population     
     Secondary enrollment -  -  
Political Variables      
     Political repression +    
Political terror +  +  
     Collapse + +   
     Conflict     
Demographic Variables     
     Fertility rate +    
     Population density     
     Infant mortality +    
     Life expectancy -    
Environmental Variables     
     CO2 per capita -    
     Cropland under cultivation     
International Variables     
     FDI penetration -    
     Trade openness   - - 
     ODA     
Semiperiphery  - + - 
     Periphery + - + - 
     INGO membership ties     
Regions     
     Middle East / North Africa     
     Latin America / Caribbean    - 
     Sub-Saharan Africa    - 
     Asia and Pacific     
     Eastern Europe / Central Asia  -   
  
The only significant negative result in this analysis is the effects of world system 
position on the residual scores. Both semiperipheral and peripheral status are associated 
with lower than expected valued refugee-receiving centrality. Countries in these positions 
receive refugees at lower rates than migrants. This is a difficult finding to interpret. As 
many countries at these levels receive few or no refugees, any appreciable level of 
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migrant inflow would generate a negative disparity in centrality. This explanation would 
be particularly salient in the case of countries in the semiperiphery as these tend to 
receive moderate levels of migrants.  
As in the valued sending residual analysis, regional variation fails to demonstrate 
any significant effects in the examination of the dichotomized sending residual scores. Of 
the explanatory variables, only political terror and world system position have significant 
positive relationships with the residual scores. These variables cause countries to have 
higher than expected levels of refugee-sending ties. Again, both findings make intuitive 
sense. Countries with poor human rights regimes tend to send refugees at relatively high 
levels, while sending few migrants due to the lack of economic or educational resources 
necessary for successful emigration. As the highest senders of refugees are all in 
semiperipheral or peripheral countries, while many of the most active migrant-sending 
countries are in the core, the world system finding is also as would be expected.  
In this analysis, secondary enrollment and trade openness demonstrate significant 
negative relationships with the residual scores. Countries that are high on both of these 
variables tend to also be high in migrant-sending centrality. Heavy activity in global trade 
opens routes through which migrants can more readily move, while educated populations 
are more attractive to potential hosts, providing more options for migrant destinations. 
High levels of migrant sending associated with these factors explain the disparity 
identified in these findings.  
Examination of the residuals of the dichotomized-receiving network again finds 
few significant relationships. While only Latin America and Africa reach significance in 
the base model, analyses of this network show the highest degree of significance for 
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regional variation. Latin America is consistently significant and each of the other regions 
demonstrates significance across a number of models in the analysis. As in the valued-
receiving analysis, every significant regional relationship is negative.  
While state strength and trade openness demonstrate marginally significant 
negative relationships with the residual scores in this analysis, the most prominent 
finding is the effects of world system position. Semiperipheral and peripheral countries 
hold refugee-receiving ties at lower levels than expected based on their level of migrant-
receiving ties. Countries at these levels receive refugees from few partners; many do not 
receive from any other countries. Given this low level of participation in the refugee-
receiving network, any appreciable level of migrant ties would create the gap identified in 
this analysis.  
Three key pictures emerge from this examination of the residuals generated from 
regressions with the migrant and refugee networks. Each of these demonstrates important 
differences between centrality in the networks. First, regional variation explains some of 
the difference between the receiving networks. Latin America in particular, but all of the 
non-Western regions in general, show some sign of receiving fewer refugees or refugee 
ties than would be expected at their level of migrant-receiving centrality. Countries in 
these regions are far less active in the migrant and refugee-receiving networks than 
Western European and other advanced countries (see Table 3.14), but this gap is less 
pronounced in the migrant networks, accounting for the disparity demonstrated in these 
findings. Interestingly, these relationships are not present in the sending analyses. This 
may be due to the highly centralized nature of these networks. Only a handful of 
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countries send refugees at a high level and the disparities generated beyond these 
countries may not be appreciable enough to register in these analyses.  
The second finding from these analyses is the role of development and conflict 
variables in explaining differences in the networks. While the results are expressed in a 
number of different variables, countries that are more highly developed are less central in 
the refugee-sending networks (both valued and dichotomized) than would be expected 
and more central in the refugee-receiving networks. Differences between the networks 
are created by the low levels of refugees sent by developed countries and the high levels 
of refugees received. With the more egalitarian distribution demonstrated by the migrant 
networks, these extremes account for the disparities identified by these variables. The 
reverse holds true for countries that are less developed and experience political turmoil. 
Measures like collapse, political terror, and infant mortality capture differences generated 
by the high levels of refugees sent from countries with high scores in these areas and low 
levels of refugees received. Again, these extremes create the gaps revealed in the 
analyses of the residual scores.  
The final key story from these analyses is the role of world system position in 
explaining differences in centrality in these networks. At least one of the world systems 
variables is significant in each analysis. Semiperipheral and / or peripheral status are 
consistently associated with higher than expected refugee-sending centrality and lower 
than expected refugee-receiving centrality. Peripheral countries in particular send 
refugees at much higher rates and to far more partners than they do migrants. These gaps 
are less distinct among countries in the semiperiphery, accounting for the weaker 
relationships exhibited by this variable in the sending analyses. The negative 
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relationships evidenced in the receiving analyses are largely a product of the high level of 
receiving centrality held by countries in the core. Domination of these networks by core 
actors lead to low levels of centrality for semiperipheral and peripheral countries, leading 
to the negative gaps identified in these models.  
 Each of these stories reflects predicted relationships identified prior to this 
analysis. The central hypothesis driving this chapter is the belief that the migrant and 
refugee networks are fundamentally different. This examination of the effects of domestic 
conditions and global integration on residual scores further demonstrates that this 
hypothesis is accurate. Centrality in these networks is shaped by different conditions, 
making the networks different. A second hypothesis verified by this analysis is that 
centrality in these networks varies by region. The effects of regional variation on residual 
scores identified in these models reflect descriptive data developed earlier in the chapter. 
Finally, the effects of economic, development, and political variables on residual scores 
generally act as expected. While not all of these variables have the predicted 
relationships, those that do tend to affect the residual scores in anticipated directions that 
match expectations based on theory and previous analysis.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 The goal of this chapter was to examine centrality in the migrant and refugee 
networks circa 2000 to determine the extent to which the two are different. While a 
number of similarities emerged in these analyses, enough differences are identified to 
indicate that the networks are clearly different. Migrant and refugee networks differ in 
scope, structure, and relationships with variables capturing domestic conditions and 
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global integration. These trends present themselves in a number of ways across the 
analyses in this chapter. 
 The first clear trend is the difference in the level of activity demonstrated by the 
respective networks. While the valued and dichotomized refugee networks are somewhat 
limited in scope, the migrant networks are extremely active. Almost every country in the 
world contributes and receives migrants to the global network. In fact, countries in the 
migrant network realize over 74 percent of the possible ties (37,432 of 50,400) while only 
7.5 percent of possible ties are realized in the migrant network (3,775 out of 50,400). 
Over 175 million migrants in 225 countries and territories participated in the migrant 
network in 2000. By contrast, the refugee network consisted of just over 10 million 
refugees moving among 187 countries, most of which contributed very little to this total.   
 These different levels of activity result in the networks having very different 
structures. The centralization scores (presented in Tables 4.1 through 4.4) for each 
network demonstrate that the refugee networks tend to be more centralized than the 
migrant. Central actors are more dominant in most of the refugee networks than they are 
in the migrant networks. The clearest example of this is the dichotomized refugee-
receiving network in which the top ten actors account for almost a third of the total ties 
(see Table 3.17), resulting in a centralization score of over 67 percent. The sole exception 
to this pattern is the valued receiving networks. While more actors are involved in the 
migrant network, relative to the refugee network, the migrant network is the more 
centralized of the two.  
 Network density is another important area of difference between the migrant and 
refugee networks. The greater level of activity in the migrant networks makes them far 
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denser than their refugee counterparts. This trend holds for both the dichotomized and 
valued networks. In the dichotomized networks, migrant network density is over 11 times 
greater than refugee network density (.737 versus .065), showing that the majority of ties 
in the migrant network are realized, while a relatively small number of ties are held in the 
refugee network. The density measure for the valued networks is actually an average 
value measure that captures the total of all values divided by the total number of possible 
ties. In essence, it captures the number of migrants or refugee per possible tie in the 
respective network. As Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show, the valued migrant network is again far 
denser than the refugee network (3455 versus 186).   
 Another area of structural difference is regional variation. Figures 4.9 through 
4.12 show the percentage of total movers and total ties held by each region. While the 
migrant networks generally show a high level of equality in the percentage held by each 
region, the refugee networks are quite varied. In three of the four networks, the range of 
variation among regions in the migrant networks is smaller than that of the refugee 
networks. The exception to this pattern is again the valued migrant-receiving network 
(Figure 4.10), which is dominated by the percentage of migrants received by Western 
countries (45 percent). Among the refugee networks, Western countries receive higher 
percentages of ties and total refugees, while Eastern Europe / Central Asia (driven by 
Afghanistan) sends relatively more refugees than other regions and Africa contributes 
more sending ties than the others. The distinction between egalitarian migrant networks 
and more varied refugee networks further clarifies the differences in activity levels 
between the networks.  
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 Pearson‟s and QAP correlations demonstrate the extent to which the networks are 
statistically different. While three of the four networks are correlated in the pairwise 
Pearson‟s analyses of centrality scores, the coefficients for these correlations are 
relatively low (see Table 4.5). This indicates that while there is some relationship 
between centrality in the networks, it is not strong. Statistics derived from the QAP 
correlations verify the level of difference that exists between these networks. Most telling 
among these is the Hamming Distance scores of 37441 (valued) and 33759 
(dichotomized). These indicate that 75 percent of cells in the valued refugee network and 
67 percent of cells in the dichotomized refugee network would have to be changed to 
match their counterparts in the migrant networks.  
 Examining the effects of variables that capture domestic conditions and global 
integration provides a mixed bag of findings about distinctions between the networks. 
While the comparisons do identify a number of differences that demonstrate that the 
migrant and refugee networks are shaped by different elements and differently shaped by 
some elements, a number of similarities also emerge. The identification of these 
relationships provides a launching point for the development of theory specifically 
related to refugee studies. 
 The networks demonstrate a high degree of similarity in terms of relationships (or 
lack of relationships) with variables in the different models. Interestingly, many of the 
relationships are similar down to the strength of the effect. While many of the similarities 
occurred in analyses with variables that did not have significant relationships with 
network centrality (i.e., the demographic models), a number of important areas of 
similarity in significant relationships were also identified. Among the valued networks, 
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state strength reduced both sending and receiving centrality for both networks. Conflict 
demonstrated a significant positive effect on centrality across all eight networks – one of 
the most persistent relationships in the analysis. Finally, among the international 
variables, the effects of INGO participation, trade openness, and foreign aid are 
consistent across most networks.  
 A number of key differences also emerge that indicate areas in which the 
networks are differentially affected by these variables. These demonstrate clear 
distinctions between the networks, further indicating the extent to which migrant and 
refugee networks are different. The effect of development variables, particularly 
secondary enrollment, on refugee networks is one such distinction. This measure 
demonstrates significant relationships across refugee models, but seldom reaches any 
level of significance in the migrant models. Another area of difference is in the analyses 
of the environmental models. While these variables demonstrate no significant 
relationships with centrality in any of the migrant networks, they do present significant 
relationships in three of the four refugee networks. A third key difference is in the effect 
of political terror on centrality. Poor human rights scores only affect migrant centrality in 
the valued sending network, but show significant relationships with refugee centrality in 
all but the dichotomized receiving network. Human rights regimes impact refugee 
movement and receipt more than that of migrants across most networks.  
 Perhaps the most important distinction between the networks in these analyses is 
the effect of world system position. Semiperipheral status affects centrality in the refugee 
networks, but not the migrant networks in three of the four comparisons, showing a 
positive relationship with sending centrality and a negative relationship with receiving 
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centrality. Comparisons of the valued receiving networks show the opposite trend. For 
these networks, the migrant network has a significant relationship with semiperipheral 
status, while this status fails to reach significance with the refugee network. The 
periphery measure is significant in every network, but the direction of the relationship 
differs based on the network under consideration. In analyses of receiving centrality, 
peripheral status has a consistent negative relationship with centrality across both migrant 
and refugee networks. Analyses of sending centrality, however, show that peripheral 
status is negatively related to centrality in the migrant networks but positively related to 
centrality in the refugee networks. Poorer countries send fewer migrants and hold fewer 
sending ties than countries in the core, while sending higher levels of refugees and hold 
more sending ties than core countries. This marks a clear difference between centrality in 
the networks. Understanding the mechanisms of these differences represents an important 
area for future study.  
 The examination of the effects of variables on the residual scores generated from 
the regression of a given refugee network on its migrant counterpart demonstrates a 
number of ways in which domestic conditions and global integration explain differences 
between the networks. While most of the variables examined in these analyses did not 
have significant relationships with the residual scores, several important significant 
effects emerged. First, regional variation plays a role in explaining distinctions between 
the receiving networks. While these variables show no relationships in the analyses of 
sending residual scores, several regions consistently demonstrate negative relationships 
with the receiving residuals. Countries in these regions, particularly Latin America, 
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receive fewer refugees and hold fewer refugee-receiving ties than would be anticipated, 
based on the extent to which they receive migrants.  
 A second distinction between the networks identified in this analysis is the role of 
development and conflict variables in shaping the networks. Across analyses of the 
residual scores of different networks, CO2 per capita, life expectancy, secondary 
enrollment, state strength, and trade openness all demonstrate significant effects in with 
at least one network. These measures cause countries to send and receive refugees at 
lower rates than would be expected, given their level of centrality in migrant networks. 
Countries that are more developed are less active in the refugee networks than the 
migrant networks. By contrast, state collapse, political terror, and world system position 
are associated with higher levels of refugee centrality relative to levels of migrant 
centrality. These measures cause countries to be more active in the refugee networks, 
particularly the sending networks. The world system findings are especially interesting. 
Lower world system position (semiperipheral or peripheral status) yields higher than 
expected refugee-sending centrality and lower than expected refugee-receiving centrality. 
While not surprising, these findings are noteworthy in that they demonstrate key areas of 
difference between centrality in the networks.   
 The analysis of differences between these networks answers a number of 
questions about the nature of these networks and about their relationships to each other. 
The research question that drives this chapter asks, “Are these networks different?” The 
analyses presented in this chapter yield a qualified “yes” to this question. The valued and 
dichotomized migrant and refugee sending and receiving networks are different in scope, 
in activity level, in structure, and in their relationships with variables from a number of 
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perspectives. While they do prove to be similar in many ways, the differences that exist 
make the direct application of migrant theory to refugee movements problematic. 
Refugee movements are different than migrant movements. There is a need for further 
research into these refugee movements and destination choices with an eye toward the 
development of refugee-specific theory. Accomplishing this research will require better 
measures of refugees and would benefit from the collection of data that includes 
individuals who participate in “forced” moves for reasons beyond the political dynamics 
outlined in the UNHCR Convention.  
 While conflict and other political elements demonstrate important effects on 
refugee movements, it is noteworthy that these are not the only elements that were 
identified as important in these analyses. Measures capturing development level (life 
expectancy, CO2 per capita, etc.) and international integration (world system position) 
consistently demonstrate significant relationships with centrality in the refugee networks 
and with residual scores. It seems that beyond political conditions, greater economic 
stability/development and participation in global trade networks impact refugee flows.  
 These analyses raise a number of questions and areas for further study. Future 
research should examine variables from other theoretical perspectives in an attempt to 
further understand and explain differences between migrant and refugee networks. 
Understanding how they are different will advance efforts to create refugee-specific 
theory and allow agencies to better predict origins and destinations of future refugee 
flows.  Additionally, the examination of the role of development in refugee centrality, 
particularly sending centrality, will help policy-makers tailor interventions and 
development policy in ways that can help stop potential flows before they begin. Finally, 
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more research is needed to help understand centrality and movements in these networks 
at the macro level. Understanding conditions that generate flows or make particular 
destinations more appealing can provide better predictions of movements and can 




Chapter Five Outline 
 
CENTRALITY IN THE GLOBAL REFUGEE NETWORK 245 
  
RANDOM EFFECTS ANALYSIS OF THE GLOBAL REFUGEE NETWORK 249 
  
 Analysis of the valued sending network 249 
  
 Analysis of the valued receiving network  
  
 Analysis of the dichotomized sending network 278 
  
 Analysis of the dichotomized receiving network 293 
  
 Summary of random effects analysis of centrality in refugee networks 307 
  
FIXED EFFECTS ANALYSIS OF THE GLOBAL REFUGEE NETWORK 317 
  
 Analysis of the valued sending network 317 
  
 Analysis of the valued receiving network 325 
  
 Analysis of the dichotomized sending network 335 
  
 Analysis of the dichotomized receiving network 346 
  
 Summary of fixed effects analysis of centrality in refugee networks 352 
  
ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES OF CENTRALITY IN THE REFUGEE 
NETWORK 
362 
   
 Standardized sample results 362 
 Removal of countries with only one observation 367 
  
 Identification and removal of outliers 367 
 Collinearity check in demographic models 369 
CONCLUSION 369 





CENTRALITY IN THE GLOBAL REFUGEE NETWORK 
This chapter addresses the third research question by examining the effects of 
domestic conditions and international integration on a country‟s level of degree centrality 
in the valued and dichotomized sending and receiving networks. Measures reflecting 
economic, political, demographic, environmental, and international conditions are 
included in random effects and fixed effects models to examine how these conditions 
influence centrality across countries and over time for each of the four permutations of 
the global refugee network. The analyses in this study contribute to cross-national 
research in refugee studies in a number of ways. Most importantly, this is the first study 
to examine influences on refugee network centrality, either sending or receiving. 
Additionally, most cross-national refugee studies have focused on elements affecting 
destination choice (see Bocker and Havinga 1998; Moore and Shellman 2007). This 
analysis includes both sending and receiving centrality as dependent variables, examining 
both sides of refugee movement. Finally, the inclusion of over 200 countries and 
territories in the dataset and the examination of the 1990 to 2008 time period make this 
study among the most expansive and most recent analyses of refugee movements 
compiled to date.  
 To examine the effects of domestic and international factors on refugee network 
centrality, degree centrality scores were calculated for each of the four possible networks: 
valued sending, valued receiving, dichotomized sending, and dichotomized receiving. 
Countries with high centrality scores in the valued networks send or receive higher 
numbers of migrants or refugees than countries with lower centrality scores, while those 
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with high centrality scores in the dichotomized networks exchange refugees with a large 
number of other countries. To develop these networks, I used data on refugees sent and 
received for 242 countries and territories for each year from 1990 to 2008. I calculated 
period averages for five waves: 1990-1993, 1994-1997, 1998-2001, 2002-2005, and 
2006-2008, and used these to develop matrices for each wave and each network that 
included the total number of migrants and refugees sent and received by each country 
during that period. I then input these matrices into the UCINET (1999) software package 
and generated valued degree centrality scores. Next, I dichotomized each network, 
assigning a sending tie for each country that sent refugees to another country and a 
receiving tie to the destination country. I then calculated degree centrality scores for these 
networks using the dichotomized data. These procedures were repeated for each of the 
waves of the study, yielding four sets of centrality scores for each of the five waves. 
Altogether, this produces a maximum of 1210 observations for each network analysis.  
  I examine relationships between the independent variables and centrality in the 
different permutations of the global refugee network using random effects models 
(REMs) and fixed effects models (FEMs). I utilized a floating sample for the main REMs 
and FEMs in order to preserve as many observations as possible. However, I also 
conducted alternative analyses using a standardized sample, as well as a sample that 
excluded all countries that contributed only one observation. Additionally, I re-ran each 
model excluding outliers identified at the .05 level by the Hadi procedure. Results of 
these alternate analyses are reported following the presentation of the main results.   
 The analyses in this study progress in much the same manner as the OLS 
regressions of the comparative study in Chapter Four. A base model is included that 
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examines regional and wave variables with each network centrality measure. Following 
this base model is each of the models outlined in the previous section: economic, 
political, demographic, international, and a final model that includes all of the variables 
that reach significance in any of the previous models in that particular network analysis. 
As some of the variables these final models demonstrated collinearity, I examined each 
model for problematic variables and then re-ran the final model, excluding those 
variables with high VIF scores. Besides this final model, a key difference between this 
analysis and that of Chapter Four is the inclusion of a full model that examines the effects 
of all of the variables for that section with the centrality measure and control variables.  
 Generally, it is expected that most of the variables will demonstrate some effect 
on centrality scores in the REMs. However, fewer significant relationships are anticipated 
in the FEMs due to the restricted attention to longitudinal change. Measures of economic 
growth and development are expected to yield higher receiving centrality, with greater 
instability and unrest yielding higher sending centrality. Among the international 
variables, it is anticipated that greater FDI penetration, trade openness, and INGO 
participation will reduce sending centrality and increase receiving centrality. For the 
world system positions, peripheral status should be associated with higher sending and 
lower receiving centrality, while semiperipheral status should demonstrate negative 







RANDOM EFFECTS ANALYSIS OF THE GLOBAL REFUGEE NETWORK 
Analysis of the valued sending network 
 Results of random effects models including variables from multiple perspectives 
on centrality in the valued refugee-sending network across five waves from 1990 to 2008 
are presented in Tables 5.1 through 5.6. Each table presents results for individual models, 
net of wave and regional variation, culminating with a full model that includes all 
variables from that analysis, again controlling for region and time. A base model that 
includes only regional variables and time is presented in Model 1 of Table 5.1. Table 5.1 
also includes economic and development variables. Political variables are presented in 
Table 5.2, demographic variables in Table 5.3, environmental variables in Table 5.4, and 
international variables in Table 5.5. Table 5.6 presents results from a final, multivariate 
model that includes all of the significant variables from the previous tables along with 
regional and wave controls.  
Economic model 
 Table 5.1 presents REMs results for the regional base model, as well as variables 
capturing economic and development conditions within countries. In the base model 
(Model 1), each of the regional variables and time demonstrate positive significant 
relationships with valued sending centrality. Countries in each of these regions 
contributed significantly greater numbers of refugees to the global network than did 
Western countries. Of these regions, Sub-Saharan Africa shows the strongest 
relationship, followed closely by Eastern Europe and the Middle East. These 
relationships hold across most of the models in this analysis. Latin America demonstrates 
the weakest relationship of any of the regions, achieving only marginal significance in the 
249 
 
base model and moving in and out of significance across the rest of the models. Regional 
measures show the least significance in the full model. Only Africa and Eastern Europe 
maintain significance when considered with all of the economic measures. Of these, both 
are reduced by 70 percent from their values in the base model, indicating that economic 
conditions explain the majority of regional variation in valued-sending centrality. The 
time measure demonstrates a consistent positive effect on centrality across all models in 
this analysis, indicating an increase in refugee-sending activity over time.  
In the individual models, each of the economic variables demonstrates a 
significant negative relationship with valued sending centrality. GDP per capita, state 
strength, urbanization, and secondary education all negatively affect levels of refugee 
sending over the period of study. Of these, GDP per capita demonstrates the strongest 
relationship, increasing in strength in the final model. While state strength and secondary 
enrollment fail to maintain significance in the full model, the effect of urban population 
persists. The direction of this effect turns around in this model, indicating the presence of 
collinearity in this model. Collinearity checks revealed that urbanization and GDP per 
capita are highly correlated (.726), making the presence of both variables in this model 
problematic. When re-run without urbanization (Model 6a), the relationships identified in 
the full model do not change, however, the effect of GDP per capita becomes slightly 
weaker (-.616).  
250 
 
Table 5.1. Random Effects Models of Effects of Economic Conditions on Valued 
Sending Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 6a 
Economic Variables        
     GDP per capita  -.630*** 
(.056) 
 




     State strength   -.067*** 
(.027) 
 




     Urban population    -.287*** 
(.058) 
 
  .180** 
(.065) 
 
     Secondary school  
     enrollment 







        
Control Variables         
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Observations 1210 924 857 1030 824 745 745 
States 242 191 182 206 190 170 170 
R
2
 Within .13 .19 .18 .17 .15 .20 .21 
R
2
 Between .22 .50 .23 .29 .32 .52 .49 
R
2
 Overall .21 .44 .24 .27 .30 .47 .45 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 






Table 5.2. Random Effects Models of Effects of Political Variables on Valued 
Sending Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Political Variables      
     Political repression  .420*** 
(.038) 
 
    .315*** 
(.047) 
     Political terror   .262*** 
(.028) 
 
   .155*** 
(.034) 
     Collapse    .029* 
(.013) 
 
  .045** 
(.015) 





Control Variables       


































































Observations 955 879 1210 1210 625 
States 194 177 242 242 163 
R2 Within .22 .20 .13 .15 .26 
R2 Between .46 .43 .23 .35 .55 
R2 Overall .42 .39 .22 .33 .51 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 Results of REMs for the effects of domestic political conditions on centrality in 
the valued refugee-sending network are presented in Table 5.2. Like the economic 
analysis, regional variables and time hold significant positive relationships across most of 
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the models. The exception again is Latin America, which moves in and out of 
significance and has the weakest effect of any of the regional variables. Interestingly, 
most of the regions fail to reach significance in the full model in this analysis, indicating 
that political instability accounts for much of the regional variation in valued-sending 
centrality. The exception to this trend is Eastern Europe. While political repression 
explains over half of the effect of this region, the rest remains largely unexplained by the 
other political measures.  
Each of the political variables included in this analysis demonstrates a significant 
positive relationship with valued sending centrality. Countries experiencing these 
conditions contributed refugees to the global network at a high level. Political repression 
demonstrates the strongest relationship, followed by political terror, conflict, and 
collapse. Each of these relationships persists in the full model. Of the included variables, 
only state collapse demonstrates a strengthening of effect in the full model. 
Demographic model 
 Table 5.3 presents the results of the analysis of the effects of population dynamics 
on valued sending centrality. While the significance of the regional variables shows less 
stability in these models, regional variation and time continue to generally demonstrate 
positive effects on centrality. Among the demographic variables, density, infant 
mortality, and life expectancy have significant effects on refugee-sending levels. 
Population density and life expectancy reduce centrality, while infant mortality rates 
positively affect increased sending levels. In the final model, the effect of population 
density fails to persist. However, infant mortality and life expectancy maintain 
significance. Fertility rate becomes significant in the final model, demonstrating a 
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negative relationship with centrality. Collinearity checks indicate that these demographic 
variables are highly correlated (Mean VIF = 3.27; fertility = 4.23, infant mortality = 6.02, 
life expectancy = 5.73), reducing the validity of this full model.  
Table 5.3. Random Effects Models of Effects of Demographic Variables on Valued 
Sending Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Demographic Variables      
     Fertility rate  .022 
(.059) 
 
   -.167* 
(.067) 
     Population density  -.137* 
(.055) 
 
  -.016 
(.058) 
     Infant mortality    .337*** 
(.063) 
 
  .221** 
(.085) 





Control Variables       



































































Observations 993 1023 959 991 900 
States 203 211 192 203 187 
R2 Within .16 .16 .16 .17 .17 
R2 Between .18 .22 .34 .35 .37 
R2 Overall .18 .21 .31 .31 .32 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 






Table 5.4. Random Effects Models of Effects of Environmental Conditions on 
Valued Sending Network Centrality, 1990-2008. 
 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 
Environmental Variables    










Control Variables     










































Observations 974 952 901 
States 197 194 183 
R2 Within .18 .17 .19 
R2 Between .39 .19 .36 
R2 Overall .37 .18 .33 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 Results of models that include measures of environmental conditions and land use 
are presented in Table 5.4. Like the population models, regional variation shows varying 
degrees of significance across these models, but consistently in a positive direction. Both 
CO2 per capita and cropland under cultivation demonstrate significant negative 
relationships with valued refugee-sending centrality. While both relationships persist in 
the full model, the effect of cropland under cultivation is reduced in both strength and 
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level of significance, becoming marginally significant. By contrast, the effect of CO2 per 
capita remains essentially unchanged.  
International model 
Table 5.5. Random Effects Models of Effects of International Integration on Valued 
Sending Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 
International Variables      
     FDI penetration  .018 
(.030) 
 
   -.061 
(.041) 
     Trade openness   .042 
(.028) 
 
  -.033 
(.034) 
     Semiperiphery    .076 
(.072) 
 
  .092 
(.068) 
     Periphery    .115 
(.084) 
 
  .073 
(.090) 





Control Variables       


































































Observations 993 924 705 1117 645 
States 202 194 141 233 134 
R2 Within .16 .17 .18 .10 .17 
R2 Between .20 .22 .27 .32 .31 
R2 Overall .19 .22 .25 .30 .28 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
256 
 
 The effects of variables capturing levels of international integration on centrality 
in the valued refugee-sending network are presented in Table 5.5. Across these models, 
all of the regional variables demonstrate strong significant positive relationships with 
centrality. This includes the Latin America variable that has previously shown varying 
levels of significance. The persistence of the effects of regional variables in the full 
model indicates that international measures do not explain regional variation in the 
valued refugee-sending network. Among the international variables, however, there is 
little in the way of significant effects to be found. FDI penetration, trade openness, and 
world system position do not affect levels of refugee-sending centrality. Only INGO 
participation has a significant relationship with centrality, demonstrating a positive effect 
in the individual model (Model 23). Countries with more INGO membership ties were 
more central in the global network over the period of the analysis. This relationship fails 
to persist when included with other measures in the full model.  
Final model 
 In Table 5.6, I estimate all of the variables that demonstrated significance in 
previous models simultaneously (Tables 5.1 through 5.5), net of regional variation and 
time. Although urban population demonstrated a significant effect in Model 4, it is 
excluded from this model due to the collinearity it introduces into models with GDP per 
capita. The change in direction demonstrated by population density and infant mortality 
in the final model indicate that multicollinearity remains, in spite of the exclusion of 
urbanization. Upon further examination of VIF scores in the model, infant mortality 
(14.19), CO2 per capita (9.35), life expectancy (7.20), and secondary enrollment (6.67) 
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were found to be highly correlated. I removed these measures and re-ran the final model 
with the remaining variables. These results are presented in Model 26.  
In this model, the Middle East and Latin America fail to demonstrate a significant 
effect on centrality, while Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe maintain 
significance. As in all previous models, the time measure demonstrates a significant 
positive relationship with centrality. A number of previously significant variables fail to 
achieve significance when evaluated with other measures. State strength, collapse, 
cropland under cultivation, and INGO participation all lose significance in this model. 
GDP per capita, repression, human rights, conflict, and population density demonstrate 
similar relationships to those presented in earlier models. GDP per capita reduces 
centrality, while the political variables and population density yield greater centrality. 
The persistence of these effects when considered together indicates that these root causes 
operate independently of each other. Of these, GDP per capita demonstrates the strongest 
effect.  
Table 5.6. Random Effects Models of Effects of all Previously Significant Variables 
on Valued Sending Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 25 Model 26 
Predictor Variables   































































Control Variables    






























Observations 655 734 
States 153 157 
R2 Within .27 .27 
R2 Between .71 .66 
R2 Overall .64 .61 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 







Discussion of valued sending network results 
 
 The results of random effects models for domestic conditions and international 
integration on centrality in the valued refugee-sending network provide several 
interesting stories about conditions that influence sending levels across the network. 
Regional variation and time demonstrate consistent significant relationships with 
centrality across most models. These regional variables have positive effects on 
centrality, indicating that non-Western regions send more refugees than advanced 
Western countries. This finding reflects the trends identified in Chapter Three (see Figure 
3.3). Interestingly, several variables cause some or all of the regions to lose significance. 
For instance, the political repression model (Model 7) causes the Middle East, Latin 
America, and Asia to fall out of significance, clearly explaining sending centrality in 
these regions. The wave measure is positively signed, indicating that sending centrality in 
this network increases over time. This reflects the finding presented in Table 3.4. 
 Along with regional variation and time, a number of variables show significant 
positive effects on valued sending centrality. Each of the variables in the political model 
(Table 5.2) demonstrates a positive effect on centrality. The presence of political 
repression, human rights abuse, state collapse, and conflict all cause countries to be more 
central in the valued-sending network. These findings are particularly robust as the effect 
of each persists in the full model, with the effect of collapse becoming stronger. In 
addition to the political variables, infant mortality and INGO participation both yield 
greater centrality. The INGO finding is surprising. The world polity perspective would 
predict that greater INGO participation would lead to better conditions within potential 
sending countries, limiting the need for refugees to leave. This does not appear to be the 
case. It may be that greater participation in the world polity generates networks through 
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which refugees can more readily move, or it may be that countries that experience 
refugee movements gain INGO ties as aid and development organizations establish work 
in these countries to help in situations that have caused refugee flows. This relationship 
does not persist in the full model, indicating that the source of the effect is absorbed by 
the presence of other measures of international integration.  
 A number of variables demonstrate negative effects on centrality as well. GDP 
per capita, state strength, urbanization, and secondary enrollment all produce reductions 
in sending centrality. Countries at higher levels of economic development do not 
experience many of the conditions noted above that lead to increased refugee sending 
(i.e., political repression, state collapse). In addition to the economic variables, other 
indicators of development demonstrate negative relationships with centrality. Population 
density, life expectancy, and the environmental variables all yield reduced levels of 
refugee sending. Of all of these variables, the effect of GDP per capita is the strongest, 
with a coefficient of -.616 in the adjusted full economic model.  
 The importance of GDP per capita to centrality in the network is further 
demonstrated in the final model (Table 5.6, Model 26) in which GDP per capita has the 
strongest effect (-.380) in spite of the presence of the political variables and other factors. 
While three of the four political measures also demonstrate significant effects, the effect 
of GDP growth seems to be at least as important, if not more so, than these in predicting 
centrality. While political instability is certainly a primary contributor to refugee 
outflows, economic growth demonstrates the ability to counter these effects.  
 Two general trends emerge in this analysis. First, positive economic and 
development conditions lead to reduced refugee-sending centrality. The presence of 
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economic growth, strong governments, high life expectancies, and other positive 
conditions create an environment in which refugee outflows are not initiated or take place 
on a limited scale. This limited level of refugee sending may be the product of potential 
refugees having greater economic ties to their native country and choosing to stay in 
circumstances when less connected individuals might choose to move.  
 The second clear trend is the role of political instability and difficult domestic 
conditions in increasing refugee flows. While these findings are not particularly 
surprising, they do confirm that addressing these conditions is an important step in the 
process of limiting refugee movement and eliminating the causes of potential future 
moves. The INGO finding is an anomaly among these positive variables, as greater 
INGO membership is typically not perceived as a negative situation. However, INGOs 
may be more tied to these countries as a result of the difficult political conditions within 
them, thereby increasing the strength of this relationship over time as many sending 
countries continue to contribute refugees over long periods of time. For these countries 
INGO participation may increase, but without limiting refugee outflows.  
 This analysis yields mixed success with respect to predicted relationships. The 
economic variables act as expected, with each demonstrating a negative relationship with 
centrality. Likewise, the political variables exhibit the predicted positive relationships 
with centrality. Among the demographic variables, infant mortality and life expectancy 
yielded the expected outcomes, but population density acted in the opposite of the 
predicted relationship, while fertility rate failed to achieve significance. Among the 
environmental measures CO2 per capita demonstrated the opposite relationship to that 
predicted, having a negative effect on centrality rather than positive, while cropland 
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under cultivation demonstrated the predicted negative effect. The international integration 
model provides the most surprising differences between predicted and observed 
relationships. While FDI penetration, trade openness, and world system position were all 
expected to have significant effects in this model, none of these variables achieved 
significance with valued sending centrality. The only significant international variable - 
INGO membership ties - acts in the opposite direction of what was predicted, exerting a 
positive effect on centrality, rather than negative.  
Analysis of the valued receiving network 
 Results of random effects models including variables from multiple perspectives 
with centrality scores for the valued refugee-receiving network from 1990 to 2008 are 
presented in Tables 5.7 through 5.12. Each table presents results for individual models, 
net of wave and regional variation, and ends with a full model that includes all variables 
from that analysis, again controlling for region and time. A base model that includes only 
regional variables and time is presented in Table 5.7. This table also includes economic 
and development variables. Political variables are presented in Table 5.8, demographic 
variables in Table 5.9, environmental variables in Table 5.10, and international variables 
in Table 5.11. Table 5.12 presents results from a final, multivariate model that includes 
all of the significant variables from the previous tables along with regional and wave 
controls. 
Economic model 
 The results of REMs examining the effects of regional variation and economic 
variables on valued refugee-receiving centrality are presented in Table 5.7. Time shows a 
consistent positive relationship with receiving centrality, reflecting trends identified in 
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Chapter Three (see Table 3.4). Regions show different effects on centrality. Latin 
America and Asia show consistent significant negative relationships with centrality 
across these models. These regions receive fewer refugees, relative to Western countries. 
Africa and Eastern Europe move in and out of significance across models while the 
Middle East generally fails to reach significance. Interestingly, Africa demonstrates a 
marginally significant positive relationship with centrality in the regional model (Model 
1), indicating that African countries are more central relative to the West. However, this 
relationship changes direction in the presence of GDP per capita (Model 2 and Model 6), 
becoming negative at a greater level of significance. Unlike the analysis of the valued 
ending network, economic conditions demonstrate little efficacy in explaining regional 
variation in this analysis.   
 As in the valued-sending network analysis, each of the economic and 
development variables demonstrates a significant relationship with receiving centrality. 
However, these relationships are not as strong and, particularly in the case of secondary 
enrollment, not as robust across models. Of these measures, only the effects of GDP per 
capita and strength persist into the full model. Interestingly, both of these relationships 
become stronger in the presence of other variables in the model. The inclusion of urban 
population in this full model again introduces collinearity, however, the removal of this 
measure does not impact the other relationships demonstrated in Model 6. 
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Table 5.7. Random Effects Models of Effects of Economic Conditions on Valued 
Receiving Network Centrality, 1990-2008    
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 
6a 
Economic Variables        
     GDP per capita  -.328*** 
(.069) 
 




     State strength   -.060* 
(.030) 
 




     Urban population    -.144* 
(.065) 
 
  .119 
(.085) 
 
     Secondary school  
     enrollment 







Control Variables         






























































     Eastern Europe / Central  































Observations 1210 924 857 1030 824 745 745 
States 242 191 182 206 190 170 170 
R
2
 Within .01 .02 .02 .02 .01 .01 .02 
R
2
 Between .18 .25 .18 .18 .20 .25 .22 
R
2
 Overall .16 .21 .13 .15 .15 .18 .16 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 








Table 5.8. Random Effects Models of Effects of Political Variables on Valued 
Receiving Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Political Variables      
     Political repression  .139** 
(.044) 
 
    .065 
(.049) 
     Political terror   .084** 
(.032) 
 
   .059† 
(.035) 










Control Variables       


































































Observations 955 879 1210 1210 861 
States 194 177 242 242 174 
R2 Within .02 .01 .01 .02 .03 
R2 Between .20 .17 .18 .32 .25 
R2 Overall .17 .15 .16 .28 .21 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 Table 5.8 presents REMs for the analysis of political variables. Political 
repression, political terror, and conflict all demonstrate positive significant relationships 
with receiving centrality. Countries that experience these factors receive refugees at 
266 
 
higher rates than those that do not. Of these, political terror and conflict persist in the 
final model. Among the regional variables, only Latin America and Asia have consistent 
relationships with refugee receiving across these models, both having negative effects on 
centrality, indicating that these regions receive fewer refugees than the West. Variation in 
receiving centrality for the other included regions is explained by political conditions in 
these countries. 
Demographic model 
The results of REMs for demographic variables are presented in Table 5.9. As in 
the political analysis, only Latin America and Asia have significant relationships among 
the regional variables. Across the population measures, fertility rate has a positive effect 
on centrality, while population density and life expectancy have negative relationships 
with refugee receipt. Countries with high fertility rates have greater receiving centrality; 
those with greater levels of density and higher life expectancies have lower centrality. 
Infant mortality does not demonstrate a significant effect on centrality. Of the significant 
relationships, population density and life expectancy demonstrate marginal significance 
in the full model, while fertility rate fails to reach significance when other elements are 
included. As in the previous demographic model, the presence of collinearity  
(Mean VIF = 3.27) calls into question the validity of the results in Model 16. 
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Table 5.9. Random Effects Models of Effects of Demographic Variables on Valued 
Receiving Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Demographic Variables      
     Fertility rate  .137* 
(.062) 
 
    .067 
(.074) 
     Population density  -.170** 
(.057) 
 
  -.119† 
(.067) 










Control Variables       



































































Observations 993 1023 959 991 900 
States 203 211 192 203 187 
R2 Within .02 .20 .01 .01 .02 
R2 Between .18 .19 .16 .19 .18 
R2 Overall .16 .17 .14 .17 .15 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Environmental model 
 Results of REMs that include environmental and land use measures with 
receiving centrality are presented in Table 5.10. As in the previous tables, Latin America 
and Asia are the only significant regional variables, both having strong negative 
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relationships with centrality. CO2 per capita and cropland under cultivation also 
demonstrate negative relationships with receiving centrality. High levels of each are 
associated with reduced centrality. These relationships persist in the full model, but at 
reduced levels of significance. In this model, CO2 per capita manages to achieve only 
marginal significance. Additionally, the strength of both effects is reduced when they are 
estimated together.  
Table 5.10. Random Effects Models of Effects of Environmental Conditions on 
Valued Receiving Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 
Environmental Variables    










Control Variables     









































Observations 974 952 901 
States 197 194 183 
R2 Within .01 .02 .02 
R2 Between .19 .23 .21 
R2 Overall .17 .20 .18 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 






Table 5.11. Random Effects Models of Effects of International Integration on 
Valued Receiving Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 
International Variables      
     FDI penetration  .055† 
(.031) 
 
   -.033 
(.047) 
     Trade openness   .067* 
(.029) 
 
  -.015 
(.039) 















Control Variables       


































































Observations 993 924 705 1117 645 
States 202 194 141 233 134 
R2 Within .03 .02 .01 .00 .01 
R2 Between .19 .17 .24 .47 .27 
R2 Overall .18 .13 .21 .41 .22 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 Table 5.11 presents REMs results of the analyses of international integration 
measures with refugee-receiving centrality. The regional variables in this analysis 
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demonstrate an interesting pattern. While Latin America and Asia have significant 
negative relationships in models with FDI penetration and trade openness (Models 20 and 
21), these effects disappear in models with world system position and INGO participation 
(Models 22 and 23). By contrast, Sub-Saharan Africa fails to be significant in the first 
two models, but becomes the only significant regional variable in the world system and 
INGO models. Africa demonstrates a positive relationship with centrality in these 
models, indicating greater centrality for countries in these regions, relative to the West, 
when these variables are included. Also, the wave measure fails to reach significance in 
the model with FDI penetration (Model 20) and again in the full model (Model 24). 
Increased centrality in the network over time seems to be explained by the presence of 
foreign investment.   
Unlike the analysis of the valued sending network (Table 5.5), all of the 
international variables demonstrate significant effects in this analysis. FDI penetration 
and trade openness are positively related to centrality, while both measures of world 
system position are negatively related to centrality. INGO participation is also significant 
and positive in this analysis. Greater levels of FDI and participation in global trade cause 
countries to be more central in the receiving network. This may reflect the primary role 
played by countries like the United States in investment and trade and also refugee 
receipt. Greater INGO participation also increases receiving centrality. Countries with 
greater connections to the world polity may feel a greater responsibility in the 
international community to receive refugees. It is also possible that some countries have 
high levels of INGO ties as a result of the presence of previous refugee flows and the 
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presence of those earlier refugees makes these countries more likely hosts for future 
refugees as networks and services are more readily available.  
 Countries in the semiperiphery and the periphery receive fewer refugees, relative 
to the core. Many of the heaviest receiving countries (e.g., the United States, Germany, 
Pakistan) are in the core, and the volume of refugees received by these countries far 
outstrips that of countries at other world system positions. These relationships are 
particularly robust as they are the only variables in this analysis to reach significance in 
the full model.   
Final model 
 Table 5.12 presents REMs results of a model that includes all of the significant 
variables from previous models with valued refugee-receiving centrality. As in the valued 
sending final model, examining VIF scores revealed a number of highly correlated 
variables. CO2 per capita (VIF=10.53), secondary school enrollment (8.58), life 
expectancy (7.04), and fertility rate (6.95) were excluded, and the final model re-run. 
Results of this adjusted model are presented in Model 26. A number of interesting 
findings emerge. As in most of the previous models in this section, Latin America and 
Asia have significant relationships, along with the time measure. While Eastern Europe 
failed to reach significance in most of the models, this measure demonstrates a significant 
effect in this one. Of the economic variables, only GDP per capita maintains significance 
in this model, while conflict is the only political variable to reach significance. 
Development and instability do not seem to have the same levels of independent effects 
with receiving centrality that they demonstrate with sending centrality.  
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 The international integration measures demonstrate varying degrees of robustness 
in this model. FDI and trade openness fail to reach significance, but the significant effects 
of world system position and INGO participation persist. Semiperipheral and peripheral 
status are negatively signed, indicating that core countries in the global trade network 
receive more refugees than those in these lower positions. The effect of peripheral 
position is particularly strong (-.362), representing the strongest relationship in any of the 
models in the analysis. The variables that persist in this model clearly demonstrate the 
independent functioning of three key sets of relationships: development, instability, and 
integration. 
Table 5.12. Random Effects Models of Effects of all Previously Significant Variables 
on Valued Receiving Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 25 Model 26 














































































Control Variables    






























Observations 534 588 
States 124 125 
R2 Within .05 .01 
R2 Between .53 .53 
R2 Overall .44 .42 
   
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Discussion of valued receiving network results 
 Analyses of the valued refugee-receiving network demonstrate a number of 
interesting and important relationships. Among the regional variables, only Latin 
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America and Asia consistently reach significance. The negative relationships 
demonstrated by these regions indicate that they receive refugees at a lower rate than 
Western countries. While these relationships are not present in international models with 
world system position or INGO ties, they are persistent across other models, including 
the final model that contains the position and INGO measures.  
 Domestic and international factors from a variety of models demonstrated 
significant positive relationships with receiving centrality. Interestingly, elements of 
political instability that increased centrality in the sending network also have a positive 
effect on centrality in the receiving network. Political repression, political terror, and 
conflict are all related to greater refugee-receiving centrality. The effect of conflict is 
particularly robust, persisting in the full political model and the final model. Two 
elements seem to be at work in these findings. First, countries that experience high levels 
of political repression and poor human rights scores tend to be in high refugee-sending 
regions. Proximity to other countries experiencing these conditions make these countries 
likely destinations for refugees who do not have the means to travel beyond crossing a 
border. Additionally, the United States and several other high-receiving countries were 
involved in conflicts away from their own country during several of the waves of the 
study. While previous studies have found that refugees tend to avoid moving to countries 
engaged in conflict when possible (Moore and Shellman 2007), the kind of conflict 
experienced by many high-receiving countries in this study would not deter inbound 
refugees. 
 In addition to political elements, several measures of international integration are 
related to increased receiving centrality. Countries that have high levels of FDI 
275 
 
penetration, trade openness, and INGO participation receive refugees at high levels. 
These countries tend to be more active in global networks, particularly transportation 
networks, and may represent easy destinations for refugees. Additionally, countries that 
are high in INGO ties may be more open to receiving refugees due to the presence of 
scripts that identify such receipt as the appropriate thing for countries to do in global 
culture. The robustness of the INGO findings, demonstrated by the persistence of the 
relationship in the final model, indicates the importance of this relationship in 
understanding receiving centrality.  
 The analyses across these models also reveal a number of elements that are 
negatively related to valued receiving centrality. Each of the economic and development 
measures demonstrates a significant negative relationship with centrality. Countries with 
growing economies, strong governments, more urban populations, and high secondary 
enrollment receive fewer refugees than those facing opposite conditions. This 
demonstrates the role played by economic development in limiting refugee receipt. It is 
possible that these more-developed countries are removed from areas of political 
instability that generate refugee flows and that this distance limits the extent to which 
these countries are affected by these movements. It is also possible, as some have 
discussed (see Betts 2008), that these advanced countries are able to limit the number of 
refugees received, thus reducing their centrality. Other measures that capture different 
facets of development – life expectancy, CO2 per capita, and cropland under cultivation – 
also demonstrate negative relationships with centrality.  
 The world system measures also have significant negative relationships with 
receiving centrality. Both semiperipheral and peripheral countries receive refugees at 
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lower levels than countries in the core. Countries at these levels are less attractive as 
destinations for refugees who are able to choose where they go and may be bypassed for 
more advanced destinations when possible. When considered with the development 
findings, these results indicate that more-developed countries receive fewer refugees, but 
countries that are highly integrated in global networks receive more. Advanced countries 
have been primary destinations for refugees for most of the modern history of these 
movements. As such, many of those counted in these countries as refugees, have resided 
in these countries for decades. An interesting area for further study would be to examine 
the destination choices of refugees in recent flows to see the extent to which these 
dynamics have changed over time, resulting in the development of new refugee 
destinations.  
 Of the economic and political variables in the final model, only GDP per capita 
and conflict persist. Other economic and political measures demonstrate important effects 
individually and with other similar variables, however, their effects are not robust when 
estimated with the other measures in this model. Integration measures fare slightly better, 
with world system position and INGO participation persisting. Peripheral status 
demonstrates the strongest relationship of any in this model, again indicating the 
importance of this measure in understanding refugee movements (-.362). 
 Two general trends are observed from this analysis. First, two kinds of countries 
emerge as high-receiving refugee destinations. Countries with greater instability are more 
central in the valued receiving network. These countries may experience greater refugee 
inflows due to proximity to refugee-sending countries or due to a reduced ability to 
control refugee flows into their borders. The movement of refugees into these countries in 
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which they may face similar circumstances as those from which they are fleeing indicates 
a lack of autonomy in destination decisions for many refugees. In addition to less-stable 
countries, those countries that are more connected to global networks are more central 
receivers of refugees. Countries with greater trade, investment, and participation in the 
INGO network are connected via communications and transportation, easing population 
movements between these countries. The world system position measures demonstrate 
this dynamic through the presence of negative relationships for semiperipheral and 
peripheral status, indicating that less connected countries receive fewer refugees. 
 The second general trend is the role of economic development in decreasing 
receiving centrality. Some advanced countries are highly central in the valued receiving 
network (e.g., the United States, Germany), demonstrating the effects of higher 
integration in global networks. However, many high-receiving countries are at medium 
and low levels of development. More-developed countries may be better able to limit 
refugee inflows, either through distance or through border protections, while less-
developed countries are easier targets for refugees. Regional movement may also play a 
role in this dynamic, as high refugee-sending countries tend to be in poorer regions. Less-
developed countries in these regions may, as a result, receive higher numbers of refugees.  
 While the relationships in the sending network emerged along fairly predictable 
lines, this is less true for the receiving network. As some of the most developed countries 
are high receivers of refugees, it stands to reason that development would be positively 
related to refugee-receiving centrality. This turns out not to be the case. Conversely, it 
makes intuitive sense that refugees would avoid moving from one negative political 
situation to another. Again, the findings from this analysis demonstrate that the opposite 
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is true. Predictions about the effects of these variables on centrality proved to be 
incorrect. Additionally, population density and semiperipheral status demonstrate 
relationships that are the opposite of predictions. Collapse also presented an unexpected 
relationship, failing to achieve a predicted negative relationship with centrality.  
 While a number of relationships demonstrated the opposite of predicted effects or 
failed to demonstrate any significant relationships, a number of predictions were 
confirmed in this analysis. Peripheral status demonstrated the anticipated negative 
relationships with receiving centrality, while INGO participation met expectations with a 
significant positive relationship. A number of variables for which no significant effect 
was predicted also impacted centrality. The population measures, environmental 
measures, FDI penetration, and trade openness all reached significance in individual or 
full models, demonstrating an unexpected important role for these measures in 
understanding receiving centrality.  
Analysis of the dichotomized sending network 
 Results of random effects models for variables from multiple perspectives with 
centrality in the dichotomized refugee-sending network from 1990 to 2008 are presented 
in Tables 5.13 through 5.18. Each table presents results for individual models, net of 
wave and regional variation, and ends with a full model that includes all variables from 
that analysis, again controlling for region and time. A base model that includes only 
regional variables and time is presented in Table 5.13. This table also includes economic 
and development variables. Political variables are presented in Table 5.14, demographic 
variables in Table 5.15, environmental variables in Table 5.16, and international variables 
in Table 5.17. Table 5.18 presents results from a final, multivariate model that includes 
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all of the significant variables from the previous tables along with regional and wave 
controls. 
Economic model 
 Results of REMs for the effects of economic and development variables on 
centrality in the dichotomized refugee-sending network are presented in Table 5.13. The 
wave measure demonstrates a consistent significant positive relationship with sending 
centrality across models, confirming earlier findings that the network becomes more 
active over time (see Table 3.2). Regional variables experience mixed results. In the base 
model, the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe reach significance, each 
demonstrating a positive relationship with centrality. Across the models in this analysis, 
all of the regional variables move in and out of significance with the exception of the 
Middle East, which consistently achieves significance.  
 As in the economic analysis of the valued sending network (Table 5.1), all of the 
economic variables demonstrate significant negative relationships with dichotomized 
sending centrality. GDP per capita has a particularly strong effect, reaching -.571 in the 
individual model with only a slight weakening to -.563 in the adjusted full model (Model 
6a). These results indicate that countries with greater economic development send 
refugees to fewer partners than less developed countries. Of the economic variables, GDP 
per capita, strength, and urbanization persist in the full model, while enrollment loses 
significance when considered with the other measures. Again, I removed urbanization 
and ran an adjusted full model to evaluate the effects of collinearity that it introduced into 
the model. The relationships of GDP per capita, state strength, and secondary enrollment 
were unchanged in this model, however, the effect of GDP per capita was diminished.  
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Table 5.13. Random Effects Models of Effects of Economic Conditions on 
Dichotomized Sending Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 6a 
Economic Variables        
     GDP per capita  -.571*** 
(.049) 
 




     State strength   -.070** 
(.022) 
 




     Urban population    -.234*** 
(.053) 
 
  .236*** 
(.052) 
 







Control Variables         




























































     Eastern Europe / Central  































Observations 1210 924 857 1030 824 745 745 
States 242 191 182 206 190 170 170 
R
2
 Within .43 .56 .57 .52 .58 .62 .62 
R
2
 Between .29 .57 .31 .34 .34 .62 .58 
R
2
 Overall .31 .55 .38 .37 .40 .63 .60 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Political model 
Table 5.14 presents the results of REMs that include political variables. Among 
the regional variables, the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe demonstrate 
consistent significant relationships while Latin America and Asia remain largely non-
significant across models. Significant relationships among these variables are all positive, 
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indicating greater centrality relative to Western countries. As in the previous models, 
time continues to demonstrate a significant positive relationship with centrality across 
models.  
Table 5.14. Random Effects Models of Effects of Political Conditions on 
Dichotomized Sending Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Political Variables      
     Political repression  .333*** 
(.032) 
 
    .244*** 
(.032) 
     Political terror   .213*** 
(.023) 
 
   .144*** 
(.023) 
     Collapse    .017 
(.011) 
 
  .019† 
(.010) 





Control Variables       



































































Observations 955 879 1210 1210 861 
States 194 177 242 242 174 
R2 Within .57 .58 .43 .42 .62 
R2 Between .50 .48 .30 .40 .59 
R2 Overall .52 .49 .31 .40 .59 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 




Political repression, political terror, and conflict all demonstrate positive effects 
on dichotomized sending centrality. Countries that experience these conditions send 
refugees to more partners than countries that do not. Political repression demonstrates the 
strongest relationship of these measures; however the African and Eastern European 
regions show stronger relationships in some of the models. Each of the three significant 
variables persists in the full model (Model 11). Interestingly, collapse becomes 
marginally significant in this model as well, demonstrating a fairly weak relationship 
with sending centrality.  
Demographic model 
 Results of REMs of the effects of demographic conditions on dichotomized 
refugee-sending centrality are presented in Table 5.15. Regional variation and time match 
the patterns demonstrated in previous models. The Middle East, Africa, and Eastern 
Europe maintain consistent significant positive relationships with centrality, while Latin 
America and Asia generally fail to reach significance. Each of the population variables 
also achieves significance in this analysis. Fertility, population density, and life 
expectancy are negatively related to sending centrality, while infant mortality 
demonstrates a positive relationship. These findings reflect the general pattern of the 
analysis, with socio-economic development reducing sending centrality. Of these 
relationships, only population density fails to reach significance in the full model. The 
effects of fertility and infant mortality become more pronounced in this model and life 
expectancy becomes weaker. As in previous demographic models, the presence of 
multicollinearity in this model calls these results into question. However, the findings 
with respect to individual relationships are sound.  
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Table 5.15. Random Effects Models of Effects of Demographic Variables on 
Dichotomized Sending Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Demographic Variables      
     Fertility rate -.113* 
(.051) 
 
   -.254*** 
(.055) 
     Population density  -.102* 
(.051) 
 
  -.015 
(.050) 
     Infant mortality    .268*** 
(.054) 
 
  .287*** 
(.070) 





Control Variables       


































































Observations 993 1023 959 991 900 
States 203 211 192 203 187 
R2 Within .54 .52 .54 .52 .57 
R2 Between .20 .27 .38 .35 .40 
R2 Overall .27 .32 .41 .38 .43 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Environmental model 
 Results of REMs evaluating the effects of environmental measures on sending 
centrality are presented in Table 5.16. The regional and time measures follow the 
established patterns in these models. CO2 per capita demonstrates a strong significant 
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negative relationship with sending centrality that persists in the full model at only a 
slightly reduced level of strength. In contrast, cropland under cultivation reaches only 
marginal significance in its individual model and fails to reach significance in the full 
model.  
Table 5.16. Random Effects Models of Effects of Environmental Conditions on 
Dichotomized Sending Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 
Environmental Variables    










Control Variables     











































Observations 974 952 901 
States 197 194 183 
R2 Within .55 .55 .58 
R2 Between .42 .25 .37 
R2 Overall .46 .31 .43 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 







Table 5.17. Effects of International Integration on Dichotomized Sending Network 
Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 
International Variables      
     FDI penetration  .027 
(.026) 
 
   -.044 
(.033) 
     Trade openness   .098*** 
(.023) 
 
   .025 
(.028) 
     Semiperiphery    .098 
(.062) 
 
  .109† 
(.057) 
     Periphery    .091 
(.072) 
 
  .038 
(.075) 





Control Variables       



































































Observations 993 924 705 1117 645 
States 202 194 141 233 134 
R2 Within .51 .55 .57 .42 .58 
R2 Between .28 .29 .34 .45 .38 
R2 Overall .32 .35 .39 .45 .43 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 Table 5.17 shows results of REMs examining the effects of international variables 
on centrality in the dichotomized refugee-sending network. While the time variable 
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continues to show the significant positive relationship seen in previous models, the 
regional variables behave somewhat differently. The Middle East, Africa, and Eastern 
Europe maintain the significant positive relationships exhibited in previous models, and, 
unlike in previous models, Latin America and Asia also reach significance across most of 
the models in this analysis.  
The international variables are largely non-significant in this model. Only trade 
openness and INGO ties demonstrate significant relationships in the individual analyses. 
Both have positive effects on sending centrality with INGO participation demonstrating a 
much stronger effect than openness (.238 versus .098). FDI penetration and world system 
position fail to reach significance. In the full model, the previously significant 
relationships of trade and INGOs fail to persist. However, semiperipheral status becomes 
marginally significant when other international measures are included in the analysis.  
Final model 
 The random effects model presented in Table 5.18 includes all of the significant 
variables from prior models in this section. After reviewing VIF scores to check for the 
presence of collinearity, I removed infant mortality (VIF = 16.90), CO2 per capita 
(10.98), secondary enrollment (8.55), life expectancy (7.82), and fertility rate (6.86). The 
results of the model with these variables excluded are presented in Model 26. The time 
measure remains positive and significant in this model, while Africa, Asia, and Eastern 
Europe also maintain significant relationships. Of the variables included in this model, 
only cropland under cultivation and trade openness fail to reach significance.  
 The variables that maintain significance in this final model tell a familiar story. 
Measures capturing positive economic or development conditions (GDP per capita, 
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strength) are negatively related to sending centrality, while those representing instability 
(political repression, political terror, conflict) demonstrate positive effects on centrality. 
While trade openness fails to reach significance, the positive significant effects of both 
semiperipheral status and INGO participation persist. Greater participation in the world 
polity through INGOs causes countries to send refugees to more partners, while greater 
participation in the global trade network reduced dichotomized sending centrality.  
Table 5.18. Random Effects Models of Effects of all Previously Significant Variables 
on Dichotomized Sending Network Centrality, 1990-2008  
 Model 25 Model 26 
Predictor Variables   








































































Control Variables    






























Observations 534 592 
States 124 125 
R2 Within .66 .65 
R2 Between .81 .79 
R2 Overall .77 .75 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Discussion of dichotomized sending centrality results 
 
 These analyses of the effects of domestic conditions and international integration 
on degree centrality in the dichotomized refugee-sending network reveal a number of 
important relationships with varying impacts on the number of sending ties held by 
countries in the global refugee network. As in earlier analyses, the wave variable holds a 
significant positive relationship with centrality across all of the models in the analysis, 
reflecting earlier findings that this network becomes more active over time (see Table 
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3.2). While not as consistent as the time measure, the Middle East, Africa, and Eastern 
Europe demonstrate significant relationships across most of the models in the analysis. 
Latin America and Asia move in and out of significance across models. When significant, 
all of the regional variables have a positive relationship with centrality, indicating that 
countries in these regions send refugees to more partners than countries in the West. As 
Western countries tend to send very few refugees, and then only to a limited number of 
partners typically at similar levels of development, it makes sense that this region would 
have low centrality relative to that of other regions.  
 As in the analysis of the valued refugee-sending network, centrality in the 
dichotomized sending network is reduced by the presence of positive economic and 
development outcomes. Countries with higher GDP per capita, state strength, 
urbanization, and secondary enrollment all send refugees to fewer countries than those 
that have lower scores on these measures. The presence of these positive conditions tends 
to preclude the development of issues that generate refugee flows and often gives 
individuals greater reason to stay when conditions emerge that might prompt movement 
in less-developed countries. Additionally, countries at higher levels of development, 
when they do send refugees, tend to send them to only a handful of other highly 
developed countries, reflecting a greater degree of autonomy held by refugees from these 
countries in choosing destinations. The trend of higher development leading to reductions 
in sending centrality is also evidenced by negative relationships held by life expectancy 
and environmental measures. Interestingly, higher fertility rates are associated with 
reduced sending centrality. It is possible that countries with high fertility are more prone 
to internal refugee movements, rather than cross-national movements, due to limited 
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resources or the difficulty of transporting a lot of children across a border. This finding is 
the exception to the general trend about development and is an interesting area for future 
study.  
 Conditions associated with increased dichotomized centrality also reflect those 
revealed in the valued sending analysis. The experience of political repression, political 
terror, collapse, and conflict all yield greater numbers of sending ties. These conditions 
are associated with the initiation and propagation of refugee flows and would be expected 
to cause countries to send refugees to more partners. For countries in which these 
conditions have become chronic, ties may also be increased as host countries close their 
borders to new refugee flows or become less attractive as destinations due to their own 
instability. These restrictions and changes create a need to find new sending partners as 
outflows continue. In addition to these political conditions, higher infant mortality rates 
are also associated with greater sending centrality. This finding reflects the inverse of the 
development effect, as higher infant mortality typically occurs in less-developed 
countries.  
 Two areas of international integration are also associated with greater 
dichotomized sending centrality. Trade openness and INGO participation both 
demonstrate positive relationships with refugee-sending ties. Countries that are involved 
in global trade tend to be more connected to global communication and transportation 
networks, facilitating movement between countries. When refugee flows occur, 
individuals are better able to take advantage of these connections, creating more potential 
destinations for refugees to be sent. Greater participation in the INGO network also 
generates more potential destinations through communication networks and the role 
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played by many INGOs in relocating refugees when crises occur. The development of 
these connections yields greater centrality for countries that send refugees.  
 The results of the final model (Table 5.18, Model 26) demonstrate the 
independence of these relationships as most of the significant variables from the analyses 
maintain significance when estimated together. The economic and political variables, as 
well as semiperipheral status and INGO participation, demonstrate strong relationships in 
the original directions. Greater development reduces centrality, while greater instability 
increases it. The effect of international integration depends on the channel. Greater INGO 
participation increases centrality, while greater participation in the trade network 
decreases it. Environmental conditions and trade openness fail to maintain significance 
when considered with variables from other models.  
 The general trends of this analysis follow those identified in the valued-sending 
analysis. Greater development is associated with reduced dichotomized refugee-sending 
centrality, while political instability and limited development yield greater centrality. 
These findings for the dichotomized network may largely reflect the number of refugees 
sent by these countries; however, other dynamics may also be at work. The positive 
relationships of participation in global systems exhibited by trade openness and INGO 
participation provide an alternate narrative of sending centrality for countries that send 
refugees at appreciable levels. Additionally, the tendency of high-sending countries to 
send refugees over long periods of time leads to the possibility of destination countries 
changing as receiving windows close, necessitating the development of new destinations.  
 Many of the previously predicted relationships emerged in this analysis. All of the 
economic and political variables demonstrated the expected relationships, as did 
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semiperipheral status. Economic variables reduced centrality, while political conditions 
and semiperipheral status increased centrality. Among the population variables, infant 
mortality and life expectancy demonstrated the predicted effects, as did the 
environmental measures. Fertility rate and population density had opposite effects of 
those anticipated, demonstrating negative relationships rather than the predicted positive 
ones. Some international variables that were predicted to affect centrality (FDI 
penetration and peripheral status) failed to demonstrate any significant relationship, while 
others (trade openness and INGO participation) demonstrated relationships in the 
opposite direction of predictions.  
Analysis of the dichotomized receiving network 
Results of random effects models examining the influence of variables from 
multiple perspectives on centrality in the dichotomized refugee-receiving network from 
1990 to 2008 are presented in Tables 5.19 through 5.24. Each table presents results for 
individual models, net of wave and regional variation, and ends with a full model that 
includes all variables from that analysis, again controlling for region and time. A base 
model that includes only regional variables and time is presented in Table 5.19. This table 
also includes economic and development variables. Political variables are presented in 
Table 5.20, demographic variables in Table 5.21, environmental variables in Table 5.22, 
and international variables in Table 5.23. Table 5.24 presents results from a final, 
multivariate model that includes all of the significant variables from the previous tables 






Table 5.19. Random Effects Models of Effects of Economic Conditions on 
Dichotomized Receiving Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 
6a 
Economic Variables        
     GDP per capita  -.146* 
(.069) 
 




     State strength   -.100** 
(.032) 
 




     Urban population     .017 
(.062) 
 
  .277** 
(.080) 
 
     Secondary school  
     enrollment 







Control Variables         
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Observations 1210 924 857 1030 824 745 745 
States 242 191 182 206 190 170 170 
R
2
 Within .19 .24 .25 .22 .25 .26 .27 
R
2
 Between .18 .19 .28 .18 .22 .32 .26 
R
2
 Overall .18 .22 .26 .19 .23 .29 .25 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 The results of REMs for the effects of the regional base model and economic 
development variables are presented in Table 5.19. The wave variable in the base model 
(Model 1) has a significant positive relationship with receiving centrality, demonstrating 
that the network becomes more active over time (Table 3.3). Among the regional 
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variables, only Latin America and Asia demonstrate significant relationships in the base 
model. However, all of the regions become significant in subsequent models as economic 
variables are added. Across these models, all of the significant regional variables 
demonstrate negative relationships with centrality, indicating that these regions hold 
fewer receiving ties, relative to Western countries.    
GDP per capita and state strength both demonstrate significant negative 
relationships with centrality. The effect of GDP per capita is relatively weak in this 
model, compared to the previous three analyses. Both urbanization and secondary 
enrollment fail to reach significance in the individual models. However, urbanization 
becomes significant in the full model, demonstrating again the collinearity noted in 
previous full economic models. When this model is estimated without urban population, 
only state strength maintains a significant relationship with centrality. Results of this 
adjusted model are presented in Model 6a.  
Political model 
 Table 5.20 presents the results of REMs examining the effects of political 
variables. As in the economic analysis, time demonstrates a positive relationship with 
centrality while the regional variables have significant negative relationships with 
centrality across most of the models. Most of the political variables fail to reach 
significance with receiving centrality. Only conflict demonstrates a significant 
relationship, showing a positive effect on centrality. This relationship persists in the full 
model. Interestingly, countries that experience conflict receive refugees from more 




Table 5.20. Random Effects Models of Effects of Political Conditions on 
Dichotomized Receiving Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Political Variables      
     Political repression  .006 
(.047) 
 
   -.067 
(.053) 
     Political terror   .037 
(.035) 
 
   .055 
(.038) 










Control Variables       


































































Observations 995 879 1210 1210 861 
States 194 177 242 242 174 
R2 Within .23 .23 .19 .18 .23 
R2 Between .20 .20 .18 .24 .23 
R2 Overall .21 .21 .18 .22 .23 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 






Table 5.21. Random Effects Models of Effects of Demographic Variables on 
Dichotomized Receiving Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 
Demographic Variables      
     Fertility rate -.003 
(.063) 
 
    .008 
(.076) 
     Population density  -.183*** 
(.055) 
 
  -.186** 
(.063) 









Control Variables       

































































Observations 993 1023 959 991 900 
States 203 211 192 203 187 
R2 Within .23 .23 .24 .23 .26 
R2 Between .18 .18 .17 .16 .20 
R2 Overall .21 .20 .19 .21 .24 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 Results of REMs examining relationships between demographic conditions and 
receiving centrality are reported in Table 5.21. The time and regional variables 
demonstrate essentially the same relationships noted in previous results. Africa is the 
exception to this pattern as it falls out of significance in models that include infant 
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mortality (Models 14 and 16). Of the population variables, only population density 
reaches significance in the individual models. Countries with denser populations receive 
fewer refugees. This relationship persists in the full model. While non-significant in the 
individual model, infant mortality becomes significant in the full model, demonstrating a 
negative relationship with centrality. This full model again demonstrates collinearity, 
casting doubt on the validity of the results in this model. 
Environmental model 
Table 5.22 reports the results of REMs of the effects of environmental and land 
use variables on centrality in the dichotomized refugee-receiving network. For this 
analysis, all of the regional variables and the wave measure demonstrate significant 
relationships across models. Regional variation is consistently negative while time has a 
positive effect on centrality. CO2 per capita fails to reach significance in either model. 
However, cropland under cultivation demonstrates a significant negative effect on 
centrality. Countries that utilize higher percentages of farmland receive refugees from 
fewer partners than less agrarian countries. As most of the countries with the highest 
scores for this measure are small and relatively isolated (e.g. Tuvalu), this finding is not a 
surprise. This relationship is robust, persisting in the full model with only a slightly 
weakened effect.  
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Table 5.22. Random Effects Models of Effects of Environmental Conditions on 
Dichotomized Receiving Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 
Environmental Variables    










Control Variables     










































Observations 974 952 901 
States 197 194 183 
R2 Within .23 .23 .25 
R2 Between .17 .30 .26 
R2 Overall .19 .29 .26 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
International model 
 Results of REMs examining relationships between international variables and 
receiving centrality are presented in Table 5.23. While the time variable is once again 
consistently significant and positive, the regional variables move in and out of 
significance across models. Only Asia demonstrates a significant effect across all of the 
models in this analysis. World system position and INGO membership ties both cause 
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most of the regions to fall out of significance, indicating that these measures explain the 
effects of regional variation, relative to the West, for these regions.  
Table 5.23. Random Effects Models of Effects of International Interaction on 
Dichotomized Receiving Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24 
International Variables      
     FDI penetration  .059† 
(.034) 
 
    .060 
(.047) 
     Trade openness   .169*** 
(.032) 
 
   .041 
(.040) 














      
Control Variables       


































































Observations 993 924 705 1117 645 
States 202 194 141 233 134 
R2 Within .23 .27 .23 .14 .25 
R2 Between .24 .21 .42 .59 .48 
R2 Overall .25 .22 .37 .52 .44 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 




All of the international variables demonstrate at least marginally significant 
effects on centrality in the dichotomized receiving network. FDI penetration, trade 
openness, and INGO participation all have positive effects on centrality in individual 
models. Greater international interaction in these systems yields increased numbers of 
partners from whom refugees are received. Of these, INGO ties demonstrates the 
strongest relationship and this measure is the only one of the three that persists in the full 
model. The world system measures demonstrate significant relationships in the opposite 
direction, having negative effects on centrality. Countries in the semiperiphery and 
periphery receive refugees from fewer partners, relative to the core, indicating that 
greater integration in the global trade network increases the number of partners from 
whom refugees are received. Only peripheral status maintains significance in the full 
model, demonstrating that the effects of semiperipheral status are explained by the 
presence of other variables in the model.  
Final model 
 Results of the final random effects model that includes all of the significant 
variables from previous models are presented in Table 5.24. Collinearity checks for this 
model indicate that only infant mortality presents a problem (VIF=11.60). The adjusted 
final model without this variable is presented in Model 26. In this model, the wave 
measure continues to demonstrate a strong, significant positive relationship with 
centrality. Among the regional variables, only Africa fails to reach significance, 
indicating that the included domestic conditions and measures of international integration 
explain the effect of African status on dichotomized receiving centrality. Each of the 
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other included regions demonstrates a significant negative relationship with receiving 
centrality.  
 The variables included in this analysis are largely non-significant when 
considered together. GDP per capita and state strength continue to be significantly related 
to receiving centrality, although strength is only marginally significant in this model. 
Political, demographic, and environmental measures all fail to reach significance. Among 
the international variables, both world system position measures reach significance in this 
model, demonstrating negative relationships with centrality. While semiperipheral status 
is only marginally significant, the effect of peripheral position is again the strongest in 
the model (-.404). Finally, INGO participation presents the only positive significant 
relationship in this model. Countries with more INGO ties experience greater receiving 
centrality.  
Table 5.24. Random Effects Models of Effects of all Previously Significant Variables 
on Dichotomized Receiving Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 25 Model 26 
Predictor Variables   
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Control Variables    






























Observations 611 611 
States 130 130 
R2 Within .25 .24 
R2 Between .56 .57 
R2 Overall .48 .48 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Discussion of dichotomized receiving network results  
 Examining the effects of domestic conditions and international interactions on 
centrality in the dichotomized refugee-receiving network reveals many interesting 
relationships, many unexpected. As in earlier analyses, the time variable demonstrates a 
consistent significant positive relationship with centrality. Once again, this result 
confirms the previous finding that this network becomes more active over time (see Table 
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3.3). Across models, the Latin America and Asia variables are consistently significant, 
with other regional measures moving in and out of significance based on the other 
variables in the model. All of the significant regional variation is negative, indicating that 
the included regions receive refugees from fewer partners than countries in the West. 
This finding also reflects previous results as the top receivers across waves are primarily 
developed Western countries (see Table 3.12 through 3.16).  
 While the analysis of the valued receiving network revealed many significant 
relationships between variables and centrality, far fewer significant effects are identified 
in the examination of the dichotomized network. GDP per capita and state strength both 
have significant negative relationships with dichotomized receiving centrality, 
demonstrating that countries with growing economies and strong governments receive 
refugees from fewer partners than weaker states. Part of this finding reflects results from 
the valued receiving analysis that these countries receive fewer total refugees, reducing 
the size of the pool from which potential ties might emerge. These countries tend to have 
tighter controls on borders and more restrictive entry policies that might favor some 
countries to the exclusion of others. Additionally, these countries may be less accessible 
for refugees due to distance. While a number of strong, growing countries are among the 
most central in this network (see again Tables 3.12 through 3.16), this finding 
demonstrates that these countries are not the norm among their peers.  
 In addition to these economic variables, population density and cropland under 
cultivation demonstrate significant negative relationships with receiving centrality. 
Countries with greater density and more arable land in production are less central in the 
network. Higher density countries might be viewed as less attractive destinations, as 
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would those with higher infant mortality. Often these countries are in heavy refugee-
sending regions. They may host large numbers of refugees, but from only a few 
surrounding countries (e.g., Pakistan). Countries at the highest levels of cropland under 
cultivation are typically smaller countries that are far removed from primary refugee-
sending areas (e.g., Tuvalu). The effect demonstrated in this analysis may have little to do 
with actual land use and more to do with proximity and development levels. It is telling 
that this relationship falls out of significance in the final model (Table 5.24), when world 
system position and other measures are included.  
The presence of conflict is positively related to dichotomized receiving centrality. 
Many of the countries among the top ten holders of receiving ties experienced conflict 
during the time period. Most of these conflicts did not occur on their native soil (e.g., the 
United States‟ conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq). The presence of these conflicts would 
cause the measure to reach significance in this model, but this does not necessarily 
indicate that refugees move readily from one area of conflict to another. However, there 
is also evidence that many refugees have limited autonomy in making destination 
choices. These refugees may move from one area of conflict to another because they have 
little choice in where they go.  
 In addition to conflict, several of the measures of international interaction 
demonstrate significant positive relationships with centrality. FDI penetration, trade 
openness, and INGO participation are all associated with increased centrality. 
Interactions along these channels make countries more open to receiving migrants of any 
type (Zlotnik 1992), refugees included. As countries are more connected to trade and 
transportation networks, they become more easily accessible destinations, often 
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increasing the number of partners from which they receive refugees. Additionally, the 
presence of high levels of INGO ties also indicates the potential for the transmission of 
world polity scripts that place a high value on the receipt of refugees as an expectation of 
a country for good citizenship in the global community.  
 The world system position measures also demonstrate the positive effects of 
greater integration through their significant negative relationships in this analysis. While 
semiperipheral status is only marginally significant in the isolated model (Table 5.23, 
Model 22) and non-significant in the full international model (Table 5.23, Model 24), 
countries in both the semiperiphery and the periphery are less central in the dichotomized 
refugee-receiving network than their more integrated counterparts in the core. Previous 
analyses have clearly demonstrated that core countries hold receiving ties at very high 
rates, dominating the overall network (see Table 3.17). These results confirm those 
findings. Both peripheral and semiperipheral countries are less attractive destinations 
than core countries. These countries also tend to be less connected to global 
communication and transportation networks, making them less easily accessible. 
Refugees who are able to choose destinations bypass these for more advanced countries, 
leaving only countries in reasonable proximity as potential receiving partners. As core 
countries become less open to new or ongoing refugee flows, these results may change as 
new destinations develop. 
 The results presented in the final model (Table 5.24) demonstrate the lack of 
strong effects found across these models. Of the included variables, GDP per capita and 
peripheral status maintain robust, significant negative relationships with centrality. State 
strength and semiperipheral status reach marginal levels of significance, but other 
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previously significant relationships disappear in this model. Countries that experience 
economic growth receive from fewer partners, but those that are most integrated in global 
trade receive from more partners, relative to less-integrated countries. This presents an 
interesting dichotomy. Of the previously significant positive relationships, only INGO 
participation retains significance in this model, demonstrating the importance of world 
polity scripts and the role of civil society in driving refugee destination options.  
 Unlike the sending networks, there are few clear stories in this analysis of the 
dichotomized refugee-receiving network. Some development measures (economic 
growth, population density, and cropland under cultivation) have a negative relationship 
with centrality, but others fail to demonstrate any significant relationship (urbanization, 
life expectancy, etc.). The clearest negative effect is that of world system position. 
Countries that are less connected to the global trade network receive refugees from fewer 
partners than better-connected countries. 
 The effects of global interactions on receiving centrality are perhaps the most 
consistent and clear findings in this analysis. Greater interaction in global finance, trade, 
and civil society yields greater receiving centrality. As more pathways are opened to 
potential destination countries, more individuals tend to use them. The relationship with 
INGO participation seems particularly important as it maintains significance at a strong 
level when considered with all of the other variables in the final model, the only positive 
effect to persist in this model. 
 A number of predicted relationships, or lack of relationship, emerged in this 
analysis. Predicted positive effects of FDI penetration, trade openness, and INGO 
membership ties proved to be as anticipated. Additionally, the negative effect of 
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peripheral status meets with expectations. The predicted lack of relationship for fertility, 
life expectancy, and CO2 per capita also developed as expected. With these successful 
predictions came a number that were incorrect. While no relationship was predicted for 
models with GDP per capita, state strength, population density, and infant mortality, all 
of these indicated some level of significance in either individual or full models, while 
urbanization failed to produce the predicted effect. Finally, conflict and semiperipheral 
status demonstrated effects in the opposite of anticipated directions. Conflict increased 
centrality while semiperipheral status led to decreased centrality. These mixed results 
with respect to predicted relationships once again demonstrates the need for the 
development of theory that is tailored to refugee movements.  
Summary of random effects analysis of centrality in refugee networks 
 Table 5.25 summarizes relationships demonstrated in random effects models of 
the effects of domestic conditions and international integration on centrality across the 
four permutations of the global refugee network. Results for valued sending, valued 
receiving, dichotomized sending, and dichotomized receiving are reported. Significance 
in either individual models or full models is indicated by a + (positive relationship) or – 
(negative relationship). Models in which no significant relationship occurred are left 
blank. Generally, this table demonstrates a high level of efficacy for variables in the 
analysis in explaining centrality in the different networks. While variation occurs across 
variables and networks, a number of trends also emerge.  
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Economic Variables     
     GDP per capita - - - - 
     State strength - - - - 
     Urban population - - -  
     Secondary school enrollment - - -  
Political Variables      
     Political repression + + +  
     Political terror + + +  
     Collapse +  +  
     Conflict + + + + 
Demographic Variables     
     Fertility rate  + -  
     Population density - - - - 
     Infant mortality +  +  
     Life expectancy - - -  
Environmental Variables     
     CO2 per capita - - -  
     Cropland under cultivation - - - - 
International Variables     
     FDI penetration  +  + 
     Trade openness  + + + 
     Semiperiphery  -  - 
     Periphery  -  - 
     INGOs + + + + 
Control Variables      
     Middle East / North Africa +  +  
     Latin America / Caribbean + -  - 
     Sub-Saharan Africa + + +  
     Asia and Pacific + -  - 
     Eastern Europe / Central Asia +  +  
    Time period + + + + 
Note: Time and regional relationships reflect findings from the base model of each analysis (Model 1). 
 
The time measure consistently demonstrates a positive relationship with centrality 
in every network. This indicates a general increase in centrality across the networks over 
time. The regional variables show different levels of robustness across the networks. 
Generally, when significant, countries in the included regions are more central in refugee 
sending, and less central in refugee receiving. Africa is the exception to these trends, 
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demonstrating a significant positive relationship with valued receiving. It is the only 
region that receives refugees at a higher rate than Western countries.  
Economic and development variables consistently demonstrate significant 
negative relationships with network centrality. These effects occur in both sending and 
receiving analyses. The only exception across any of the analyses is a lack of effect 
demonstrated by secondary enrollment in the dichotomized receiving analysis. Growing 
economies, strong governments, urbanization, and education are associated with reduced 
sending and receiving centrality. Countries with these conditions tend to not experience 
conditions that generate refugee flows, thus limiting sending centrality. When conflict or 
other issues arise that might prompt refugee movements, the presence of economic 
development and education might be enough to keep potential refugees from leaving the 
country, choosing instead to ride out difficult conditions to keep what they have. 
Additionally, refugees that do choose to leave these countries typically have resources 
available that allow them to be discriminating in destination choices. This ability to 
choose eliminates the potential for high centrality in the dichotomized sending network as 
less attractive potential destinations are rejected. As for receiving centrality, countries 
with greater growth and development may be better able to control their borders and limit 
the number of refugees that are allowed to enter. They may also be able to prevent flows 
from some destinations, effectively reducing their dichotomized centrality. It is also 
possible that many of these countries are far enough removed geographically from high-
sending regions that refugees are unable move to them or choose to find host countries 
closer to home.  
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 Measures of political instability demonstrate the opposite effect of development 
measures. The presence of political repression, political terror, state collapse, and conflict 
all yield increased centrality in the valued and dichotomized sending networks. These 
findings are expected and confirm previous research in the area of refugee studies 
(Davenport et al. 2003; Neumayer 2005). As the UN definition of refugee is predicated 
on threats presented through political means, it stands to reason that these elements would 
be important predictors of sending centrality. What this definition and these measures fail 
to capture are those forced migrants who move for reasons other than political violence. 
The need for data on this population and further study into the scope and reasons for their 
movements is an important next step in refugee studies.  
 While the positive relationships with sending centrality for these measures are 
intuitive, the positive relationships evidenced with receiving centrality are less so. 
Political repression, political terror, and conflict are positively associated with valued 
receiving centrality, while conflict yields greater dichotomized receiving centrality. 
Several elements are at play in these results. The valued findings may reflect the lack of 
autonomy experienced by many refugees who simply cross a border in order to avoid 
conditions in their native country with little regard to conditions in the new host country. 
As many countries experiencing these conditions are in relative close proximity to one 
another, those refugees who move to cross the nearest border may find themselves in 
very similar situations to those they left. The conflict finding may also be driven by a 
number of high-receiving countries that were engaged in conflicts in parts of the world 
other than their native soil. These would represent safe havens for refugees in spite of the 
experience of conflict.  
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 The effects of demographic variables beyond individual relationships are hard to 
identify, due to the high degree of collinearity introduced into models where these are 
considered together. Generally, these measures demonstrated a much more active role in 
affecting centrality than anticipated. In the analyses of both sending networks, almost all 
of the variables had significant relationships with centrality. Only fertility in the valued-
sending analysis failed to reach significance. When significant, fertility, density, and life 
expectancy reduced sending centrality, while infant mortality was related to greater 
outflows and sending ties. These findings largely reflect the development trends 
identified in the economic variables: better health and demographic outcomes yield 
reduced refugee sending. The exception to this trend is the effect of fertility. Based on the 
development hypothesis, increased fertility rates should be associated with increased 
sending centrality, as fertility tends to go down with development. However, the reverse 
of this relationship emerges in the analysis. This effect is unexpected and the dynamics 
behind it provide an interesting area for further study.  
 The demographic variables are somewhat less important in the receiving 
networks. While fertility, population density, and life expectancy are significant in the 
valued-receiving analysis, only density remains significant in the dichotomized-receiving 
analysis. Density is negative and significant in both networks, and life expectancy has a 
negative relationship with valued receiving centrality. The only positive relationship 
among these is that of fertility with the valued receiving network. The fertility and life 
expectancy findings reflect the development results previously discussed. The population 
density effect is less readily explained. Greater density may be associated with 
development, but it may also be connected to small countries with large populations (e.g., 
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Japan). These could exist at any level of development. This is an unexpected relationship 
and an interesting avenue of future study.  
 While no clear theoretical tie exists between environmental and land use measures 
and sending or receiving centrality, the variables included in this study demonstrate 
consistent relationships across most of the analyses. CO2 per capita and cropland under 
cultivation both have significant negative effects on sending and receiving centrality 
across seven of eight potential relationships in the analysis. These findings closely reflect 
the results of economic and development variables, indicating again that these 
environmental measures may be acting as proxies for development. It is also possible that 
the cropland finding reflects a human ecology niche phenomenon, particularly in 
relationships with receiving centrality. Countries with greater levels of land under 
agricultural development by native populations may be considered less attractive 
destinations by refugees planning to farm to survive in their host country. As that 
economic niche becomes filled, fewer refugees may be attracted.  
 The effects of international integration on centrality in these networks present 
another set of clear relationships that are easily interpreted and provide important insights 
for potential refugee theory development. In the analyses of sending networks, the 
international variables are largely not significant. Only trade openness in the 
dichotomized sending network and INGO participation in both networks demonstrate 
significant effects. Greater participation in these global systems yields increased sending 
centrality. Trade openness may lead to increased options for refugees when outflows 
occur, creating the potential for greater dichotomized centrality. However, states that are 
more active in global trade may not experience refugee-generating conditions as readily 
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as less active countries, reducing the total refugees sent by the countries and making this 
measure non-significant in the valued sending model. INGO participation could increase 
centrality through a variety of means. Like openness, greater participation in civil society 
through INGOs may open channels of communication and transportation that facilitate 
refugee movements to a wider number of partners. It may also be that specific INGOs 
that deal with refugee-related conditions gravitate to countries in which conditions are 
present for the initiation of refugee flows. This creates a temporal order argument that 
may be better adjudicated by fixed effects models. However, results of this panel study 
seem to indicate that the correct order is presented in these models, although there may be 
earlier connections in the other direction that cannot be evaluated in this study. Finally, 
many INGOs work to place refugees in host countries when outflows occur (e.g., the 
International Red Cross). As these organizations are tied to a large number of countries, it 
stands to reason that they would place refugees with a large number of partners. This 
INGO connection is an interesting one and an important avenue for future examination, 
as it seems to run contrary to world polity expectations.   
 While the international measures show few effects on the sending networks, a 
clear pattern emerges in analyses of the receiving networks. In both the valued and 
dichotomized receiving analyses, greater integration is positively related to centrality, 
while both measures of world system position are negatively related to centrality. The 
world system measures demonstrate that core countries are central in receiving networks, 
particularly the dichotomized network. High centrality for the core produces the negative 
relationships observed in these analyses as semiperipheral and peripheral countries 
receive fewer refugees and ties, relative to the core. All of these measures of global 
314 
 
connection demonstrate channels through which information, scripts, resources, goods, 
and labor travel. It makes intuitive sense that refugees may utilize these channels when 
searching for potential hosts. This finding represents a particularly important and 
promising area for further analysis with potential for the development of refugee-specific 
theory.  
In these analyses of centrality in the global refugee network, four key stories 
emerge. The first involves the role of regional variation in both sending and receiving 
centrality. Regional variables demonstrate significant relationships with centrality across 
most models in each of the analyses. In sending analyses, they are positively related to 
centrality, while they have negative effects on centrality in receiving analyses. Non-
Western countries are more central in the valued and dichotomized sending networks and 
less central in the valued and dichotomized receiving networks. These results reflect 
earlier findings in Chapter Three that demonstrate the primary role of core countries in 
receiving networks (see Tables 3.12 through 3.16) and the limited role these countries 
play in refugee sending (See Tables 3.6 through 3.10). More developed countries do not 
face conditions that generate refugee outflows, but are attractive destinations for refugees 
who are able to get to them.  
 The importance of development in sending and receiving centrality is the second 
important finding from these analyses. Measures of economic growth and development 
are almost universally associated with reduced sending and receiving centrality in both 
valued and dichotomized networks. Countries that experience positive development 
outcomes are generally less active in the global refugee network. The importance of these 
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relationships is demonstrated by the persistence of several of these measures – most 
notably GDP per capita – in the final models of the analyses.  
On the sending side, these countries are less likely to experience conditions that 
lead to refugee flows. Additionally, the presence of positive development and welfare 
outcomes in these countries might make potential refugees more likely to stay when 
political instability does occur. The sending of fewer refugees is directly related to being 
less central in the dichotomized sending network as the contribution of fewer actors to the 
network means less opportunity for those actors to create ties with large numbers of 
hosts. Refugees from more developed countries also have more resources and greater 
efficacy in choosing destinations. This ability to choose reduces potential sending ties as 
many potential hosts are considered unattractive destinations and are rejected, when 
possible.  
 As for reducing receiving centrality, more developed countries may be better able 
to dictate origin countries from which refugees will be accepted and limit the number of 
refugees that are allowed to enter. This ability to control borders is an important factor in 
reducing centrality. Additionally, many developed countries are located a considerable 
distance from primary refugee-sending regions. Refugees may not have the resources to 
travel to these countries or may find other suitable destinations that are closer to home or 
more easily accessible. This relationship between development and centrality is a key 
finding and presents important potential theoretical connections for future study.  
 A third finding from this analysis is the importance of political instability in 
refugee-sending centrality. This study confirms observations from  previous studies that 
find repression, human rights violations, collapse, and conflict to be important indicators 
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of refugee outflows (Apodaca 1998; Davenport et al. 2003). While these results are not 
surprising, they are important. Connecting specific types of political instability to refugee 
outflows is an important step in understanding the mechanisms at play in causing refugee 
flows to take place in some circumstances, but not others. Additionally, examining the 
interplay of these conditions in models with development and other measures provides 
some understanding of ways in which the potential refugee-sending effects of political 
instability can be tempered by other domestic and global conditions. The interaction of 
these factors represents another key area for further investigation.  
 Finally, the role of global connections in refugee-receiving centrality is a finding 
with important implications for future analysis and theory building. The positive effects 
of foreign investment, trade openness, and INGO participation demonstrate that greater 
connectivity in global systems generates openness to refugee receipt in both valued and 
dichotomized networks. The effects of INGO participation are particularly strong, 
persisting in the final models of not only the receiving networks, but the dichotomized 
sending network as well. Additionally, the negative effects demonstrated by 
semiperipheral and peripheral status indicate that greater centrality in the global trade 
network is associated with greater receiving centrality. It may be that participating in 
these systems generates channels through which refugees more easily flow or it is 
possible that greater connections in these global systems lead countries to feel more like 
global citizens, with the acceptance of refugees seen as an expectation of good 
citizenship. Interestingly, these relationships and channels seem to primarily affect 
refugee receiving. The effects of global connectedness on refugee-sending centrality are 
less robust, although strong effects of INGO participation exist in these networks as well. 
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These relationships are a final key area for future study. Other vectors of global 
connection should be examined to determine their effects and the mechanisms through 
which these relationships take place evaluated to better understand how these connections 
facilitate refugee movement.  
 
FIXED EFFECTS ANALYSIS OF REFUGEE NETWORK CENTRALITY 
 
 Fixed effects models (FEMs) allow for the examination of changes that occur in 
panel data over time. While capturing longitudinal variation, they do not have the cross-
sectional component present in random effects models. Significant relationships in these 
models indicate effects that occur over time within countries. This allows for the 
identification of relationships that exist over time, regardless of starting point, providing 
an important contrast to the random effects findings that capture variation both over time 
and across countries. Because FEMs cannot accommodate the presence of time-invariant 
measures, regional variation and world system position are not examined in these models.  
Analysis of the valued sending network 
 Results of FEMs examining the effects of domestic conditions and international 
integration on centrality in the valued refugee-sending network are presented in Tables 
5.26 through 5.31. Variables from a number of different perspectives are considered to 
identify their effects on centrality. Each table progresses in the same way as in previous 
analyses. Results of economic and development variables are reported in Table 5.26, 
political variables in Table 5.27, demographic variables in Table 5.28, environmental 
variables in Table 5.29, and international variables in Table 5.30. A final model is 
318 
 
presented in Table 5.31 that includes all of the significant variables from previous models 
and the wave measure.  
Economic model 
Table 5.26. Fixed Effects Models of the Effects of Economic Conditions on Valued 
Sending Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 5a 
Economic Variables       
     GDP per capita -.726*** 
(.163) 
 




     State strength   .016 
(.031) 
 




     Urban population    .261 
(.263) 
 
  .074 
(.245) 
 







Control Variables       













Observations 733 675 824 634 575 575 
States 190 177 206 187 165 165 
R2 Within .04 .00 .00 .01 .12 .12 
R2 Between .37 .12 .13 .19 .39 .38 
R2 Overall .35 .06 .12 .13 .36 .35 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 Results of FEMs for economic and development variables are reported in Table 
5.26. Of the included measures, only GDP per capita demonstrates a significant 
relationship with centrality. Countries that experience economic growth send fewer 
refugees over time. This effect is the strongest identified in any of the models, with a 
coefficient in the full model of -1.27. Clearly, this is an important element for limiting 
refugee outflows and a key area for policy and intervention efforts. While the collinearity 
noted in the economic full models random effects section is not present, the high degree 
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of correlation between urban population and GDP per capita justifies the examination of 
a model without the urbanization measure. The results of this adjusted model are reported 
in Model 5a and demonstrate almost no change in the relationships or strength of effects 
among the remaining variables. 
Political model 
Table 5.27. Fixed Effects Models of the Effects of Political Conditions on Valued 
Sending Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Political Variables      
     Political repression  .083 
(.054) 
 
    .067 
(.052) 
     Political terror   .022 
(.028) 
 
   .007 
(.029) 
     Collapse    .010 
(.011) 
 
  .027** 
(.010) 





Control Variables      











Observations 761 702 968 968 687 
States 192 177 242 242 174 
R2 Within .00 .01 .00 .01 .03 
R2 Between .43 .46 .14 .40 .49 
R2 Overall .39 .12 .04 .31 .40 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 Table 5.27 reports results of FEMs examining relationships between domestic 
political conditions and sending centrality. Among the individual models, only conflict 
has a significant effect, demonstrating a marginally significant positive relationship with 
centrality. This relationship persists in the full model. Additionally, collapse becomes 
significant in the full model, again demonstrating a positive relationship. The experience 
320 
 
of conflict and/or state collapse causes refugee sending to increase. Interestingly, political 
repression and political terror are not significantly related to a country‟s experience of 
sending refugees over time.   
Demographic model 
Table 5.28. Fixed Effects Models of the Effects of Demographic Variables on Valued 
Sending Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
Demographic Variables      
     Fertility rate -.053 
(.103) 
 
    .066 
(.119) 
     Population density   .131 
(.413) 
 
   .080 
(.545) 
     Infant mortality    .170 
(.136) 
 
  .117 
(.165) 





Control Variables      












Observations 790 812 767 788 713 
States 203 208 192 200 183 
R2 Within .00 .00 .00 .01 .02 
R2 Between .07 .03 .23 .18 .18 
R2 Overall .06 .02 .21 .17 .16 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 Results of FEMs for demographic conditions are presented in Table 5.28. Of these 
measures, only life expectancy demonstrates a significant relationship. Increases in life 
expectancy yield decreased refugee sending in countries over time. This finding reflects 
the development hypothesis discussed in the random effects section. Increases in life 
expectancy are typically associated with development and countries that experience 
development tend to be less likely to experience refugee flows. The result is robust, 
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persisting in the full model with only a slightly diminished effect. Other population 
dynamics fail to reach significance in this analysis. Collinearity checks for this and 
subsequent full models do not indicate the level of collinearity noted in the random 
effects models for these variables (Mean VIF=2.80), but the possibility remains that the 
results of these models may be influenced by the level of correlation present.  
Environmental model 
 FEMs results for the effects of environmental conditions are presented in Table 
5.29. No significant relationships are identified in either the individual or full models. 
These measures do not impact refugee sending by countries over time.  
Table 5.29. Fixed Effects Models of the Effects of Environmental Conditions on 
Valued Sending Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
Environmental Variables    











Control Variables    







Observations 777 758 718 
States 197 192 183 
R2 Within .00 .00 .00 
R2 Between .22 .01 .15 
R2 Overall .19 .01 .13 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
International model 
Table 5.30 presents findings from FEMs examining relationships between 
measures of international integration and valued refugee-sending centrality. Like the 
environmental model, none of the international variables demonstrate significant effects 
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in either individual models or the full model. Participation in these global systems does 
not impact rates of refugee sending. 
Table 5.30. Fixed Effects Models of the Effects of International Integration on 
Valued Sending Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 
International Variables     
     FDI penetration -.026 
(.040) 
 
   .001 
(.052) 










Control Variables     








Observations 791 730 884 511 
States 202 193 232 133 
R2 Within .00 .00 .00 .01 
R2 Between .05 .00 .11 .04 
R2 Overall .03 .00 .11 .02 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Final model   
In Table 5.31, each of the significant variables from the previous models is 
included in a final fixed effects model to examine how these variables affect each other 
with respect to their relationships with centrality in the valued refugee-sending network. 
Checks for collinearity in this model failed to indicate any problems among these 
measures (Mean VIF=1.75). Three of the four included variables maintain significance in 
this model, with only collapse becoming non-significant. GDP growth and increases in 
life expectancy reduce centrality while the experience of conflict yields greater centrality. 
These findings reflect the development and stability findings from earlier REMs and their 
323 
 
persistence in this model indicates the presence of independent competing effects 
experienced by countries in these areas.  
Table 5.31. Fixed Effects Models of the Effects of all Previously Significant 
Variables with Valued Sending Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 23 
Predictor Variables  
     GDP per capita (logged) -.657*** 
(.164) 
 
     Collapse -.000 
(.012) 
 
     Conflict  .047* 
(.022) 
 
     Life expectancy -.261** 
(.099) 
 
Control Variables  





R2 Within .05 
R2 Between .36 
R2 Overall .33 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Discussion of valued sending network results 
 The fixed effects analysis of the valued refugee-sending network confirms several 
findings previously discovered in random effects analyses. The time measure in these 
models moves in and out of significance, depending on the other included variables. Both 
GDP per capita and life expectancy demonstrate significant negative effects on valued 
sending centrality. Increases in these areas are associated with reduced centrality. The 
relationship between GDP per capita and sending centrality in the full economic model is 
the strongest effect discovered in any of the analyses in this project (-1.27), 
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demonstrating the central importance of economic development in limiting refugee 
outflows. Economic growth clearly impacts refugee movements and should be a key area 
of focus for policymakers and other working to limit refugee outflows. Life expectancy is 
another development outcome that affects refugee movements. Countries with higher life 
expectancies also have other qualities that make them less likely to experience significant 
refugee outflows and give potential refugees greater incentive to stay. These findings 
clearly reflect the development trends noted in the REMs section of this chapter. 
 The role of instability in encouraging refugee flows observed in random effects 
models is also portrayed in these results. Both conflict and collapse demonstrate positive 
relationships with sending centrality. The experience of these conditions is associated 
with increases in sending centrality. As these factors are significant in creating situations 
of persecution and the potential for political violence, it stands to reason that they would 
be key initiators of refugee outflows.  
 The persistence of most of these relationships in the final model (Table 5.31) 
indicates the importance of each in influencing refugee movements. The effects of 
development and instability are clearly independent of each other. This model may 
represent the clearest presentation of the robustness of these opposing relationships. 
Interestingly, both development measures demonstrate far stronger effects in this full 
model than the conflict measure. It is also noteworthy that the effect of life expectancy 
persists in spite of the presence of GDP per capita in this model, indicating that this 




 In comparing this analysis with the REMs, it is clear that the general trends are 
the same. Greater development leads to reductions in sending centrality while greater 
instability leads to increased sending centrality. There are, however, a number of 
significant relationships that emerge in the REMs that fail to appear in the FEMs. It may 
be that the broad categories of development and stability (e.g., GDP per capita and 
conflict) capture the longitudinal changes in centrality, while more nuanced measures 
(e.g., urbanization and political terror) explain cross-national differences in centrality. 
These findings provide different pictures of the same phenomenon, with REMs giving a 
tighter understanding of some of the mechanisms through which these general trends 
emerge in different contexts.  
 While the majority of predicted relationships fail to emerge in these analyses, key 
predictions are verified. The negative effects of GDP per capita and life expectancy 
follow expectations, as do the positive effects of collapse and conflict. Predicted 
relationships that failed to reach significance may be the product of the differences 
between random and fixed effects modeling, discussed previously.  
Analysis of the valued receiving network 
Results of FEMs examining the effects of domestic conditions and international 
integration on centrality in the valued refugee-receiving network are presented in Tables 
5.32 through 5.37. Each table progresses in the same way as in previous analyses. Results 
of economic and development variables are reported in Table 5.32, political variables in 
Table 5.33, demographic variables in Table 5.34, environmental variables in Table 5.35, 
and international variables in Table 5.36. A final model is presented in Table 5.37 that 




 Results of FEMs estimating relationships between economic conditions and 
valued receiving centrality are presented in Table 5.32. While the time measure 
demonstrates a consistent negative relationship with centrality, none of the economic or 
development variables reach significance in these models. The time measure indicates 
that countries receive fewer refugees over time, a finding that reflects the general 
downward trend of refugee receipt presented in Table 3.1. Centrality differences in this 
network are not driven by change over time in economic status.  
Table 5.32. Fixed Effects Models of the Effects of Economic Conditions on Valued 
Receiving Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 5a 
Economic Variables       
     GDP per capita  .054 
(.173) 
 




     State strength  -.033 
(.037) 
 




     Urban population   -.042 
(.284) 
 
  .110 
(.300) 
 







Control Variables       













Observations 733 675 824 634 575 575 
States 190 177 206 187 165 165 
R2 Within .02 .02 .02 .02 .03 .03 
R2 Between .05 .03 .01 .01 .01 .01 
R2 Overall .02 .01 .01 .00 .00 .01 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 








 Table 5.32 presents FEMs for the effects of political conditions. The significant 
effect of time persists across these models. Among the political variables, only political 
repression demonstrates a significant relationship, and then only in the full model. 
Increased repression is associated with decreased receiving centrality. As regimes 
become more restrictive with respect to individual rights, they become less attractive as 
destinations for refugees. Political terror, collapse, and conflict all fail to reach 
significance in individual models or the full model.  
Table 5.33. Fixed Effects Models of the Effects of Political Variables on Valued 
Receiving Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Political Variables      
     Political repression -.091 
(.059) 
 
   -.119† 
(.064) 
     Political terror   .013 
(.034) 
 
   .033 
(.036) 
     Collapse    .004 
(.011) 
 
  .002 
(.012) 





Control Variables      











Observations 761 702 968 968 687 
States 192 177 242 242 174 
R2 Within .03 .03 .01 .01 .03 
R2 Between .05 .11 .05 .36 .00 
R2 Overall .03 .01 .00 .06 .00 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 








Table 5.34. Fixed Effects Models of the Effects of Demographic Variables on Valued 
Receiving Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
Demographic Variables      
     Fertility rate -.181† 
(.107) 
 
   -.163 
(.122) 
     Population density   .124 
(.429) 
 
   .099 
(.566) 










Control Variables      











Observations 790 812 767 788 713 
States 203 208 192 200 183 
R2 Within .02 .02 .02 .02 .03 
R2 Between .01 .05 .02 .05 .00 
R2 Overall .01 .03 .00 .04 .00 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 Results of FEMs examining the relationships between demographic conditions 
and valued refugee-receiving centrality are presented in Table 5.34. While the effect of 
time becomes only marginally significant in models with life expectancy, it continues to 
demonstrate a significant negative effect across models in this analysis. Fertility is the 
only demographic variable that achieves significance, demonstrating a marginally 
significant negative relationship with receiving centrality, an effect that fails to persist in 
the full model. In isolation, increased fertility reduces receiving centrality. As increases 
in fertility are primarily taking place in only the poorest countries, it stands to reason that 
these countries would be less attractive to refugees. Other demographic measures – 
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population density, infant mortality, and life expectancy – do not demonstrate significant 
effects on receiving centrality.  
Environmental model 
 Table 5.35 presents FEMs for examinations of the effects of environmental 
measures. As in previous tables, the time measure is negative and significant across 
models. CO2 per capita demonstrates a marginally significant positive relationship with 
centrality, while cropland under cultivation fails to reach significance. Countries that 
experience increased CO2 production become more central in the receiving network. As 
in earlier analyses, this finding may be acting as a proxy for development as increased 
industrialization would generate higher levels of CO2 per capita. This effect is not 
particularly robust, but is persistent, continuing in the full model.  
Table 5.35. Fixed Effects Models of the Effects of Environmental Variables on 
Valued Receiving Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
Environmental Variables    
     CO2 per capita  .186† 
(.098) 
 
  .193† 
(.104) 





Control Variables    







Observations 777 758 718 
States 197 192 183 
R2 Within .03 .02 .03 
R2 Between .03 .08 .03 
R2 Overall .02 .04 .03 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 







 Results of FEMs examining the effects of international integration are presented 
in Table 5.36. The time measure is again negative and significant across models, although 
reaching only marginal significance in the full model. Both trade openness and INGO 
participation demonstrate significant relationships with centrality in this model, with the 
effect of openness persisting and becoming more robust in the full model. Countries that 
become more active in global trade experience reduced centrality in the refugee-receiving 
network. By contrast, countries that increase INGO membership ties become more 
central receivers over time. Changes in FDI penetration do not affect refugee-receiving 
centrality.  
Table 5.36. Fixed Effects Models of the Effects of International Integration on 
Valued Receiving Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 
International Variables     
     FDI penetration -.019 
(.039) 
 
  -.031 
(.048) 










Control Variables     









Observations 791 730 884 672 
States 202 193 232 182 
R2 Within .02 .03 .02 .03 
R2 Between .03 .02 .39 .05 
R2 Overall .00 .01 .31 .03 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 







Table 5.37. Fixed Effects Models of the Effects of all Previously Significant 
Variables with Valued Receiving Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 23 
Predictor Variables  
     Political repression -.124† 
(.064) 
 
     Fertility rate -.233† 
(.120) 
 
     CO2 per capita  .303* 
(.127) 
 
     Trade openness -.070* 
(.033) 
 
     INGO membership ties -.072 
(.073) 
 
Control Variables  





R2 Within .06 
R2 Between .05 
R2 Overall .04 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 The results of a final fixed effects model that includes all of the significant 
variables indentified in previous analyses in this section are presented in Table 5.37. 
These results demonstrate that the effects from earlier models are generally robust as four 
of the five included variables continue to reach significance in the presence of other 
measures. Political repression, fertility, and trade openness have consistent negative 
effects on centrality, while CO2 per capita has a persistent positive relationship with 
centrality. Only the effect of INGO participation fails to reach significance in this model. 
Evaluations for collinearity again revealed no problems in this model (Mean VIF = 1.80).  
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Discussion of valued receiving network results 
 FEMs for the valued refugee-receiving network reveal a number of important 
relationships and effects that influence the levels at which countries receive refugees. The 
time measure is significant and negative across models throughout the analysis. This 
reflects the results presented in Table 3.1 that show that the total number of refugees in 
the network in 2008 is less than the total in 1990.  
 Three key variables demonstrate significant negative relationships with valued 
receiving centrality in this analysis, each telling a slightly different story. Political 
repression reduces receiving centrality as countries that restrict individual rights at 
increasing levels become less attractive as potential destination choices. While not all 
refugees are able to choose destinations, many do, and those that are able seem to avoid 
moving from one negative political situation to another.  
 Fertility rates are also negatively related to receiving centrality. Countries with 
growing fertility levels become less central in the receiving network. With the global 
emphasis on fertility reduction among poor countries, only those at the lowest levels of 
development are still experiencing increasing fertility. These countries would not be 
considered viable destinations for refugees, given the choice. This demonstrates the 
inverse of the development effect: countries with negative development outcomes 
become less central in the receiving networks.  
 The final negative relationship is with trade openness. There are multiple possible 
explanations for this finding. Dependency scholars would argue that greater openness 
leads to negative development outcomes (Kentor and Boswell 2003), making these 
countries less attractive as potential destinations. However, the inclusion of highly 
333 
 
developed countries in this analysis, many of which are heavily involved in global trade, 
indicates that this result may be the product of more highly developed countries choosing 
to limit refugee inflows. The combination of these limitations and participation in trade 
by these countries would yield the observed result. The difference in direction of effect 
between REMs and FEMs is telling. The experience of openness across countries is 
positive, indicating that more open countries receive more refugees. However, 
longitudinally, openness reduces receiving centrality. Over time, increased openness 
reduces rates of refugee receipt. This finding may reflect the ability of more advanced 
economies to limit refugee inflows, or it may simply reflect the reduced number of 
refugees in the network over time.  
 Positive effects on centrality exist for CO2 per capita and INGO participation. The 
CO2 finding may be capturing increases in development and industrialization. Countries 
with emerging economic opportunities would be attractive destinations. Additionally, 
these newly developing countries may serve as “second choice” destinations for refugees 
who are not able to enter the most developed countries due to restrictions or limited 
resources. The INGO finding is consistent across most of the analyses in this study. 
Greater participation in the world polity through INGOs yields greater centrality in both 
sending and receiving networks. As countries increase their participation in civil society, 
they may become more inclined to receiving refugees as part of the expectations of good 
global citizenship. Greater ties may also open new communication and information 
pathways through which refugees can more easily move. This effect of INGOs on 
centrality is clear and robust, and represents both an important finding for this study and a 
key area for further analysis. 
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 The importance of these negative and positive relationships to valued receiving 
centrality is evidenced by their ability to persist in the presence of other significant 
variables. Of the five variables included in the final model, only INGO participation fails 
to reach significance. Political repression, fertility rates, trade openness, and CO2 per 
capita demonstrate a significant effect in the previously identified direction. CO2 has the 
strongest effect in this model. Interestingly, all of the significant effects demonstrate 
stronger relationships in this model than they did in earlier individual and full models. 
The persistence of these measures again demonstrates the multitude of forces at play in 
determining centrality in refugee networks. The low R
2
 in this model (.04) indicates that 
these measures account for only a small part of the variation in centrality across 
participants in the network.  
 The comparison of the REMs and FEMs for the valued refugee-receiving network 
is marked by contrast. The first clear difference is the much greater importance 
demonstrated by economic and political variables in the random effects analysis. While 
few of these measures reach significance in the fixed effects models, most of them 
demonstrate significant effects in the random effects models. This indicates that only a 
handful of relationships – those identified in the FEMs – explain variation across time, 
while a number of conditions influence differences in centrality cross-sectionally. In 
another critical area of difference, of the five significant variables in the FEMs, only 
INGO ties demonstrates the same relationship observed in the REMs analysis. 
Repression, fertility, CO2 levels, and trade openness all have significant relationships in 
the opposite direction in REMs analyses of this network. This finding represents an 
interesting nuance that is only possible with these kinds of comparisons. Repression, 
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fertility, and trade openness reduce receiving centrality over time; however, the 
experience of these measures across countries yields the opposite effect. While individual 
countries experience decreased receiving centrality when repression increases, repression 
is associated with greater centrality when all of the actors in the network are considered 
together. This reality that different countries have very different experiences of these 
variables with respect to centrality is an important element to be disaggregated in future 
analyses.  
 While many of the variables in the fixed effects analysis of the valued receiving 
network demonstrate opposite relationships from the random effects analysis, they fall in 
line with hypothesized relationships. Political repression, trade openness, and INGO 
participation all demonstrate significant relationships in expected directions. The 
economic variables, most of the political variables, and FDI penetration fail to achieve 
significant relationships, contrary to expectations. While it was expected that none of the 
demographic or environmental measures would have significant relationships, fertility 
and CO2 per capita demonstrated significant effects in this analysis. The other population 
measures and cropland under cultivation fail to reach significance, as predicted.  
Analysis of the dichotomized sending network 
Results of FEMs examining the effects of domestic conditions and international 
integration on centrality in the dichotomized refugee-sending network are presented in 
Tables 5.38 through 5.43. Each table progresses in the same way as in previous analyses. 
Results of economic and development variables are reported in Table 5.38, political 
variables in Table 5.39, demographic variables in Table 5.40, environmental variables in 
Table 5.41, and international variables in Table 5.42. A final model is presented in Table 
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5.43 that includes all of the significant variables from previous models and the wave 
measure.  
Economic model  
Table 5.38. Fixed Effects Models of the Effects of Economic Conditions on 
Dichotomized Sending Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 5a 
Economic Variables       
     GDP per capita -.360** 
(.118) 
 




     State strength   .013 
(.019) 
 




     Urban population    .295 
(.192) 
 
  .248 
(.152) 
 







Control Variables       













Observations 733 675 824 634 575 575 
States 190 177 206 187 165 165 
R2 Within .05 .05 .03 .03 .11 .11 
R2 Between .39 .06 .11 .13 .52 .45 
R2 Overall .39 .01 .09 .10 .49 .43 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Table 5.38 presents the results of FEMs examining relationships between 
economic variables and centrality in the dichotomized refugee-sending network. The time 
measure demonstrates a significant positive relationship with centrality across models, 
indicating that countries increase sending ties over time. This result reflects trends 
identified in Table 3.1. Of the economic variables, only GDP per capita reaches 
significance in this analysis, demonstrating a strong negative effect on centrality that 
becomes stronger in the full model. Countries that experience economic growth reduce 
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dichotomized sending centrality. These countries increase the number of partners from 
whom they receive refugees at a slower rate than countries that fail to grow 
economically. State strength, urbanization, and enrollment fail to demonstrate significant 
relationships with centrality across this model.  
Political model   
Table 5.39. Fixed Effects Models of the Effects of Political Conditions on 
Dichotomized Sending Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Political Variables      
     Political repression  .086* 
(.039) 
 
    .073* 
(.032) 
     Political terror   .046** 
(.017) 
 
   .028 
(.018) 
     Collapse    .005 
(.009) 
 
  .018** 
(.006) 





Control Variables      











Observations 761 702 968 968 687 
States 192 177 242 242 174 
R2 Within .07 .03 .01  .01 .08 
R2 Between .46 .49 .13 .46 .55 
R2 Overall .39 .43 .02 .08 .52 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Results of FEMs examining the relationships between measures of political 
instability and dichotomized sending centrality are presented in Table 5.39. The time 
measure continues to have a significant positive effect on centrality in these models. 
Political repression and political terror demonstrate significant positive relationships with 
sending centrality. The effect of repression persists into the full model, while that of 
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political terror falls out of significance. While not significant in isolation, collapse 
becomes positively significant in the full model. Increases in repression and human right 
abuses, as well as the presence of state collapse, all increase dichotomized refugee-
sending centrality. Countries that experience these conditions send refugees to increasing 
numbers of partners over time. Interestingly, the presence of conflict does not have a 
significant effect on centrality. This may be due to a number of low-sending countries 
that are involved in conflicts in countries other than their own (e.g., the United States). 
Demographic model 
 Results of FEMs examining demographic conditions are presented in Table 5.40. 
The effect of these variables on the time measure is interesting, as time becomes non-
significant in models including population density. Across other models, the previously 
observed trend of positive significance continues. Of the population measures, only 
fertility demonstrates a significant relationship with centrality. As fertility rates increase, 
countries become less central in the dichotomized sending network. This may again 
reflect the low level of development evidenced by countries that experience increased 
fertility. Refugees from poor countries may have fewer options for potential destinations 
due to a lack of resources. These countries may continue to send refugees at stable levels 
– a dynamic that seems to be confirmed by the lack of effect of fertility in the valued 
sending analysis (Table 5.28) – but do not add new destinations. This effect is not 
particularly robust, becoming non-significant in the full model. Other population 
variables fail to reach significance in either individual or full models.  
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Table 5.40. Fixed Effects Models of the Effects of Demographic Variables on 
Dichotomized Sending Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
Demographic Variables      
     Fertility rate -.143† 
(.074) 
 
   -.075 
(.080) 
     Population density   .469 
(.296) 
 
   .489 
(.368) 










Control Variables      











Observations 790 812 767 788 713 
States 203 208 192 200 183 
R2 Within .03 .03 .05 .04 .05 
R2 Between .07 .03 .26 .22 .01 
R2 Overall .04 .02 .00 .22 .01 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Environmental model 
 Table 5.41 reports fixed effects results for relationships between environmental 
conditions and dichotomized sending centrality. The significant positive relationship of 
the time measure persists in these models. While both environmental variables fail to 
reach significance in individual models, CO2 per capita moves from being almost 
significant (p=.104) to marginally significant (p=.089) with centrality in the full model. 
Although not particularly robust, increased CO2 production leads to reductions in sending 
centrality. As countries industrialize, potential refugees have greater incentive to stay, 




Table 5.41. Fixed Effects Models of the Effects of Environmental Conditions on 
Dichotomized Sending Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
Environmental Variables    










Control Variables    







Observations 777 758 718 
States 197 192 183 
R2 Within .042 .04 .07 
R2 Between .22 .06 .17 
R2 Overall .22 .01 .19 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
International model   
Table 5.42. Fixed Effects Models of the Effects of International Integration on 
Dichotomized Sending Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 
International Variables     
     FDI penetration -.027 
(.031) 
 
   .000 
(.033) 
     Trade openness   .019 
(.023) 
 
  .019 
(.023) 





Control Variables     









Observations 791 730 884 672 
States 202 193 232 182 
R2 Within .04 .04 .04 .08 
R2 Between .06 .01 .19 .02 
R2 Overall .06 .04 .18 .05 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
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Results of FEMs examining the effects of international integration are reported in 
Table 5.42. Only INGO participation demonstrates a significant relationship in this 
analysis. Increased participation in civil society through INGOs results in greater 
dichotomized sending centrality. Countries that increase INGO ties increase connections 
through which potential refugee movements can take place. As these connections are 
realized, increased sending ties result. FDI penetration and trade openness do not 
demonstrate relationships with sending centrality. As in earlier analyses, the time 
measure is significant and positive across models. Its level of significance decreases in 
the model with INGO participation (Model 21), but regains the highest level of 
significance in the full model.  
Final model 
A fixed effects model that includes all previously significant variables with 
dichotomized refugee-sending centrality is presented in Table 5.43. Unlike previous final 
models in the FEMs section, collinearity is present in this model, introduced by the 
presence of CO2 per capita (Mean VIF=3.26, CO2 per capita=6.22). I excluded this 
measure and re-ran the final model. Results of this adjusted model are presented in Model 
24. As in the previous models for this network, the time variable demonstrates a 
significant positive effect on centrality. Of the previously significant variables, GDP per 
capita, repression, and collapse maintain significant relationships in this model. While 
economic growth is associated with less centrality in the dichotomized sending network, 
increases in political repression and the experience of state collapse both increase 
centrality. Countries that experience instability increase sending ties at faster rates than 
those that do not. As these are important initiating factors for refugee flows, this finding 
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makes sense. The persistence of these relationships net of each other and the presence of 
INGO participation indicate the independent effects exerted by development and 
instability on centrality in this network.  
Table 5.43. Fixed Effects Models of the Effects of all Previously Significant 
Variables on Dichotomized Sending Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 23 Model 24 
Predictor Variables   


































Control Variables   





Observations 612 617 
States 163 164 
R2 Within .11 .10 
R2 Between .52 .55 
R2 Overall .52 .54 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Discussion of dichotomized sending network results 
 The FEMs for the dichotomized refugee-sending network demonstrate elements 
of each of the key relationships identified in the summary of the random effects section. 
First, development plays in important role in centrality. GDP per capita, fertility, and CO2 
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per capita all demonstrate significant negative relationships with dichotomized sending 
centrality. Economic growth and increased CO2 levels are key development markers that 
reduce sending partners over time. Countries experiencing these positive outcomes send 
fewer refugees and have populations that are often more able to choose destinations. 
Increased fertility, while having the same effect, operates from the opposite direction. 
Most countries that experience increased fertility are among the poorest in the world 
(e.g., Afghanistan). When refugees leave these countries, they tend to be limited in 
destination options, often moving to countries in the immediate proximity, effectively 
eliminating the possibility of increasing sending ties. Additionally, potential refugees 
may lack the resources to cross an international border, becoming IDPs within their home 
country instead.  
 The second key story identified in this analysis is the role of instability in 
generating increased sending centrality. Political repression, political terror, and collapse 
are all associated with higher dichotomized sending centrality. These measures of 
political instability are important to the generation of sending ties both across time and 
across countries.  
 Finally, the positive relationship between INGO participation and sending 
centrality touches on the importance of global connectedness in centrality. Countries that 
increase INGO ties also increase refugee-sending ties. As has been previously mentioned, 
it may be that these countries create ties to INGOs that help relocate refugees or that the 
generation of increased INGO ties creates pathways through which refugees are able to 
move to new destinations. This relationship between connectedness and centrality 
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continues to emerge across different networks and types of analyses, confirming its 
importance in considerations of refugee movements.  
 In addition to these stories, the time measure demonstrates a positive significant 
relationship with sending centrality across most models in this analysis. Countries in the 
network increase sending ties over time. This confirms the descriptive results presented 
in Table 3.1.  
 In the final model of this analysis (Table 5.43), GDP per capita, political 
repression, and collapse maintain significant relationships. The international variables 
lose significance when included together with these other measures. The strength of GDP 
per capita and the political measures in influencing sending centrality is clearly 
demonstrated by the persistence of these effects in this model, net of each other.  
 While results of the FEMs generally mirror those of the REMs for this network, 
far more of the variables in these models reached significance in the REMs. Only GDP 
per capita and fertility are significant in the FEMs, but all of the economic and 
demographic variables demonstrate significant effects on centrality in REMs. This again 
marks a clear difference between the identification of measures that impact changes in 
centrality over time and the identification of more nuanced differences that occur 
between countries in their experience of sending centrality. Development in general (as 
evidenced by GDP per capita) reduces centrality over time, but the experience of higher 
life expectancies in many countries – a result of development – specifically impacts the 
experience of sending centrality across countries.  
 Another difference between these analyses is the persistence of variables in the 
final models. While only GDP per capita and the instability variables maintain 
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significance in the final FEMs table (Table 5.43), most of the included measures, 
including state strength and INGO ties, reach significance in the final REMs table for this 
network (Table 5.16). This distinction marks another example of differences between 
effects identified as important over time and those that are significant both over time and 
across countries in the network.  
 While many of the predicted relationships failed to emerge in this analysis, the 
observed effects of GDP per capita, political repression, political terror, and collapse are 
as anticipated. These relationships follow expected effects for development and stability 
variables. However, fertility, CO2 per capita, and INGO participation demonstrated 
significant relationships that run counter to expectations. The effects of CO2 per capita 
closely mirror development measures and it is highly probable that this relationship is a 
product of development level, an assumption that seems to be confirmed by the high 
degree of correlation between these measures (pairwise correlation = .852). While world 
polity theory would predict that the presence of INGO ties leads to the dispersion of 
scripts that might results in a reduction in sending centrality, the opposite effect is 
observed. Rather than dispersing these scripts, it seems that INGO participation creates 
opportunities for refugees to move to new destinations, increasing sending ties over time.  
Analysis of the dichotomized receiving network 
Results of FEMs examining the effects of domestic conditions and international 
integration on centrality in the dichotomized refugee-receiving network are presented in 
Tables 5.44 through 5.49. Each table progresses in the same way as in previous analyses. 
Results of economic and development variables are reported in Table 5.44, political 
variables in Table 5.45, demographic variables in Table 5.46, environmental variables in 
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Table 5.47, and international variables in Table 5.48. A final model is presented in Table 
5.49 that includes all of the significant variables from previous models and the wave 
measure.  
Economic model 
Table 5.44. Fixed Effects Models of the Effects of Economic Conditions on 
Dichotomized Receiving Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 5a 
Economic Variables       
     GDP per capita  .104 
(.204) 
 




     State strength  -.108* 
(.042) 
 

















Control Variables       













Observations 733 675 824 634 575 575 
States 190 177 206 187 165 165 
R2 Within .00 .01 .00 .00 .02 .03 
R2 Between .01 .01 .02 .07 .05 .07 
R2 Overall .01 .01 .02 .02 .04 .05 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 Table 5.44 reports results of FEMs for relationships between economic variables 
and centrality in the dichotomized refugee-receiving network. The time measure fails to 
reach significance in any of the models in this or any of the subsequent models in the 
analysis of this network. Of the economic variables, only state strength indicates a 
significant relationship with receiving centrality. As countries spend more on internal 
needs, receiving centrality decreases. The economic development of these states may 
347 
 
correspond with a greater ability or desire to control borders, limiting the potential for 
new receiving partners. However, other measures of economic development (GDP per 
capita, urbanization, and enrollment) fail to reach significance in these models.  
Political model 
Table 5.45. Fixed Effects Models of the Effects of Political Conditions on 
Dichotomized Receiving Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Political Variables      
     Political repression -.139* 
(.067) 
 
   -.134† 
(.075) 
     Political terror  -.032 
(.040) 
 
  -.008 
(.042) 










Control Variables      












Observations 761 702 968 968 687 
States 192 177 242 242 174 
R2 Within .01 .00 .00 .00 .01 
R2 Between .01 .00 .00 .20 .02 
R2 Overall .01 .01 .01 .14 .02 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
 In the political analysis of the dichotomized receiving network, only political 
repression demonstrates a significant relationship. This mirrors results from the fixed 
effects analysis of the valued receiving network (Table 5.20). Increases in political 
repression yield decreased dichotomized receiving centrality, indicating that more 
repressive states become less attractive destinations for refugees. While existing refugee 
networks into these countries may continue to operate, inflows from new partners do not 
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take place as these new refugees attempt to seek less repressive conditions. The presence 
of political terror, collapse, and conflict do not influence receiving centrality in this 
analysis.  
Demographic model 
 Table 5.46 reports the results of FEMs examining the effects of demographic 
conditions. Across all individual models and the full model, these variables fail to reach 
significance with centrality. Demographic variables do not have significant effects on 
dichotomized receiving centrality.  
Table 5.46. Fixed Effects Models of the Effects of Demographic Variables on 
Dichotomized Receiving Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 
Demographic Variables      
     Fertility rate  .064 
(.122) 
 
    .059 
(.140) 
     Population density  -.535 
(.499) 
 
  -.734 
(.645) 









Control Variables      











Observations 790 812 767 788 713 
States 203 208 192 200 183 
R2 Within .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 
R2 Between .03 .04 .04 .00 .04 
R2 Overall .03 .04 .03 .00 .03 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Environmental model 
 Like the population model, the environmental model fails to demonstrate any 
significant relationships with receiving centrality. FEMs for this analysis are presented in 
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Table 5.47. No significant effects are identified in either individual models or the full 
model.  
Table 5.47. Fixed Effects Models of the Effects of Environmental Conditions on 
Dichotomized Receiving Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
Environmental Variables    
     CO2 per capita  .162 
(.112) 
 
  .160 
(.119) 





Control Variables    







Observations 777 758 718 
States 197 192 183 
R2 Within .01 .00 .01 
R2 Between .01 .08 .08 
R2 Overall .00 .08 .07 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
International model 
Table 5.48 presents results of FEMs examining the effects of international 
integration. Like the population and environmental analyses, this set of models fails to 
identify any significant relationships between international variables and centrality. 
Increased activity in these networks does not yield any change in centrality over time.  
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Table 5.48. Fixed Effects Models of the Effects of International Integration on 
Dichotomized Receiving Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 
International Variables     
     FDI penetration -.016 
(.045) 
 
  -.010 
(.057) 
     Trade openness   .026 
(.039) 
 
  .016 
(.039) 
     INGO membership 
ties 





Control Variables     








Observations 791 730 884 672 
States 202 193 232 182 
R2 Within .00 .00 .00 .00 
R2 Between .01 .06 .60 .23 
R2 Overall .00 .06 .49 .18 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 
coefficient with the standard error in parentheses. 
 
Final model 
Table 5.49. Fixed Effects Models of the Effects of all Previously Significant 
Variables on Dichotomized Receiving Network Centrality, 1990-2008 
 Model 23 
Predictor Variables  
     State strength -.103* 
(.043) 
 
     Political repression -.135† 
(.077) 
 
Control Variables  





R2 Within .02 
R2 Between .08 
R2 Overall .06 
† p < .1          * p < .05          ** p < .01          *** p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
Notes: All models include a first-order autocorrelation correction.  Each cell reports the standardized 




 A fixed effects model that includes state strength and political repression – the 
only significant variables in any of the dichotomized receiving centrality models – is 
presented in Table 5.49. Collinearity checks for this model find no problems among these 
variables (Mean VIF = 1.04). Both of the variables demonstrate robust relationships with 
receiving centrality by maintaining significance in this model. Both state strength and 
repression cause countries to be less central in this network over time.  
Discussion of dichotomized receiving network results 
 The fixed effects models for centrality in the dichotomized refugee-receiving 
network reveals very little in the way of significant effects. The time measure is non-
significant across all models, indicating that centrality does not change appreciably over 
time. Among the domestic conditions and international variables, only state strength and 
political repression demonstrate significant relationships with receiving centrality. 
Governments that are able to increase public expenditures and those that reduce 
individual rights both experience less receiving centrality over time. Strong states may be 
better able to control refugee inflows and limit the development of new ties or may be at 
such a high level of receiving centrality that they lose centrality relative to other countries 
that become more central over time.  
As for the repression finding, this reflects the results in the valued receiving 
analysis that show that repressive regimes are less attractive targets for refugees who are 
able to make choices about destinations. As flows emerge from new potential receiving 
partners, these ties are not fully realized as refugees from these countries avoid moving to 
more repressive countries. When considered together in the final model (Table 5.49), 
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these variables demonstrate almost identical strengths of effect to those observed in their 
original models, indicating the presence of independent effects for these measures.  
 Interestingly, there are no significant positive relationships identified in the FEMs 
for this network. This marks one of the key differences in comparisons of analyses of this 
network. The REMs identify a number of relationships, both positive and negative, that 
influence receiving centrality, while the FEMs reveal only two. While repression is 
significant in the fixed effects model, it fails to reach significance in the random effects 
model. This measure is the only one that affects dichotomized receiving centrality over 
time, but not across countries.  
 As few significant relationships are identified in this FEMs analysis, most of the 
predictions fail to emerge. However, a number of predictions about lack of effects do 
prove to be accurate. The failure of GDP per capita and the demographic variables to 
reach significance meets with expectations. While state strength was not predicted to 
have an effect on centrality, this relationship emerged in the analysis. On the other hand, 
repression acted as anticipated, reducing refugee-receiving centrality over time. 
Summary of fixed effects analysis of centrality in refugee networks 
Table 5.50 summarizes relationships demonstrated across the four sets of FEMs 
examining the effects of domestic conditions and international integration on centrality in 
the global refugee sending and receiving networks. Results for valued sending, valued 
receiving, dichotomized sending, and dichotomized receiving are reported. Significance 
in either individual models or full models is indicated by a + (positive relationship) or – 
(negative relationship). Models in which no significant relationship occurs are left blank. 
The value recorded for the time measure is an identification of the trend observed for this 
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variable across models. Generally, this table demonstrates a surprising lack of significant 
effects across analyses of the different networks. Of the seventeen possible relationships 
for each network, the most that are realized in any analysis is seven in the dichotomized 
sending. The dichotomized receiving network presents only two significant relationships. 
While this lack of significant effects is a key feature of these analyses, the relationships 
that do emerge identify some clear trends in changes to centrality over time.  









Economic Variables     
     GDP per capita -  -  
     State strength    - 
     Urban population     
     Secondary school enrollment     
Political Variables      
     Political repression  - + - 
     Political terror   +  
     Collapse +  +  
     Conflict +    
Demographic Variables     
     Fertility rate  - -  
     Population density     
     Infant mortality     
     Life expectancy -    
Environmental Variables     
     CO2 per capita  + -  
     Cropland under cultivation     
International Variables     
     FDI penetration     
     Trade openness  -   
     INGO membership ties  + +  
Control Variable     
     Time  - +  
Note: The effects presented for the time measure reflect general trends observed across models for each 
network.  
 
Both GDP per capita and state strength demonstrate significant relationships with 
centrality in at least one of the networks, while urbanization and secondary enrollment 
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fail to reach significance in any of the network analyses. Increased state strength is 
associated with reduced dichotomized receiving centrality. This effect could be the result 
of newly imposed limitations on refugee entrance or it could be the product of the large 
numbers of ties already held by many countries with high spending levels. Either of these 
would reduce centrality over time as fewer new ties are realized. The GDP per capita 
finding is particularly important in understanding refugee movements. The negative 
effect demonstrated by this measure with both sending networks is one of the strongest 
relationships observed between any variable and one of the networks. Economic growth 
clearly reduces refugee outflows and sending ties. As FEMs capture only variation over 
time, this finding indicates that it is not just wealthy countries that are less central in the 
refugee-sending networks, but rather that any country that experiences growth reaps this 
benefit. This may be through the development of greater economic opportunities that 
create greater incentive for potential refugees to stay or it may be that economic growth 
precludes the development of conditions that would lead to the generation of new refugee 
movements. This relationship is an important one and provides a key area of focus for 
further study and for the development of policy and intervention strategies designed to 
limit future refugee outflows.  
The political variables demonstrate strong and consistent relationships across 
these analyses, especially with the sending networks. Experiencing collapse and / or 
conflict is associated with greater sending centrality in the valued network while political 
repression, political terror, and collapse yield increased centrality in the dichotomized 
sending network. The effects of these variables are as expected, given the political nature 
of the refugee status recognized by the United Nations and used for this analysis. 
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Difficult political conditions lead to greater outflows of individuals fearing persecution 
and political violence.  
Only political repression demonstrates a significant effect on receiving centrality. 
Greater political repression results in reduced refugee-receiving centrality in both the 
valued and dichotomized networks. While some refugees have little choice about 
destinations, many do, and those that are able to choose tend to avoid countries with 
repressive regimes. This finding marks an interesting difference between the REMs and 
FEMs as repression demonstrates a significant positive relationship with valued receiving 
centrality. The effect found in the REMs is almost certainly the product of a handful of 
high-receiving countries with repressive regimes that are in close proximity to high-
sending countries with refugees that have less autonomy in choosing destinations (e.g., 
Iran).  
Variables in the demographic models are largely non-significant across analyses 
of the networks. Infant mortality and population density fail to reach significance in any 
of the models. Life expectancy has a significant negative relationship with valued 
sending centrality. As life expectancy increases, countries become less central in refugee 
sending. Again, this does not just reflect the influence of countries with high life 
expectancies, but also the changes experienced by poorer countries that raise life 
expectancy over time.  
A second finding among the demographic variables is the effect of fertility on 
centrality in the valued receiving and dichotomized sending networks. Fertility 
demonstrates a negative relationship in both of these analyses. Countries that increase 
fertility receive fewer refugees and send refugees to fewer partners over time. Both of 
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these findings are related to the low level of development represented by countries that 
have higher fertility rates. With the emphasis currently placed on reducing fertility in the 
developing world by the Millennium Development Goals (United Nations 2010), only 
countries at the lowest levels of development (e.g., Afghanistan) experienced increases in 
fertility over the course of the study. These countries represent decidedly unattractive 
destinations for refugees, limiting receiving centrality. Additionally, refugees from poor 
countries tend to move to fewer destinations (see Tables 3.6 through 3.10), limiting 
growth in sending ties.  
Among the environmental and land use variables, only CO2 per capita reaches 
significance. Increases in CO2 are positively related to valued receiving centrality and 
negatively related to dichotomized sending centrality. Cropland under cultivation is not a 
significant variable in any of the FEMs. The CO2 finding may reflect developing 
countries that increase in industrialization over the period of the study. These countries 
experience increases in CO2 production and have begun to emerge as “second choice” 
destinations for refugees who cannot reach the most advanced countries or are not 
allowed entry into these countries. As countries industrialize they become less likely to 
send new waves of refugees, thus limiting the likelihood of increasing dichotomized 
sending centrality. While this measure seems to track along development lines, it is 
somewhat nuanced by the emergence of relationships based on increases in CO2 
production and not just high production in general.  
While international variables are important to the REMs, they are somewhat less 
central in the FEMs. Part of this is due to the exclusion of world system position as fixed 
effects models cannot incorporate time-invariant measures. Beyond the loss of these 
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measures, however, the included variables demonstrate limited effects on centrality. FDI 
penetration fails to achieve significance in any of the models in this analysis. While 
somewhat important in understanding centrality across counties, it has no bearing on 
change in centrality over time. Trade openness performs only a little better, reaching 
significance with the valued receiving network. Increased trade openness yields reduced 
receiving centrality as more active countries are better able to control refugee flows or are 
already at high levels of refugee receipt, making increases in centrality difficult.  
INGO participation continues to have a counter-intuitive relationship with 
sending centrality in these analyses, particularly in the dichotomized sending analysis. 
While world polity theory would predict that increased INGO participation results in 
reductions in sending centrality, the opposite effect is demonstrated. Increases in INGO 
membership ties lead to increased centrality in the dichotomized network. While some of 
this increase may be due to the presence of INGOs that work to place refugees in 
destination countries across the world, it is more likely that much of this relationship is 
driven by new connections that are formed via these associations with INGOs. These 
connections create relationships and networks of communication and, occasionally, 
transportation that facilitate movements of refugees to new destinations.  
INGO participation is also connected to increased centrality in the valued 
receiving network. This finding falls more in line with the expectations of world polity 
theory as countries that increase connections to civil society through INGOs are likely to 
receive scripts that identify the receiving of refugees as the kind of thing that “good 
citizen” countries do. As these scripts are received, centrality in the receiving network is 
increased and more refugees are hosted.  
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 While the FEMs reveal fewer relationships than the REMs, three important stories 
emerge. The first involves the relationship of the wave variable with centrality. While 
time does not have a significant effect on centrality in the valued sending and 
dichotomized receiving networks, it does demonstrate a significant relationship with the 
other two. For the valued receiving network, time has a consistent negative relationship 
across models, indicating that, over time, centrality scores in this network decrease. This 
reflects the trends identified in Chapter Three that the overall scope of the valued refugee 
network is shrinking over time (Table 3.1) and that the most central actors in the network 
are hosting fewer refugees across waves. Iran, the top receiving country in Wave 1, 
played host to over 3.8 million refugees during this wave. By Wave 5, Iran is again the 
top receiving country, but hosts less than a million refugees. This pattern holds true 
across the top ten recipients of refugees in the study (see Tables 3.12 through 3.16).  
 By contrast, time demonstrates a significant positive effect on centrality in the 
dichotomized refugee-sending network. Over time, centrality scores in this network 
increase as actors gain more partners by sending refugees to new destinations. This result 
again reflects trends noted in Chapter Three. Total sending ties increased 230 percent 
from Wave 1 to Wave 5, indicating a clear positive trend in centrality (see Table 3.2). 
The most central actor in this network in Waves 1 and 5 (Somalia in both cases) almost 
doubled its partners from 1990 to 2008, increasing from 54 to 104. Each of the top actors 
in this network demonstrated similar results over this period (see Tables 3.6 to 3.10).  
 The second story observed in the FEMs is the confirmation of key patterns 
demonstrated in the REMs. While fewer significant variables are present in these models, 
the key roles of development, stability, and – to a lesser extent – global connectedness are 
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evidenced across FEMs examining centrality in the refugee network. GDP per capita is 
the most important of the development variables in fixed effects models, demonstrating a 
significant negative effect on sending centrality in the valued and dichotomized sending 
networks. Life expectancy and CO2 per capita also show the importance of development 
in reducing sending centrality. While there are fewer significant relationships to discuss 
in these analyses, two observations emerge that add to the already identified importance 
of development in limiting refugee outflows. As FEMs are only able to capture variation 
across time with no regard to variation across countries, the development findings in 
these analyses indicate that economic growth limits future refugee movements regardless 
of the level at which a country starts. It is not just that wealthy countries send fewer 
refugees, but rather that countries that experience economic growth (GDP per capita) and 
reap the benefits of that growth (increased life expectancy, greater industrialization) send 
fewer total refugees and connect to fewer new destination partners over time. The second 
observation from these analyses is the strength of relationship indicated by GDP per 
capita, particularly in the analysis of the valued network. Economic growth seems to be a 
vital part of any efforts to limit refugee outflows.  
 In these FEMs, the political instability variables also operate in ways that reflect 
findings from the REMs. Again, these variables are not significant as frequently in FEMs, 
but when significant, demonstrate expected effects on centrality. This is especially true in 
the analyses of the sending networks. Political repression, Political terror, collapse, and 
conflict all contribute to increased sending centrality in one or both of the sending 
networks. Countries that experience these conditions send more refugees to more partners 
over time.  
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 The third key perspective identified in the REMs – that global connectedness 
through investment, trade, and INGOs – receives less support in the FEMs. FDI 
penetration does not demonstrate any significant relationships and trade openness is only 
significant in the valued receiving model. However, INGO participation has a significant 
positive effect in both the valued receiving and dichotomized sending analyses, indicating 
that increases in INGO ties cause countries to receive more refugees over time and send 
refugees to more destinations. These findings reflect those observed in the REMs, where 
INGO participation had a positive significant relationship with centrality in every 
network. Again, finding these relationships in the FEMs indicates that greater 
participation in civil society through INGOs yields these effects for countries at every 
level of development and pattern of sending and / or receiving. While less robust than 
earlier evidence for the relationship between connectedness and centrality, this finding 
adds a layer to the conversation that further supports the importance of participation on 
the global stage.  
 The third key story that emerges from the FEMs is the identification of key 
differences in the effects of variables over time and across countries. Relationships 
identified in the FEMs are fewer, but demonstrate clear effects that occur over time 
across the period of study. By contrast, REMs identify effects that occur both over time 
and across countries. The efficacy of these variables to affect centrality is reflected in 
differences both across countries and over time. These differences between the types of 
analyses mean that the FEMs capture changes that occur over time as conditions change 
in countries, regardless of level of development, while REMs portray conditions as they 
currently exist and as they change with time.  The observation of more significant 
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relationships in REMs means that these measures explain differences in centrality 
experienced by countries based on their differential experience of these conditions (e.g., 
population density). However, the lack of significance evidenced by many of these 
measures in the FEMs analysis indicates that changes over time in these conditions do not 
yield centrality changes or that there is insufficient change over time for countries in 
these areas to register significant effects.  
 
ALTERNATIVE ANALYSES OF CENTRALITY IN THE REFUGEE NETWORK 
A number of additional analyses were conducted to test the robustness of the 
REMs and FEMs results under different conditions. These analyses generally examine 
the extent to which findings persist with different permutations of the sample. Results of 
analyses using a standardized sample, as well as a sample that excluded all countries that 
contributed only one observation are included. Additionally, results from analyses in 
which outliers identified by the Hadi procedure are excluded are presented. Finally, 
several optional full models were run with the demographic variables to observe the 
effects when one of the several highly correlated variables is excluded.  
Standardized sample results 
 The REMs and FEMs reported in this chapter use a floating sample. The full data 
set is included in each model and all countries and waves that have data for all variables 
in that model are included. This results in changes in the number of observations and 
countries contributing data for each model. The sample size ranges from 1210 to 645 
across the REMs and 968 to 672 in the FEMs. The use of this kind of sample allows for 
the retention of all possible observations for each model. While the use of a floating 
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sample presents some problems of comparability and raises the issue of bias toward 
countries that are able to contribute data for all measures and waves, it proved to be the 
best option for this study. The use of a standardized sample eliminates many less-
developed countries and skews the sample toward those countries that typically send few 
refugees. The loss of a number of high-sending (e.g., Afghanistan) and high-receiving 
(e.g. Sudan) countries for all models in the analysis proved to be more problematic than 
losing these across some models, but retaining them in others.  
 The potential exists that some of the results are influenced by the countries and 
observations included in the model. I created an unbalanced standardized sample to test 
for these effects by examining changes in results that occur when each model includes the 
same number of observations across the analysis. However, it should be noted that the 
standardized samples exclude a number of countries and observations due to missing 
data, making these findings the product of a limited sample as well. A full list of 
countries and observations included in the standardized samples is presented in Appendix 
C (Table C.3). To develop this sample, I ran a model that included all of the variables 
from the analysis with one of the networks and saved the sample for this model as a new 
sample, with the observations and countries included becoming the sample for the study. 
While standardized, this sample remained unbalanced as some of the countries did not 
have data for all five waves. Each network contains the same number of countries and 
observations; therefore, it was only necessary to do this procedure once for the REMs and 
once for the FEMs. The standardized REMs sample contains 530 observations 
contributed by 124 countries and the standardized FEMs sample contains 491 
observations from 150 countries. The loss of over half of the countries and observations 
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in the creation of these samples presents a clear problem with using this sample and is 
one of the key reasons why it was ultimately rejected in favor of the floating sample.  
 The REMs for the valued sending network using the standardized sample revealed 
several differences from the floating results. A number of significant relationships from 
the floating sample fail to emerge in the standardized analysis, including: urbanization in 
the full economic model, collapse in the full political model, population density, and 
fertility in the full demographic model, cropland under cultivation in individual and the 
full environmental model, and INGO participation. The collapse measure proved 
particularly problematic across analyses with standardized samples. Data for many of the 
measures examined in this study are often not available from states that do not have 
central governments. However, these countries tend contribute refugees at high rates. 
Eliminating countries with missing data for some measures eliminates most of the 
collapsed states, reducing variation on this measure to almost none. This lack of inclusion 
of collapsed states accounts for the loss of significance for this measure across analyses.  
 With the variables that lose significance across these models, there are also 
several relationships that become significant when the standardized sample is employed. 
State strength in the full economic model, fertility, and trade openness in both individual 
and the full international models demonstrate significant effects in these analyses. 
Strength reduces sending centrality while higher fertility and trade openness increase 
centrality in this network.  
 Standardized analysis of the valued receiving network follows the same pattern as 
that of the sending network. Ten previously significant relationships fail to reach 
significance in these models, including: state strength, urbanization, secondary 
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enrollment, GDP per capita and strength in the full economic model, population density 
in individual and the full population model, cropland in both models, FDI penetration, 
and trade openness. Previously non-significant relationships with infant mortality, 
fertility in the full population model, and INGO participation in the full international 
model became significant when the standardized sample was used. Each of these 
measures is associated with increased receiving centrality in these analyses.  
 Standardized analyses of the dichotomized networks demonstrate fewer 
differences. Collapse loses significance in the full political model as do fertility, 
population density, and trade openness. Interestingly, collapse becomes significant in its 
individual model, when it was not in the floating analysis of this network. Additionally, 
population density in the full demographic model, cropland under cultivation in the full 
environmental model, semiperipheral status, and FDI in the full international model all 
become significant in the standardized analysis. FDI penetration decreases dichotomized 
sending centrality in this analysis, while the other newly significant variables all 
demonstrate positive relationships.  
 In the dichotomized receiving network, conflict and population density lose 
significance in both individual and full models. Additionally, cropland under cultivation 
fails to reach significance in the full environmental model, as does FDI penetration. The 
individual urbanization model and Political terror in the full political model are the only 
variables that become newly significant in this network, both demonstrating positive 
relationships with dichotomized receiving centrality.  
 While a number of differences emerge between REMs analyses of these networks 
using floating and standardized samples, the general trends identified in the floating 
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analyses do not change. Development, stability, and global connectedness influence 
sending and receiving centrality across both valued and dichotomized networks. The 
elimination of countries with missing data limits the contributions of less developed 
countries to the models, a problem that seems to be particularly telling in effects on 
collapse and demographic variables. Additionally, many previously marginally 
significant relationships fail to emerge as significant when countries and observations are 
standardized.  
 As the fixed effects analyses identify fewer significant relationships using the 
floating sample, fewer differences emerge in comparisons of these results with those 
using a standardized sample. In analyses of the valued sending network, only conflict and 
life expectancy lose significance, while collapse, trade openness, and INGO participation 
become significant. Trade openness and INGO ties reach significance in both individual 
models and the full international model, demonstrating particular robustness in this 
analysis. Collapse and INGO participation increase sending centrality over time, while 
greater trade openness yields a reduction in sending centrality.  
 In the standardized FEMs for the valued receiving network, repression in the full 
political model, CO2 per capita in both models, and INGO participation in its individual 
model fail to maintain previously significant relationships. Population density in its 
individual model and fertility in the full model are the only newly significant 
relationships to emerge in this network. Density is positively related to receiving 
centrality while fertility demonstrates a negative effect.  
 The dichotomized sending network only loses one relationship when analyzed 
with the standardized sample: fertility fails to reach significance in either model. 
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However, a number of relationships become significant across models with this network. 
Collapse, population density, life expectancy in both individual and full models, both 
environmental variables in individual models, FDI penetration in its individual model, 
and FDI and INGO participation in the full international model. Of these, collapse, 
population density, cropland under cultivation, and INGO participation have positive 
effects on dichotomized sending centrality, while life expectancy, CO2 per capita, and 
FDI penetration reduce sending centrality.  
 Of the eight standardized analyses, only the FEMs for the dichotomized receiving 
network have identical results to those of the floating analysis. State strength and political 
repression demonstrate significance with centrality in this network, both leading to 
decreased centrality. All other measures fail to achieve any level of significance in this 
analysis. 
 The FEMs using standardized samples demonstrate a higher degree of similarity 
to the floating analyses than do comparisons of the floating and standardized REMs. 
However, this may be largely due to the more limited significance demonstrated by 
variables in the floating FEMs, relative to that evidenced in the floating REMs. Whatever 
differences emerge between analyses using the floating and standardized samples, the 
main trends are the same. The primary differences seem to involve the effects of 
demographic and international variables, measures that were not significant when all 
possible relationships were included, but become significant with this more limited 
sample. This seems to indicate the presence of a selection effect that favors these 




Removal of countries with only one observation 
 To further test the robustness of results, countries that contributed only one 
observation to the standardized sample were identified and removed from the sample. As 
the goal of the analysis is to examine effects of variables both over time and across 
countries, the inclusion of a number of countries that have only one observation limit the 
extent to which changes over time can be observed. Countries in the standardized sample 
were listed, with the number of observations for each identified. Of the 124 countries 
included in the standardized sample, two contributed only one observation: Barbados and 
Qatar. These countries were removed from the sample and each individual and full model 
was re-run for all four networks using this new sample. Results for these analyses were 
identical to those using the standardized sample that included these countries. The 
elimination of countries with single observations from the sample had no effect on the 
observed results.  
Identification and removal of outliers 
 The presence of outliers in models creates the possibility that a few cases can 
influence the results, presenting an inaccurate representation of general relationships. To 
test for the presence and possible influence of outliers, HADIMVO procedures were 
conducted for all of the REMs and FEMs for each of the networks, using the floating 
samples. This procedure tests for the presence of outliers in multivariate models. Through 
this procedure, I identified countries that registered as outliers at the .05 level in each 
model and removed these from the sample. I then re-ran all models to determine if 
differences emerged.  
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 Few outliers were identified in either the REMs or the FEMs for individual and 
full models across each network. In fact, most of the individual and full models across 
networks had no outliers. Those that did emerge were unique for each model. While the 
same cases were identified as outliers in similar models across networks, no case served 
as an outlier in multiple models within the same network. For example, the observation 
for Rwanda in the first wave was identified as an outlier in the individual life expectancy 
model and the full demographic model of the valued sending network. Upon continued 
examination, this observation was an outlier in these models of all four networks. 
However, the first wave Rwanda observation was not identified as an outlier in any of the 
other individual or full models in the valued sending or any other network.  
 Evaluations of the final models of each network provided more evidence of the 
presence of outliers. In the final models of the REMs analyses, several observations 
consistently emerged as outliers, including: all observations from Eritrea and Trinidad 
and Tobago, the Wave 5 observation from Solomon Islands, the Wave 4 observation 
from Equatorial Guinea, and the Wave 1 observation from Rwanda. Other outliers were 
also identified in each of these models, but were different from model to model. The 
removal of these outliers from sample used to estimate the adjusted final models 
produced no changes in effect or level of significance for any of the variables in these 
models. The findings across models and analyses are not influenced by the presence of 
outliers. 
 The final models in the FEMs for each network had fewer outliers and evidenced 
no changes. Of the four final models, only the dichotomized receiving model had more 
than two outliers and none of the outliers for any of the models were similar. The valued 
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receiving network final model had no outliers, while the valued sending had one and the 
dichotomized sending had two. Once removed, none of these outliers demonstrated any 
influence on findings in these models. Results of final models run with new samples that 
excluded outliers were unchanged from those previously reported.  
Collinearity check in demographic models 
 Results of tests for collinearity indicated a high degree of correlation between life 
expectancy and infant mortality, introducing collinearity into the demographic models. 
To test for possible effects, full demographic models were run that excluded infant 
mortality and kept life expectancy and then excluded life expectancy, while retaining 
infant mortality. Results of these models in both the REMs and FEMs showed no 
difference in the direction or significance of the relationships of these variables. The 
effects of all of the variables in the population model were identical in the full model and 
each of the models that excluded one or the other variable. While the possibility of 
collinearity between these measures exists, it does not appear that the observed effects on 
centrality are influenced by this condition.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 The goal of this chapter was to examine the effects of variables from a variety of 
perspectives in influencing centrality in the valued and dichotomized refugee sending and 
receiving networks across five waves from 1990 to 2008. Measures representing 
domestic conditions (economic, political, demographic, and environmental), as well as 
international interactions were included in random effects and fixed effects models of the 
four networks to determine relationships with centrality in these networks across 
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countries and over time. Two primary analyses and a number of alternative analyses were 
conducted to study relationships and determine the robustness of the effects that were 
identified.  
 To examine these relationships, I performed a series of random effects and fixed 
effects models. The analysis of each network included five distinct models: economic, 
political, demographic, environmental, and international. For each of these, individual 
models were conducted that included a single predictor variable with the given network, 
net of regional and time control variables (or only time in the case of the FEMs) and all 
of the predictors from that model together with the network and controls in a full model. 
The analysis of each network also included a final model that brought together all of the 
significant variables from previous models, net of controls. To examine the robustness of 
the identified relationships, additional analyses were conducted that included the use of 
an unbalanced standardized sample, a sample that excluded countries that only 
contributed one observation to the analyses, and tests to identify outliers that were 
subsequently removed to determine their effects.  
 The results of these analyses present two important stories about influences on 
centrality in these networks. The first is the identification of three clear trends about the 
determination of centrality across countries and over time. Economic development, 
political instability, and global connectedness each have clear effects on sending and / or 
receiving centrality in these networks. These relationships demonstrate a high level of 
robustness, persisting across models that include multiple variables from different 
perspectives, across both REMs and FEMs, and across analyses that employ different 
permutations of the sample.  
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 Measures of economic growth and development demonstrate a consistent negative 
effect on sending centrality in both the valued and dichotomized networks in the REMs. 
GDP per capita, state strength, urbanization, school enrollment, life expectancy, and CO2 
per capita all demonstrate negative relationships with centrality. Countries with higher 
scores for these measures of economic growth and development send fewer refugees 
overall and to fewer partners than less developed countries. Additionally, infant mortality 
– typically connected to a lack of development – has a positive relationship with 
centrality in both networks. While most of these variables fail to reach significance in the 
FEMs, the relationship demonstrated by GDP per capita with sending centrality in fixed 
effects models is the strongest of any observed in the study. This indicates that it is not 
just highly developed countries that experience reduced sending centrality, but also that 
economic growth negatively influences sending centrality regardless of the development 
level of the country that experiences it. Negative effects of life expectancy in the valued 
sending network and CO2 per capita in the dichotomized sending network that emerge in 
the FEMs further validate the importance of this connection between development and 
reduced centrality. Increases in these areas – typically connected with increased 
economic well-being and industrialization, respectively – are also associated with 
reduced sending centrality. Clearly, the pursuit of economic growth and the 
accompanying benefits associated with development are key components of a strategy 
designed to limit refugee outflows.  
 The effects of political instability on refugee-sending centrality emerged as 
expected. REMs and FEMs confirm that countries with higher levels of political 
repression, Political terror, and the experience of collapse and conflict are more central in 
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the valued and dichotomized refugee-sending networks. The definition of refugees used 
to develop networks for this analysis is predicated on the experience or fear of 
persecution or political violence, so it stands to reason that the presence of conditions that 
generate greater potential for these issues would encourage refugee movement. The 
persistence of these effects in fixed effects models demonstrates again that it is not just 
repressive regimes that are high in sending centrality, but also countries that experience 
increases in levels of repression and human rights violations experience commensurate 
increases in refugee outflows. These findings reflect those discovered in previous 
research, but the use of REMs and FEMs in examining these effects, as well as the 
inclusion of high numbers of countries and territories in the study, add nuance to the 
results identified in earlier work.  
 While economic development and instability demonstrate clear relationships with 
sending centrality, measures capturing participation in global systems showed consistent 
and strong relationships with centrality in the valued and dichotomized receiving 
networks. Countries with greater foreign investment, trade openness, and INGO 
participation receive greater levels of refugees and receive refugees from more partners 
than those less involved in these networks. Additionally, the negative relationships with 
centrality evidenced by world system measures indicate that countries that are less 
connected to global trade networks are less central in receiving refugees and hold ties to 
fewer countries. Greater levels of global connectedness through participation in systems 
like finance and trade create communication and transportation pathways that may 
facilitate moves for refugees when the necessity arises. The more connected a country is, 
the more potential receiving partners they have. As these potential ties are realized, 
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centrality increases. Lack of connectedness, as demonstrated by semiperipheral and 
peripheral world system position, results in fewer pathways and, consequently, reduced 
centrality.  
 The mechanisms through which INGO participation yields greater receiving 
centrality may be slightly different than those of the other global measures. While greater 
connectedness to other countries through ties to INGOs certainly creates the 
aforementioned pathways through which refugees may travel, additional factors 
contribute to this relationship. The world polity thesis that INGOs are the vehicles 
through which scripts are passed regarding human rights violations and appropriate state 
responses to them (Peterson and Hughes 2008) would indicate that countries with high 
numbers of INGO ties or that increase ties over time may receive scripts about the 
responsibility of countries to receive refugees as part of good global citizenship. As these 
scripts are adopted, countries may become more open to receiving refugees, increasing 
centrality in the receiving networks. Additionally, many INGOs work in the area of 
relocating refugees (e.g., the International Rescue Committee). Ties with these kinds of 
organizations might result in greater inflows of refugees as potential hosts are found 
within the connected country.  
 Interestingly, INGO membership ties is the only global variable that consistently 
demonstrates a significant relationship with centrality in the sending networks, 
particularly in the REMs. Countries with greater levels of INGO participation are more 
central in the sending networks. The significant relationship evidenced in the 
dichotomized sending FEMs indicates that increases in INGO participation are associated 
with increases in sending ties. This relationship runs contrary to the expectation of world 
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polity theory. Given the role of INGOs to disperse scripts about good governance and 
how countries ought to act in the global system and with respect to the rights of their 
citizens, it would logically follow that greater INGO participation would lead to reduced 
sending centrality as scripts are adopted and conditions that tend to generate refugee 
outflows tempered. This, however, does not seem to be the case. The positive 
relationships evidenced across sending network models seem to reinforce the idea of 
greater connectedness generates channels through which refugees can move, increasing 
sending centrality, particularly in the dichotomized network.  
 The lack of relationships demonstrated by FDI, trade, and world system position 
with the sending networks seems to run contrary to expectations of both dependency and 
neoclassical arguments. Dependency scholars view trade and FDI penetration as negative 
for developing countries as more advanced countries are able to take advantage of them, 
creating negative welfare outcomes. Refugee outflows or the domestic conditions that 
encourage these movements would seem to be among the possible negative outcomes 
experienced. However, trade and FDI are generally not associated with greater sending 
centrality. By contrast, neoclassical economic theory would predict that greater 
participation in these networks would lead to reduced sending centrality as greater trade 
and investment create domestic conditions that eliminate the conditions that lead to 
refugee movements. This relationship fails to emerge as well. Foreign investment and 
trade do not seem to be connected to development that impacts sending centrality.  
 The independence and strength of the economic, instability, and connectedness 
effects are tested in the final adjusted models of many of these analyses, as variables 
reflecting each of these trends are included together in a single model. In the sending 
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REMs, the effects of economic measures, instability measures, and INGO participation 
persist in spite of each other, indicating the independent effects produced by these 
different sets of conditions. The final models of the receiving networks also demonstrate 
independent effects, primarily of development and global variables. INGO participation 
and world system position are significant in both valued and dichotomized receiving 
models, as is GDP per capita.  
 Examination of the final FEMs indicate that global connectedness is not an 
important element over time, when considered with development and instability 
measures. Economic growth and increased instability demonstrate more significant 
relationships in the individual and full models than does connectedness, and the few 
international measures that do emerge tend to be absorbed by the presence of these other 
measures in the final models. The effect of trade openness in the valued receiving 
network is the only international relationship to persist. This difference between REMs 
and FEMs seems to indicate that, while important to centrality, the effects of global 
connectedness are more a product of the different levels at which countries are connected, 
and less the result of changes in connectedness over time.  
 Differences like these between relationships identified across REMs and FEMs 
mark the second major story developed from this study. Random effects models capture 
both longitudinal and cross-sectional variation. In this case, these models make 
comparisons between countries and within a single country over time. By contrast, fixed 
effects models only evaluate change over time. Using both methods in evaluating the 
effects of domestic conditions and international participation on centrality in these 
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networks produced a number of similarities and differences that identify key influences 
on these networks and how they change over time.  
 Generally, the primary stories from these analyses are the same across procedures. 
Economic development and instability consistently affect sending centrality in both 
REMs and FEMs, while global connectedness influences receiving centrality – although 
to a lesser degree in the FEMs than the REMs. This is an important discovery as it 
demonstrates that variation in centrality in the networks is not solely due to differences 
between countries, but is also the product of changes that occur over time. Increases in 
GDP per capita are associated with reductions in refugee-sending centrality for all 
countries, not just those that start at a high level of development. The identification of 
these temporal relationships allows for the evaluation of the efficacy of policy measures 
taken to limit refugee outflows and for the development of new measures that take into 
account the influences of things like economic growth, instability, and global 
participation over time.  
 Within these similar stories, there are a number of differences in the effects of 
individual variables that emerge between the REMs and FEMs. Generally, variables in 
the FEMs beyond the primary measures of instability and economic growth fail to reach 
significance across most models. For example, in the REMs of the valued sending 
network, there are fifteen significant relationships identified. In the FEMs for the same 
network, there are only four. While key indicators of growth and stability (e.g., GDP per 
capita and conflict) reach significance in FEMs, variables that capture outcomes related 
to growth or stability (e.g., urbanization and infant mortality), fail to demonstrate 
significant effects. Economic growth is associated with change over time, but different 
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experiences of infant mortality affect only cross-sectional variation of centrality. It may 
be that the key indicators identified in the FEMs drive centrality through the outcomes 
they generate, creating cross-sectional differences that impact centrality beyond the effect 
of the primary condition. For instance, economic growth reduces sending centrality over 
time, a relationship identified in the FEMs for this network. Additionally, economic 
growth generates positive welfare outcomes like life expectancy, infant mortality, and 
education. While changes in these welfare outcomes do not demonstrate significant 
effects over time (in FEMs), the differential experience of these outcomes across 
countries does affect a particular country‟s experience of centrality (as identified in the 
REMs).  
 The general lack of significance across measures of global interaction in FEMs 
presents another puzzle. The difference in significance between the REMs and FEMs 
seems to indicate that, in general, changes in global participation matter less for centrality 
in sending and receiving networks than the current level of global connectedness 
experienced by countries. Influences found in the REMs are more cross-sectional than 
longitudinal in effect. The exception to this pattern is the role of trade openness in the 
valued receiving network and INGO participation in the valued receiving and 
dichotomized sending networks. As countries increase the level of INGO participation, 
they become more central receivers of refugees and increase the numbers of countries to 
which they send refugees. Interestingly, the effect demonstrated by trade openness in the 
FEMs is in the opposite direction of that identified in the REMs. Over time, greater trade 
openness decreases valued receiving centrality, while across countries greater openness is 
associated with greater receiving centrality.  
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 This change in direction from the REMs to the FEMs occurs for four variables in 
the study. In evaluations of the receiving networks, political repression, fertility rate, and 
trade openness switch from positive to negative, while CO2 per capita changes from 
negative to positive. These differences indicate that changes in these conditions over time 
generate different effects than the cross-sectional experience of them at any given point 
in time. For example, over time, countries that experience increases in political repression 
become less central in the valued and dichotomized receiving networks. They become 
less attractive as destinations over time. However, at any given point in time, countries 
with higher levels of political repression are more central as receivers in these same 
networks. This may be due to refugees that are already present in these countries or to the 
proximity of these countries to other high-sending countries. The experience of 
repression has a different effect on centrality than changes in the level of repression over 
time.  
Implications for theory and policy 
 Three implications for theory and policy emerge from these key stories about the 
influence of domestic conditions and international integration on sending and receiving 
centrality in the global refugee networks. First, it is clear from the REMs and FEMs that 
sending centrality is not solely the product of political instability. While political unrest 
and repression are key elements in driving refuge outflows (as would be expected for the 
movement of political refugees), other domestic conditions shape these flows as well. 
Particularly important to this discussion is the relationship identified between economic 
development and sending centrality. That this effect exists regardless of starting point 
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provides direction for policy measures and interventions designed to limit future refuge 
outflows.  
The second implication flows from the first. Efforts designed to reduce or end 
refugee outflows must address conditions beyond political repression and conflict. 
Affecting refugee movements is not just a matter of ending negative political conditions, 
but also helping countries develop positive economic momentum. In many cases, these 
initiatives may go hand in hand, but both should be addressed. The focus on economic 
growth and attendant increases in welfare and development outcomes may initiate 
changes in the political realm without specific interventions or measures levied in this 
direction.  
 Finally, these findings make it clear that proximity is not the only factor present in 
determinations of refugee destinations. While some refugees do not have the resources to 
be choosy about destinations, many do. Those who are able to choose tend to move along 
pathways established through previous interactions (e.g., INGO ties), rather than simply 
cross the nearest available border. This is not to negate the obvious importance of 
proximity in determining countries that are vulnerable to refugee inflows when new 
movements occur, but rather to note that there are other factors in play as well (e.g., 
language spoken, colonial or historical links).  
 A number of directions for future study are generated by these findings. The 
relationship between international integration and receiving centrality is an important 
area for further examination. Future studies should examine other avenues of 
connectedness (communications, transportation, etc.) to see how these systems influence 
centrality and the relationships identified in this study. Additionally, the findings in this 
380 
 
study are admittedly limited to relationships at the nation-state level. Refugee movements 
have both macro and micro components, and need to be studied from both angles. The 
relationships identified in this analysis provide a framework through which case studies 
of specific refugee movements could be studied. The analysis of how these relationships 
impact or fail to impact sending and receiving in specific contexts will further expand on 
the foundation developed in this study. While this project demonstrates again the efficacy 
of examining refugee movements at the macro level, the rich tradition of qualitative work 
in refugee studies is vital and must be continued.  
 Finally, the data used to develop the networks for this study are clearly limited 
and need to be expanded if the full scope of forced migration is to be examined and 
understood. While they represent the best data available, the UNHCR data only capture 
political refugees that cross international borders, excluding internally displaced persons, 
environmental refugees, and a host of other groups and individuals. There is a need in the 
field of migration and refugee studies to gather data on all forcibly displaced populations 
to better understand the scope of initiating factors and elements that go into destination 
choices. The collection and development of this kind of data will greatly expand the 
scope of the discipline and facilitate growth in the development of cross-national studies 
and other areas and methods of examination that will ultimately lead to better 
understanding of these movements and better policy in sending and receiving countries to 
deal with those who move.  





 The purpose of this project was to examine the structure and degree centrality of 
the global refugee sending and receiving networks over five waves for the years 1990 to 
2008. I used 242 countries and territories to develop these networks and identify valued 
and dichotomized degree centrality scores. Once developed, I analyzed these networks 
using a variety of statistical procedures and means of data presentation. These 
examinations have revealed several important patterns that address the three central 
questions of this analysis, outlined below.  
What does the structure of the global refugee network look like?  
 The descriptive examination of the valued and dichotomized refugee sending and 
receiving networks, presented in Chapter Three, provides multiple images of the structure 
of these networks, key actors in each network, and how these changed from 1990 to 
2008. These pictures of the scope and shape of the network reveal four clear trends.  
 First, there is a high level of stability among the most central actors in each 
network. Tables 3.6 through 3.10 show that 90 percent of the top ten countries in the 
dichotomized sending network remain the same from Wave 1 to Wave 5. Top ten actors 
in the receiving networks, presented in Tables 3.12 through 3.16 also demonstrate 
stability in top actors as both networks experience retention rates of around 80 percent. 
The valued sending network represents an exception to this trend, as only 50 percent 
were the same due to the extent to which conditions that generate refugee outflows vary 
over time.  
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The tendency toward stability reflects two important patterns in these networks. 
First, conditions that generate high levels of refugee flows often become chronic, causing 
countries to continually experience new outflows or, at the least, limit repatriation. 
Second, once a country establishes itself as a refugee destination, whether intentionally or 
otherwise, it maintains prominence. This may be due to more open receiving policies, the 
establishment of networks that facilitate movement to these particular destinations, or 
proximity to an ongoing refugee movement.  
 The second major trend identified in descriptive analyses is the diffusion of the 
network from Wave 1 to Wave 5.  The number of total refugees in the network shrank 
over this time period, while the total sending and receiving ties held by countries in the 
network more than doubled. The number of refugees present in the network may be 
shrinking due to an alleviation of conditions that create new outflows. It is also possible 
that the drop in refugees is due to renewed efforts toward repatriation or the dying off of 
an earlier generation of refugee stock. The trends of fewer individuals choosing to be 
identified as refugees (Zetter 1991) and many who would formerly have been refugees 
choosing to stay within the borders of their own countries as IDPs may also be 
contributing to this decline. The expansion of refugee ties may reflect new areas of 
refugee-generating conflict that have emerged, creating new receiving ties as refugees 
move to previously low-receiving countries within the region (UNHCR 2009). It is also 
possible that new refugee destinations have developed among countries at middle levels 
of development as developed countries have become less open to high volumes of 
refugee receiving (UNDP 2009). Understanding the reasons for these shifts is an 
important area for further study.  
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 The increased refugee-receiving burden experienced by countries at middle and 
low levels of development is the third trend identified in this chapter. This finding 
confirms trends identified by the UNHCR (2009). Eight of the top ten countries in 
increased valued receiving from 1990 to 2008 (presented in Table 3.18) are at these 
levels of development. As these countries experience increased refugee inflows, strains 
on economic resources and population burdens result (Betts 2008). Refugee populations 
are often concentrated within small areas, creating enclaves that may become sources of 
political unrest for the host country (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006). Poor countries that 
receive refugees at high levels must receive aid and support from the international 
community to help deal with the social, political, and economic strains created by these 
inflows.  
 The final, and perhaps most telling, trend identified in these analyses is the clear 
difference between top actors in the dichotomized receiving network and those in the 
other three networks. Of the four networks, only the top tens of the dichotomized 
receiving network consist exclusively of countries at the highest levels of development 
(see Tables 3.12 through 3.16). The central position of these countries in other types of 
global networks (e.g., trade, transportation) make them easy and attractive targets for 
refugees who have the resources and ability to choose their destination. While these 
countries receive refugees from more countries than others, few of them are included 
among the most central receivers in the valued network. Figure 3.17 demonstrates that 
only three of the top ten receiving actors from the dichotomized list are on the valued list 
in the wave in which they are most similar. This disparity further highlights the refugee 
burden placed on less-developed countries. 
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 Overall, the picture of the refugee network developed in Chapter Three is of a 
network that is expanding in scope, but declining in overall number. In spite of this 
diffusion, central actors are becoming more prominent in the valued networks as they 
account for higher percentages of the refugees sent and received in Wave 5 than they did 
in Wave 1. Countries that are least able to absorb the cost of refugee inflows or that can 
least afford the loss of population through outflows continue to experience the brunt of 
these movements.  
Are the global migrant and refugee networks different? 
 Addressing the question of similarity between the migrant and refugee sending 
and receiving networks prompted the examination of the two networks from a number of 
perspectives. After developing centrality scores for the migrant network, I compared 
descriptive statistics, regional variation, correlations, and relationships between the 
centrality scores and a number of domestic and international variables. Additionally, I 
examined the relationships of these variables with residual scores to understand the extent 
to which these domestic and international elements explain differences in the networks. 
These investigations produced answers to two questions related to similarity between the 
migrant and refuge networks. First, are the networks different? Also, can domestic 
conditions and international interactions explain the differences that exist?  
 Chapter Four presents clear evidence of differences between the multiple 
permutations of the migrant and refugee networks. Comparisons of descriptive statistics 
demonstrate that the migrant network is more active than the refugee network in terms of 
both individual movers and ties held. The migrant network involves 17.5 times more 
actors than the refugee network (see Table 4.1) and 10 times the number of ties (see 
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Table 4.3). These different levels of activity result in very different structures. The 
migrant networks are the far denser of the two, while the refugee networks are generally 
more centralized. The most central actors in refugee networks send and receive refugees 
at high rates, relative to the rest of the actors in the network, causing these networks to 
have higher centralization than their migrant counterparts. The exception to this is the 
valued receiving networks, where the migrant network is actually far more centralized, 
due to the high volume of migrants present in a few key countries (e.g., the United 
States).  
 Differences in regional variation between the networks are also highlighted in 
these descriptive comparisons (see Figures 4.9 through 4.12). While most of the migrant 
networks demonstrate a degree of equality in regional distribution, with roughly equal 
percentages of individuals and ties sent and received by each region, the refugee 
networks are quite varied. The migrant valued receiving network is again the exception to 
this trend as it is skewed heavily toward advanced countries in Europe and the West 
(Figure 4.10). Among the refugee networks, Western countries receive higher 
percentages of ties and total refugees, while Eastern Europe sends relatively more 
refugees than other regions and Africa contributes more sending ties than the others.  
 In addition to differences identified by descriptive comparisons, correlations 
identify clear statistical differences between the networks. Pearson‟s bivariate 
correlations of centrality scores of the matched pairs (Table 4.5) show that three of the 
four networks are significantly correlated (the valued sending networks are the 
exception), but with low coefficients (.422 is the highest). QAP correlations of the valued 
and dichotomized networks also demonstrate high levels of difference between the two. 
386 
 
Hamming Distance scores for both valued (37,441.00) and dichotomized (33,759.00) 
networks show that most of the cells in the refugee network would have to change to 
match those of the migrant network. While not surprising when dealing with valued data, 
the fact that the Hamming Distance is high between the dichotomized networks indicates 
extensive differences in the partner relationships in these networks.   
 Once difference between the networks was established, the next task was to 
understand what factors caused centrality to differ these networks. To explore 
differences, I first compared the effects of domestic conditions and levels of international 
integration on centrality scores for the different networks. I performed a series of OLS 
regressions using variables from a number of theoretical perspectives and models. I then 
compared the results of these analyses for each migrant and refugee network pair to 
identify similarities and differences in relationships with the measures included in the 
models.  
 In evaluating the results of these comparisons, it is clear that there is a high degree 
of similarity between centrality in the migrant and refugee networks in their relationships 
with many of the variables included in these analyses. Often, these similarities manifested 
in relationships that failed to reach significance with centrality scores for either network 
(e.g., variables in the demographic model). However, important similarities between 
networks and their relationships with variables also emerged. Among the valued 
networks, state strength reduced both sending and receiving centrality for both networks. 
Conflict demonstrated a significant positive effect on centrality across all eight networks, 
representing one of the most persistent relationships in the analysis. Finally, among the 
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international variables, the effects of INGO participation, trade openness, and foreign aid 
are consistent across most networks.  
 A number of differences between the networks also emerged that highlight ways 
in which centrality is affected differently by domestic conditions and international 
integration. Modernization measures (i.e., urbanization and secondary school enrollment) 
and environmental variables demonstrate significant relationships with the refugee 
centrality scores, but fail to do so in analyses of the migrant network. These relationships 
influence centrality in various permutations of the refugee network, but have little effect 
on migrant network centrality. This pattern also holds true for the political terror measure 
that has a significant positive relationship with valued migrant-sending centrality, but 
fails to reach significance in the other three migrant analyses. By contrast, this measure is 
significantly related to centrality in three of the four refugee networks, reflecting 
expectations based on previous research (Apodaca 1998; Gibney et al. 1996; Neumayer 
2005). That the dichotomized receiving network is the only refugee network to fail to 
achieve a significant relationship with political terror scores again demonstrates the 
distinctiveness of this network. 
 Among the identified differences in effects, the most telling are those associated 
with world system position. Semiperipheral status demonstrates a significant relationship 
with refugee centrality but not migrant centrality in three of the four networks, while in 
comparisons of the fourth network (the valued receiving), the opposite holds true. 
Peripheral status reaches significance with centrality scores for all eight networks, but the 
direction of these relationships varies based on the network under consideration. In 
analyses of receiving centrality, peripheral status is consistently associated with lower 
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centrality scores across both migrant and refugee networks. However, analyses of 
sending centrality show that peripheral status is negatively related to centrality in the 
migrant networks, but positively related to centrality in the refugee networks. Countries 
in the periphery of the global trade network receive migrants and refugees and send 
migrants at low levels, relative to core countries, but send refugees at a higher rate. These 
differential experiences demonstrate a significant distinction between how these networks 
are developed. Understanding the mechanisms behind these differences is an important 
area for further examination.  
 In the final section of Chapter Four, OLS regressions were performed on residual 
scores generated by the regression of each migrant network on its refugee counterpart. 
The goal of this analysis was to identify variables that caused a country‟s centrality in the 
refugee network to be different than would be expected, given its centrality in its 
counterpart migrant network. The emergence of significant effects provides insight into 
what conditions and factors generate differences between these networks. The results of 
these analyses provide the first clear articulation of three key stories that emerge in the 
REMs and FEMs presented in Chapter Five.  
 Variables capturing economic development or associated welfare outcomes (i.e., 
CO2 per capita, life expectancy, secondary enrollment, and state strength) each 
demonstrate significant negative relationships in at least one of the residual analyses. 
Greater levels of development in these areas cause countries to experience significantly 
less refugee sending and / or receiving centrality than would be expected, given their 
level of centrality in migrant networks. The opposite effect was observed in models that 
included the collapse and political terror measures. The presence of these vectors of 
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political instability causes countries to be more active in the refugee networks, 
particularly the sending networks, than would be expected, based on their level of activity 
in the migrant networks. These findings make clear intuitive sense as more developed 
countries are less prone to experience conditions that lead to refugee movements. These 
countries also tend to have populations with better educations and more resources that 
may be more inclined to emigrate when opportunities arise. By contrast, countries that 
violate human rights or experience state collapse are prime candidates for high refugee 
sending (Neumayer 2005), but may have few citizens who are able to move as migrants. 
 The third trend identified in these analyses involves differences generated by the 
relationships between international variables and residual scores. Trade openness 
demonstrates a similar pattern of relationships to those of the development variables: 
greater openness leads to lower refugee sending centrality than would be expected. 
Among the world system measures, lower world system position (semiperipheral or 
peripheral status) yields higher than expected refugee-sending centrality and lower than 
expected refugee-receiving centrality. These findings reflect the neoclassical argument 
(Sachs and Warner 1995) that greater openness yields positive welfare outcomes and 
greater stability through integration in global markets. 
 The analyses conducted in Chapter Four present a clear picture of difference 
between the migrant and refugee networks. The consistent theme of every comparison in 
this chapter is the identification of important distinctions in structure and centrality 
between the networks. These networks are different in scope, in structure, in regional 
sending and receiving experiences, and in activity levels. Additionally, centrality in these 
networks is shaped differently by domestic and global factors, particularly those 
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reflecting economic development, political instability, and integration in the global trade 
network. The identification of these differences creates a compelling argument for the 
need to develop refugee theory that is distinct from migrant theory. While some overlap 
occurs between these populations, there are nuances to refugee movements that cannot be 
understood in a migration framework. Countries that characterize and treat refugees as 
illegal immigrants should reevaluate these policies in light of the different forces at play 
in refugee movements. These populations and networks are not the same, and the 
academic and policymaking communities must acknowledge and understand these 
differences in order to adequately structure work in the area of refugees accordingly.  
How do domestic conditions and global interactions affect centrality in the refugee 
network over time? 
 Chapter Five presents findings from the investigation of the effects of domestic 
conditions and international integration on sending and receiving centrality in the global 
refugee network. I used a series of random effects and fixed effects models that include 
these elements with centrality scores for each permutation of the refugee network. These 
analyses investigate relationships both longitudinally and cross-sectionally for 242 
countries and territories over five waves from 1990 to 2008. As noted in the previous 
section, three clear trends emerge in this analysis that provide insight into key 
contributors that impact position in these networks.  
 The first clear trend identified in the random effects models is the importance of 
economic development in reducing refugee-sending centrality. A number of measures 
capturing economic growth and development demonstrate negative relationships with 
both valued and dichotomized refugee-sending centrality. In the fixed effects models, 
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economic growth continues to demonstrate a strong and robust negative relationship 
across individual, full economic, and final models. This result indicates that growth is 
negatively related to sending centrality for all countries over time, regardless of level of 
development. Growth and the development and welfare outcomes that accompany it 
temper many of the conditions in a country that cause people to move as refugees. 
Additionally, the presence of greater economic opportunity may cause those who might 
otherwise move to be less inclined to do so, given the losses that might be incurred. 
These findings confirm and update those in previous cross-national work in refugee 
studies (Neumayer 2005; Schmeidl 1997; Vogler and Rotte 2000), using more recent data 
and a larger sample of countries.  
 The second clear trend is the effect of political instability on sending centrality. 
Countries with higher levels of political repression and political terror, as well as the 
experience of collapse or conflict, are more central in the valued and dichotomized 
refugee-sending networks. These results are not surprising and reflect previous work in 
this area (Gibney et al. 1996; Schmeidl 1997). The influence of political conditions 
makes clear intuitive sense, given the political nature of the definition of refugee used to 
identify those in the network (UNHCR 1951). The persistence of these effects in FEMs 
indicates that changes in these conditions, not just their presence, affect refugee outflows. 
Even if a country‟s political repression score rises from a low to a moderate level, that 
country may experience increased refugee movement.  
 The final important trend identified in these analyses is the key role played by 
participation in global systems in influencing receiving centrality. Countries with greater 
foreign investment, trade openness, and INGO participation receive greater levels of 
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refugees and receive refugees from more partners than those less involved in these 
networks, while countries that are less connected to global trade networks (i.e., have 
lower world system positions) are less central in receiving refugees and hold ties to fewer 
countries. These results reflect a world polity model by demonstrating the importance of 
global connections in influencing destination choices. With investment, trade, and INGO 
participation come expanded connections to information, communication, and 
transportation networks that may facilitate the movement of refugees, causing countries 
that participate in these systems to become more easily accessible targets.  
 In addition to these trends, a number of differences in effects between random and 
fixed effects models emerged in this chapter. Both procedures were included in the study 
to identify differences between relationships that occur over time and those that are 
present due to cross-sectional variation. Comparisons of the two analyses show far fewer 
significant relationships in the fixed effects models, demonstrating that much of the 
significance achieved in the random effects models is due to variation across countries, 
rather than over time. However, key indicators of growth and instability (i.e., GDP per 
capita and conflict), do reach significance in FEMs. It may be that these key indicators 
drive centrality through the outcomes they generate, creating cross-sectional differences 
that impact centrality beyond the effect of the primary condition. The identification of 
these key longitudinal relationships provides important direction for policy development 
as they point to factors that can impact centrality, regardless of a country‟s level of 
development.  
 Another difference noted between REMs and FEMs is a change in the direction of 
significant relationships noted for four variables from the REMs to the FEMs. In 
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evaluations of the receiving networks, political repression, fertility rate, and trade 
openness switch from positive to negative, while CO2 per capita changes from negative to 
positive. These changes indicate that the effects of these conditions over time are 
different than the effects of the cross-sectional experience of them at any given point in 
time. This discovery is important as it further highlights the need to examine the 
relationships identified in these analyses to understand which elements might best be 
addressed in efforts to influence refugee centrality across countries and which are 
dependent on level of development or other endogenous factors. 
 This chapter highlights key relationships that impact sending and receiving 
centrality. REMs and FEMs demonstrate that centrality in the refugee network is a 
product of a number of domestic and international factors operating, at times, together 
and, at other times, independent of each other. Understanding how these elements impact 
sending and receiving centrality in countries at different levels of development may 
provide important direction for policymaking and the development of interventions 
designed to influence refugee movements.   
Limitations of the data used for this study 
 A key problem faced by this study is the nature of the data available for the 
development of the refugee networks. While the refugee data provided by the UNHCR 
are the best available for studies of this kind, a number of limitations must be 
acknowledged. First, refugees are a notoriously difficult population to identify and count 
(Bloch 2007). Movements tend to take place en masse over short periods of time, 
frustrating attempts to develop an accurate census of those that move. Additionally, many 
who fit the UNHCR definition of refugee choose to avoid the label due to the stigma that 
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may be attached or issues faced in potential destinations that limit refugee entry (Zetter 
1991). The possibility of step migration among refugees further complicates attempts to 
enumerate this population. Some refugees move from one host country to another, 
without returning home, clouding efforts to accurately identify countries of origin and 
destination and creating the possibility of some refugees being counted twice, while 
others are never counted.  
 In addition to difficulties in counting the population, these data are limited by the 
definition employed. The use of the 1951 Convention definition excludes individuals 
fleeing for reasons other than political persecution (e.g., environmental degradation, 
natural disasters, gendered violence, etc.), as well as those who leave their homes, but do 
not cross an international border (i.e., IDPs). While it may be politically expedient for 
potential receiving countries to operate with a limited definition of refugees, it is 
important that data on all forced migrants be available, in order to better study the entire 
population and examine differences in sending and receiving dynamics presented by 
different populations of forced migrants.  
 In spite of the difficulties presented by the nature of refugee data, cross-national 
research is needed to expand our understanding of the global framework within which 
more nuanced movements occur. While flawed, the UNHCR data are the best available 
and, as such, are the best option for cross-national examinations of refugee movements. 
Whatever the limitations inherent in these data, the results of the current analysis present 
a compelling picture of the worth of the data that do exist and highlight the need for 





 A number of implications emerge from this analysis of the global refugee 
network. Chief among these is the discovery that centrality in sending and receiving 
networks is more nuanced than simply connecting conflict with sending and development 
with receiving. Multiple forces are at play in the development of these networks and all 
of these must be acknowledged and addressed in efforts to understand and reduce the 
strain on sending and receiving countries produced by refugee movements.  
 A second important implication is the ongoing need for efforts to help less-
developed countries cope with refugee movements. As many of the most central actors in 
the valued receiving networks are poor countries with few resources available to address 
the needs of refugee populations and respond to the resource and political strain 
generated by these inflows, the international community must continue to find ways to 
assist these destination countries. This assistance must move beyond simply helping to 
meet the immediate physical needs of refugee communities, but also to help with efforts 
toward repatriation, assimilation in host countries, and / or further diffusion of refugee 
populations to better spread the burden that these movements place on receiving 
communities. Addressing the most central sending countries should involve both conflict 
mediation and efforts at political stabilization, as well as help in developing economic 
growth and self-sufficiency.  
 Evaluating the efficacy of Clark‟s (1989) root causes approach is a final 
implication of this study. The application of this approach to the cross-national 
examination of refugee movements provided both benefits and shortcomings. The key 
benefit is the identification of effects from both domestic (internal) and international 
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(external) factors on sending and receiving centrality. The persistence of domestic and 
global relationships when considered together in final models indicates the independence 
of these effects and the necessity of considering both in evaluations of causes of refugee 
movement and destination decisions. These results call into question the adoption of a 
strict internalist or externalist view of refugee movements. The application of the roots 
causes approach as a via media between these perspectives in this project is somewhat 
successful. However, the taxonomy of root causes and intervening factors proved to be 
less successful for this analysis. The degree of interaction present in many of these 
conditions creates difficulties in determining the appropriate category to which variables 
belong. While international integration can act as an intervening factor through the 
facilitation of movement via the networks it creates, the presence of integration in global 
economic and civil networks over time may also be considered a “root cause”. The 
efficacy of this approach for future work in refugee studies hinges on the clear 
delineation of these categories in general and in the specific projects undertaken.  
Future directions  
 A number of important directions for future research in refugee studies and 
beyond have been noted throughout this study. First, the need for more expansive data on 
forced migrant populations beyond the 1951 Convention definition is clear. The number 
of individuals moving as political refugees is shrinking, while that of those moving as a 
result of displacement from a number of other factors is on the rise. These populations 
have the potential to impact destination countries in the same ways as refugee 
populations and, therefore, need to be counted so that the international community has a 
picture of the scope of the potential need. As has been noted, collecting data on these 
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populations is difficult, perhaps to the point of near impossibility, but efforts to better the 
quality of data on refugees and other forced migrant populations must continue in spite of 
the challenges 
 While this study advances cross-national quantitative work in the area of refugee 
studies, it also develops a framework for future case studies and qualitative work in this 
area. The relationships identified in these analyses operate at different levels in different 
contexts, nuances that often cannot be parsed at the macro level. The study of these 
effects on refugee movements in specific countries is necessary to elaborate on the trends 
observed in this cross-national work. The issue in refugee studies of qualitative versus 
quantitative or cross-national versus case studies is not an either / or proposition. As has 
been demonstrated by this study, qualitative work has the ability to inform larger 
quantitative analyses, while large studies identify relationships and patterns that inform 
and direct examinations at the local level. Collaboration between researchers and research 
agendas and the recognition of the efficacy of both ends of the research spectrum are 
important keys for the future development of work in this field.  
 A number of specific relationships or effects observed in this study also call for 
further investigation. The important role played by economic growth and development on 
sending centrality is one such area. While growth is clearly related to reduced centrality, 
future study is needed to determine if different means of obtaining growth have 
differential effects on sending centrality or the conditions that promote sending centrality. 
Dependency scholars might argue that the growth derived through foreign investment 
will ultimately prove to be harmful, possibly resulting in economic and political 
conditions that encourage greater refugee flows. It is also possible that growth in certain 
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sectors may prove more valuable with respect to reducing centrality compared to growth 
in other areas. Further investigation toward understanding these nuances will better help 
policymakers develop strategies to reduce refugee outflows through economic 
development, rather than border control or repatriation.  
 The importance of international integration provides another area of future study. 
While participation in finance, trade, and INGO systems demonstrated various levels of 
impact on sending and receiving centrality, other areas of global interaction have yet to 
be investigated. Global information, communication, and transportation networks should 
be examined to determine how participation in these networks affects refugee-receiving 
centrality. Additionally, relationships with these networks should be examined net of the 
previously studied international variables to understand the extent to which the effects of 
integration in these networks occur through increased communication and transportation.  
 While this study demonstrates that refugee sending and receiving centrality are 
affected by more than proximity to highly active countries, proximity remains an 
important factor in refugee movements. Future cross-national and case study research 
should build on previous work in this area to more fully understand the importance of 
proximity in determining refugee destinations and how knowledge about the potential 
host‟s experience of conditions analyzed in this study affects refugee decisions about 
which border to cross, when options are presented. While some refugees may simply flee 
for the nearest border, others are involved in a more explicit decision-making process that 
incorporates many of the factors identified as important in this study.  
 Finally, there is a clear need for the development of refugee-specific theory in the 
social sciences. Borrowing from other theoretical traditions has some merit in refugee 
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studies; however, as this study has shown, refugees are a unique population. As such, the 
needs, motivations, autonomy, and decision-making processes of this group need to be 
understood on their own terms. The relationships identified in this study, as well as those 
observed in earlier work, provide a starting point for the development of such theory.  
Contributions 
 This analysis of structure and centrality in the global refugee network contributes 
to the refugee studies literature and multiple other disciplines in a variety of ways. The 
use of data from 242 countries and territories and the 1990 to 2008 time frame make this 
project one of the largest and most recent cross-national investigations of refugee 
movement to date. Additionally, the development of valued and dichotomized sending 
and receiving networks for five waves over this time period contributes a set of variables 
that can be used in future work in refugee studies and other areas of cross-national 
analysis.  
 The trends and relationships identified across the different levels of this study 
provide a second body of contributions. The demonstrations of the effects of economic 
development on sending centrality and participation in global systems on receiving 
centrality are of particular significance, as these represent relationships that have received 
little study in cross-national examinations of refugee movements. The presentation of 
clear differences between the migrant and refugee networks and the identification of 
domestic and international elements that contribute to those differences is another key 
contribution. Additionally, the descriptive analyses of regional variation and activity 
levels in the refugee networks provide clear pictures of how these networks have evolved 
since 1990.  
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 Finally, the analyses in this study contribute to the literature of a number of 
theoretical traditions, particularly in areas of cross-national study. Refugee movements 
mark a previously unexamined dependent variable in dependency, world systems, and 
world polity studies. The identification of relationships with variables from these 
traditions (i.e., FDI penetration, trade openness, INGO participation, and world system 
position), demonstrate the applicability of these traditions to the examination of refugee 
movements. The unexpected nature of some of these relationships calls into question 
some of the key assumptions of these theoretical positions and generates several 
possibilities for further study in these areas.  
 In addition to contributions made by this study to the literature of other theoretical 
traditions, the analyses presented here demonstrate the need for scholars in the field of 
refugee studies to pursue the development of refugee-specific theory. While theory 
borrowed from other disciplines has demonstrated a degree of efficacy in work done in 
refugee studies, refugees represent a distinct population with unique dynamics that cannot 
be fully understood using “borrowed” theory. The varied nature of refugee movements 
and destination choices creates challenges for the development of theory in this area, but 
the identification of general trends and patterns identified by this study and previous 
cross-national research in refugee studies provide the beginnings of a framework from 
which theory can derive.  
 The goal of this project was to examine the global refugee sending and receiving 
networks from a variety of angles to better understand the scope and structure of the 
network, identify differences between refugee and migrant networks, and examine 
relationships between centrality in the refugee networks and a variety of domestic and 
401 
 
international factors. Through the identification and analysis of trends in refugee 
movements and destinations in the global network, a number of patterns and relationships 
have been identified. The application of descriptive, comparative, and statistical analysis 
to questions related to the structure and centrality in these networks confirmed previously 
observed patterns and revealed new effects and trends that expand the scope of refugee 
studies and other areas. Additionally, this work generates a number of questions for 
future study to better understand the mechanisms through which these relationships take 
place and implications of these effects for the development of policy and strategy for 
limiting the impact of current and future refugee movements.  
 Refugee movements are as old as human history. In the current age, the 
movements of populations across international borders to avoid political violence or 
persecution create a number of issues and opportunities for refugees and hosts alike. The 
identification of relationships and trends affecting refugee movements and destination 
decisions and the scope of the network they create serves to better inform the academic 
community, civil society, and policymakers. While the process of examining refugee 
movements is rife with challenges, understanding these movements, as well as their 
causes and effects, is necessary to help ease the difficulties faced by both those that move 
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Variables and Sources  
 
Table A.1. Variables Used in the Analysis with Source and Operationalization  
Variable  Source Operationalization 
Refugees UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) 
Counts of refugees in a 
country from each sending 
country 
Migrants World Bank World 
Development Indicators 
(WDI) 
Counts of foreign born 
persons present in a country 
from each sending country 




Region World Bank  
Economic    
Gross Domestic Product 
per capita 
WDI GDP per capita in constant 
2000 US dollars 
State Strength United Nations Statistics 
Division (UN Data) 
WDI 
Government Consumption / 
GDP 
Economic Growth WDI Annual percent change in 
GDP  
Urbanization UN Data Percent of total population 
living in urban areas 
Enrollment WDI Percent of secondary-school 
age children enrolled in 
school 
Political   
Political Freedom Freedom House Project Average political rights and 
civil liberties scores for 25 
indicators as calculated by 
Freedom House analysts 
Political Terror Purdue University 
Political Terror Scale 
Human rights ratings based 
on Amnesty International 
and US State Department  
Collapse Political Instability Task 
Force, 
George Mason University 
Presence of political 
revolution, secession, or loss 
of central authority 
Conflict Uppsala Conflict 
Database 
Intrastate or interstate 
conflict in which at least one 
actor is a state and at least 25 




Variable  Source Operationalization 
Demography   
Fertility Rate WDI Average births per female 
Population Density UN Data Population per square km 
Infant Mortality UN Data Deaths to children under 1 
year of age per 1000 
children born 
Life Expectancy UN Data Average expected life span 
of an individual born in the 
particular year 
Environmental   
CO2 per capita UN Data Metric tons of CO2 
emissions per capita 
Cropland under 
cultivation 





Trade Openness United Nations Human 
Development Reports 
Total imports plus total 
exports divided by GDP 
Foreign direct 
investment penetration 
UN Conference on Trade 
and Development 
FDI Stock / GDP 
Official development 
assistance 





Yearbook of International 
Organizations 
Count of INGO membership 
ties 
World System Position Clark and Beckfield 
(2009) 
Trichotomous hierarchy 
based on partners in the 




















strength Economic growth 
Valued Sending 1.000       
Valued Receiving 0.576 1.000      
Dichotomized Sending 0.915 0.652 1.000     
Dichotomized Receiving 0.434 0.809 0.550 1.000    
GDP per capita -0.566 -0.227 -0.545 0.083 1.000   
State strength -0.268 -0.174 -0.304 -0.124 0.252 1.000  
Economic growth -0.122 -0.013 -0.089 0.073 0.303 0.075 1.000 
Urban population -0.339 -0.114 -0.290 0.125 0.726 0.171 0.171 
Secondary enrollment -0.387 -0.158 -0.378 0.166 0.782 0.263 0.213 
Political repression 0.588 0.225 0.581 -0.079 -0.647 -0.192 -0.206 
Political terror 0.617 0.280 0.629 0.066 -0.554 -0.346 -0.136 
Collapse 0.255 0.140 0.228 0.025 -0.227 -0.034 -0.047 
Conflict 0.545 0.535 0.556 0.360 -0.390 -0.133 -0.097 
Fertility rate 0.236 0.127 0.212 -0.144 -0.717 -0.100 -0.204 
Population density -0.150 -0.194 -0.149 -0.171 0.181 -0.138 0.086 
Infant mortality 0.409 0.151 0.389 -0.175 -0.894 -0.276 -0.301 
Life expectancy -0.411 -0.235 -0.401 0.036 0.787 0.153 0.195 
CO2 per capita -0.438 -0.180 -0.423 0.046 0.852 0.277 0.221 
Cropland under cultivation -0.111 -0.267 -0.138 -0.252 -0.030 -0.199 -0.073 
FDI penetration -0.124 -0.107 -0.085 0.028 0.136 0.024 0.098 
Trade openness 0.002 0.122 0.057 0.222 0.120 0.021 0.000 
Official development assistance -0.285 -0.366 -0.312 -0.393 -0.059 0.233 -0.013 
Semiperiphery 0.022 -0.028 0.075 0.068 0.048 -0.035 -0.015 
Periphery 0.200 -0.192 0.198 -0.427 -0.571 -0.125 -0.165 
INGO membership ties 0.297 0.557 0.423 0.701 0.391 -0.066 0.150 
Middle East / North Africa 0.141 0.128 0.219 0.058 0.070 0.116 0.017 
Latin America -0.135 -0.190 -0.153 -0.103 0.138 -0.042 0.000 
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.245 0.243 0.295 0.120 -0.525 -0.069 -0.100 
Asia and Pacific -0.157 -0.277 -0.239 -0.312 -0.066 -0.134 -0.037 
Eastern Europe / Central Asia 0.215 0.111 0.186 0.105 -0.036 0.025 -0.048 
















Urban population 1.000         
Secondary enrollment 0.658 1.000        
Political repression -0.369 -0.599 1.000       
Political terror -0.286 -0.472 0.616 1.000      
Collapse -0.168 -0.204 0.230 0.232 1.000     
Conflict -0.216 -0.345 0.475 0.364 0.162 1.000    
Fertility rate -0.575 -0.802 0.512 0.371 0.178 0.255 1.000   
Population density 0.131 0.156 -0.142 -0.003 -0.057 -0.278 -0.300 1.000  
Infant mortality -0.666 -0.845 0.650 0.537 0.248 0.376 0.807 -0.275 1.000 
Life expectancy 0.647 0.815 -0.522 -0.462 -0.289 -0.335 -0.761 0.274 -0.856 
CO2 per capita 0.713 0.824 -0.408 -0.432 -0.259 -0.248 -0.737 0.118 -0.784 
Cropland under cultivation -0.080 0.010 -0.067 0.096 -0.034 -0.274 -0.084 0.674 -0.051 
FDI penetration 0.070 0.159 -0.191 -0.160 -0.104 -0.191 -0.125 0.043 -0.178 
Trade openness 0.132 0.197 -0.079 -0.186 -0.088 -0.013 -0.283 0.049 -0.189 
Official development 
assistance -0.190 -0.067 -0.323 -0.332 -0.031 -0.317 0.163 -0.009 0.046 
Semiperiphery 0.136 0.053 0.069 0.162 -0.036 0.060 -0.009 -0.001 -0.032 
Periphery -0.483 -0.578 0.387 0.166 0.156 0.048 0.578 -0.145 0.580 
INGO membership ties 0.279 0.472 -0.281 -0.106 -0.035 0.214 -0.457 0.022 -0.512 
Middle East / North Africa 0.184 0.031 0.312 0.139 0.039 0.201 0.138 -0.039 -0.009 
Latin America 0.144 0.081 -0.143 -0.004 -0.080 -0.176 -0.082 0.027 -0.036 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.428 -0.621 0.291 0.209 0.131 0.189 0.556 -0.182 0.577 
Asia and Pacific -0.146 -0.070 0.012 -0.018 -0.021 -0.168 0.039 0.176 0.059 
Eastern Europe / Central Asia 0.050 0.268 0.038 0.003 0.028 0.176 -0.364 -0.007 -0.173 

























Life expectancy 1.000         
CO2 per capita 0.781 1.000        
Cropland under cultivation 0.173 -0.038 1.000       
FDI penetration 0.101 0.110 0.035 1.000      
Trade openness 0.224 0.217 -0.062 0.194 1.000     
Official development assistance -0.075 -0.188 0.175 0.144 -0.116 1.000    
Semiperiphery 0.097 0.079 0.090 -0.041 0.025 -0.197 1.000   
Periphery -0.543 -0.555 -0.009 -0.001 -0.202 0.537 -0.446 1  
INGO membership ties 0.342 0.320 -0.171 0.086 0.247 -0.483 0.054 -0.6816 1 
Middle East / North Africa 0.107 0.170 -0.044 -0.060 -0.029 -0.127 0.198 -0.0671 0.0625 
Latin America / Caribbean 0.208 0.104 0.093 0.197 -0.039 -0.025 0.058 0.0795 -0.0597 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.711 -0.591 -0.162 -0.012 -0.030 0.120 -0.081 0.453 -0.1022 
Asia and Pacific 0.047 -0.103 0.214 -0.097 -0.113 0.093 0.023 -0.0668 -0.2682 
Eastern Europe / Central Asia 0.153 0.219 0.000 -0.080 0.206 -0.101 -0.109 -0.2202 0.1467 




















Middle East / North Africa 1      
Latin America / Caribbean -0.1493 1     
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.1573 -0.2472 1    
Asia and Pacific -0.175 -0.2751 -0.2898 1   
Eastern Europe / Central Asia -0.1182 -0.1857 -0.1956 -0.2176 1  





Countries Included in the Analyses 
 
Table C.1. Countries Included in Refugee Network Analyses with Region and World 
System Position 
Country Region World System Position 
Afghanistan Eastern Europe / Central Asia Periphery 
Albania Eastern Europe / Central Asia Periphery 
Algeria Middle East / North Africa Semiperiphery 
American Samoa Asia and Pacific  
Andorra Eastern Europe / Central Asia  
Angola Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Anguilla Latin America  
Antigua and Barbuda Latin America  
Argentina Latin America Core 
Armenia Eastern Europe / Central Asia  
Aruba Latin America  
Australia Europe and the West Core 
Austria Europe and the West Core 
Azerbaijan Eastern Europe / Central Asia  
Bahamas Latin America Periphery 
Bahrain Middle East / North Africa Periphery 
Bangladesh Asia and Pacific Semiperiphery 
Barbados Latin America Periphery 
Belarus Eastern Europe / Central Asia  
Belgium Europe and the West Core 
Belize Latin America  
Benin Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Bermuda Latin America  
Bhutan Asia and Pacific  
Bolivia Latin America Periphery 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Eastern Europe / Central Asia  
Botswana Sub-Saharan Africa  
Bouvet Island Europe and the West  
Brazil Latin America Core 
British Virgin Islands Latin America  
Brunei Darussalam Asia and Pacific Periphery 
Bulgaria Eastern Europe / Central Asia Core 
Burkina Faso Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Burundi Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Cambodia Asia and Pacific Periphery 
Cameroon Europe and the West Periphery 
Canada Europe and the West Core 
Cape Verde Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Cayman Islands Latin America  
Central African Republic Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Chad Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Chile Latin America Semiperiphery 
China Asia and Pacific Core 
China (Taiwan) Asia and Pacific  
China (Hong Kong) Asia and Pacific  
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Country Region World System Position 
China (Macao) Asia and Pacific  
Christmas Island Asia and Pacific  
Cocos Islands Asia and Pacific  
Columbia Latin America Semiperiphery 
Comoros Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Congo Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Cook Islands Asia and Pacific  
Costa Rica Latin America Periphery 
Cote d'Ivoire Sub-Saharan Africa Semiperiphery 
Croatia Eastern Europe / Central Asia  
Cuba Latin America Periphery 
Cyprus Europe and the West Semiperiphery 
Czech Republic Eastern Europe / Central Asia Core 
DPR Korea Europe and the West Periphery 
DR Congo Middle East / North Africa Periphery 
Denmark Latin America Core 
Djibouti Latin America Periphery 
Dominica Asia and Pacific  
Dominican Republic Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Ecuador Latin America Periphery 
Egypt Middle East / North Africa Core 
El Salvador Latin America Periphery 
Equatorial Guinea Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Eritrea Sub-Saharan Africa  
Estonia Eastern Europe / Central Asia  
Ethiopia Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Falkland Islands Latin America  
Faroe Islands Europe and the West  
Fiji Asia and Pacific Periphery 
Finland Europe and the West Core 
France Europe and the West Core 
French Guiana Latin America  
French Polynesia Asia and Pacific  
Gabon Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Gambia Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Georgia Eastern Europe / Central Asia  
Germany Europe and the West Core 
Ghana Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Gibraltar Europe and the West  
Greece Europe and the West Core 
Greenland Europe and the West  
Grenada Latin America  
Guadeloupe Latin America  
Guam Asia and Pacific  
Guatemala Latin America Periphery 
Guinea Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Guinea-Bissau Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Guyana Latin America Periphery 
Haiti Latin America Periphery 
Heard Island and McDonald Islands Asia and Pacific  
Honduras Latin America Periphery 
Hungary Eastern Europe / Central Asia Core 
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Country Region World System Position 
Iceland Europe and the West Periphery 
India Asia and Pacific Core 
Indonesia Asia and Pacific Core 
Iran Middle East / North Africa Core 
Iraq Middle East / North Africa Semiperiphery 
Ireland Europe and the West Core 
Israel Middle East / North Africa Semiperiphery 
Italy Europe and the West Core 
Jamaica Latin America Periphery 
Japan Asia and Pacific Core 
Johnson Atoll Asia and Pacific  
Jordan Middle East / North Africa Periphery 
Kazakhstan Eastern Europe / Central Asia  
Kenya Sub-Saharan Africa Semiperiphery 
Kiribati Asia and Pacific  
Kosovo Eastern Europe / Central Asia  
Kuwait Middle East / North Africa Semiperiphery 
Kyrgyzstan Eastern Europe / Central Asia  
Lao PDR Asia and Pacific Periphery 
Latvia Eastern Europe / Central Asia  
Lebanon Middle East / North Africa Periphery 
Lesotho Sub-Saharan Africa  
Liberia Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Libya Middle East / North Africa Semiperiphery 
Liechtenstein Europe and the West  
Lithuania Eastern Europe / Central Asia  
Luxembourg Europe and the West Core 
Madagascar Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Malawi Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Malaysia Asia and Pacific Core 
Maldives Asia and Pacific Periphery 
Mali Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Malta Europe and the West Periphery 
Marshall Islands Asia and Pacific  
Martinique Latin America  
Mauritania Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Mauritius Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Mayotte Sub-Saharan Africa  
Mexico Latin America Core 
Micronesia Asia and Pacific  
Midway Islands Asia and Pacific  
Monaco Europe and the West  
Mongolia Asia and Pacific Periphery 
Montenegro Eastern Europe / Central Asia  
Montserrat Latin America  
Morocco Middle East / North Africa Core 
Mozambique Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Myanmar Asia and Pacific Periphery 
Namibia Sub-Saharan Africa  
Nauru Asia and Pacific  
Nepal Asia and Pacific Periphery 
Netherlands Europe and the West Core 
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Country Region World System Position 
Netherlands Antilles Latin America  
New Caledonia Asia and Pacific  
New Zealand Asia and Pacific Core 
Nicaragua Latin America Periphery 
Niger Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Nigeria Sub-Saharan Africa Semiperiphery 
Niue Asia and Pacific  
Norfolk Island Asia and Pacific  
Northern Mariana Islands Asia and Pacific  
Norway Europe and the West Core 
Occupied Palestinian Territory Middle East / North Africa  
Oman Middle East / North Africa Periphery 
Pakistan Asia and Pacific Core 
Palau Asia and Pacific  
Panama Latin America Semiperiphery 
Papua New Guinea Asia and Pacific Periphery 
Paraguay Latin America Periphery 
Peru Latin America Semiperiphery 
Philippines Asia and Pacific Semiperiphery 
Pitcairn Island Asia and Pacific  
Poland Eastern Europe / Central Asia Core 
Portugal Europe and the West Core 
Puerto Rico Latin America  
Qatar Middle East / North Africa Periphery 
Rep Korea Asia and Pacific Core 
Rep Moldova Eastern Europe / Central Asia  
Reunion Sub-Saharan Africa  
Romania Eastern Europe / Central Asia Core 
Russian Federation Eastern Europe / Central Asia Core 
Rwanda Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Saint Helena Sub-Saharan Africa  
Saint Kitts and Nevis Latin America  
Saint Lucia Latin America  
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Latin America  
Samoa Asia and Pacific  
San Marino Europe and the West  
Sao Tome Sub-Saharan Africa  
Saudi Arabia Middle East / North Africa Core 
Senegal Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Serbia Eastern Europe / Central Asia  
Serbia and Montenegro Eastern Europe / Central Asia  
Seychelles Sub-Saharan Africa  
Sierra Leone Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Singapore Asia and Pacific Core 
Slovakia Eastern Europe / Central Asia  
Slovenia Eastern Europe / Central Asia  
Solomon Islands Asia and Pacific Periphery 
Somalia Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
South Africa Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Spain Europe and the West Core 
Sri Lanka Asia and Pacific Semiperiphery 
Stateless   
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Country Region World System Position 
Sudan Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Suriname Latin America Periphery 
Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands Europe and the West  
Swaziland Sub-Saharan Africa  
Sweden Europe and the West Core 
Switzerland Europe and the West Core 
Syria Middle East / North Africa Periphery 
Tajikistan Asia and Pacific  
Thailand Eastern Europe / Central Asia Core 
TFYR Macedonia Asia and Pacific  
Tibet Asia and Pacific  
Timor-Leste Asia and Pacific  
Togo Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Tokelau Asia and Pacific  
Tonga Asia and Pacific  
Trinidad and Tobago Latin America Periphery 
Tunisia Middle East / North Africa Semiperiphery 
Turkey Eastern Europe / Central Asia Core 
Turkmenistan Eastern Europe / Central Asia  
Turks and Caicos Islands Latin America  
Tuvalu Asia and Pacific  
Uganda Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
Ukraine Eastern Europe / Central Asia  
United Arab Emirates Middle East / North Africa Semiperiphery 
United Kingdom Europe and the West Core 
United Rep Tanzania Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 
USA Europe and the West Core 
US Virgin Islands Latin America  
Uruguay Europe and the West Semiperiphery 
Uzbekistan Eastern Europe / Central Asia  
Vanuatu Asia and Pacific  
Various   
Venezuela Latin America Semiperiphery 
Vietnam Asia and Pacific Periphery 
Wake Island Asia and Pacific  
Wallis and Futuna Islands Asia and Pacific  
West Bank and Gaza Middle East / North Africa  
Western Sahara Sub-Saharan Africa  
Yemen Middle East / North Africa Periphery 
Zambia Sub-Saharan Africa Periphery 




Table C.2. Countries Included in Migrant and Refugee Comparative Analyses 
Country Country Country 
Afghanistan Croatia Kenya 
Albania Cuba Kiribati 
Algeria Cyprus Kuwait 
American Samoa Czech Republic Kyrgyzstan 
Andorra DPR Korea Lao PDR 
Angola DR Congo Latvia 
Anguilla Denmark Lebanon 
Antigua & Barbuda Djibouti Lesotho 
Argentina Dominica Liberia 
Armenia Dominican Republic Libya 
Aruba Ecuador Liechtenstein 
Australia Egypt Lithuania 
Austria El Salvador Luxembourg 
Azerbaijan Equatorial Guinea Madagascar 
Bahamas Eritrea Malawi 
Bahrain Estonia Malaysia 
Bangladesh Ethiopia Maldives 
Barbados Falkland Islands Mali 
Belarus Faroe Islands Malta 
Belgium Fiji Marshall Islands 
Belize Finland Martinique 
Benin France Mauritania 
Bermuda French Guiana Mauritius 
Bhutan French Polynesia Mayotte 
Bolivia Gabon Mexico 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Gambia Micronesia, Federated States of 
Botswana Georgia Monaco 
Brazil Germany Mongolia 
Virgin Islands, British Ghana Montserrat 
Brunei Darussalam Gibraltar Morocco 
Bulgaria Greece Mozambique 
Burkina Faso Greenland Myanmar 
Burundi Grenada Namibia 
Cambodia Guadeloupe Nauru 
Cameroon Guam Nepal 
Canada Guatemala Netherlands 
Cape Verde Guinea Netherlands Antilles 
Cayman Islands Guinea-Bissau New Caledonia 
Central African Republic Guyana New Zealand 
Chad Haiti Nicaragua 
Chile Honduras Niger 
China Hungary Nigeria 
Taiwan Iceland Niue 
Hong Kong India Norfolk Island 
Macau Indonesia Northern Mariana Islands 
Columbia Iran Norway 
Comoros Iraq Palestinian Territory, Occupied 
Congo Ireland Oman 
Cook Islands Israel Pakistan 
Costa Rica Italy Palau 
Cote d'Ivoire Jamaica Panama 
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Country Country  
Philippines United Arab Emirates  
Poland United Kingdom  
Portugal Tanzania, United Republic of  
Puerto Rico United States of America  
Qatar Virgin Islands, U.S.  
Korea, Republic of Uruguay  
Moldova, Republic of Uzbekistan  
Reunion Vanuatu  
Romania Venezuela  
Russian Federation Viet Nam  
Rwanda Wallis and Futuna   
Saint Helena Yemen  
Saint Kitts and Nevis Zambia  
Saint Lucia Zimbabwe  
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines   
Samoa   
San Marino   
Sao Tome and Principe   
Saudi Arabia   
Senegal   
Serbia and Montenegro   
Seychelles   
Sierra Leone   
Singapore   
Slovakia   
Slovenia   
Solomon Islands   
Somalia   
South Africa   
Spain   
Sri Lanka   
Sudan   
Suriname   
Swaziland   
Sweden   
Switzerland   
Syria   
Tajikistan   
Thailand   
TFYR Macedonia   
Timor Leste   
Togo   
Tokelau   
Tonga   
Trinidad and Tobago   
Tunisia   
Turkey   
Turkmenistan   
Turks and Caicos    
Tuvalu   
Uganda   
Ukraine   
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Table C.3. Countries Included in Standardized Sample with Wave 
Country 1 2 3 4 5 
Afghanistan      
Albania      
Algeria      
American Samoa      
Andorra      
Angola      
Anguilla      
Antigua and Barbuda      
Argentina      
Armenia      
Aruba      
Australia      
Austria      
Azerbaijan      
Bahamas      
Bahrain      
Bangladesh      
Barbados      
Belarus      
Belgium      
Belize      
Benin      
Bermuda      
Bhutan      
Bolivia      
Bosnia and Herzegovina      
Botswana      
Bouvet Island      
Brazil      
British Virgin Islands      
Brunei Darussalam      
Bulgaria      
Burkina Faso      
Burundi      
Cambodia      
Cameroon      
Canada      
Cape Verde      
Cayman Islands      
Central African Republic      
Chad      
Chile      
China      
China (Taiwan)      
China (Hong Kong)      
China (Macao)      
Christmas Island      
Cocos Islands      
Columbia      
Comoros      
Congo      
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Country 1 2 3 4 5 
Cook Islands      
Costa Rica      
Cote d'Ivoire      
Croatia      
Cuba      
Cyprus      
Czech Republic      
DPR Korea      
DR Congo      
Denmark      
Djibouti      
Dominica      
Dominican Republic      
Ecuador      
Egypt      
El Salvador      
Equatorial Guinea      
Eritrea      
Estonia      
Ethiopia      
Falkland Islands      
Faroe Islands      
Fiji      
Finland      
France      
French Guiana      
French Polynesia      
Gabon      
Gambia      
Georgia      
Germany      
Ghana      
Gibraltar      
Greece      
Greenland      
Grenada      
Guadeloupe      
Guam      
Guatemala      
Guinea      
Guinea-Bissau      
Guyana      
Haiti      
Heard Island and McDonald Islands      
Honduras      
Hungary      
Iceland      
India      
Indonesia      
Iran      
Iraq      
Ireland      
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Country 1 2 3 4 5 
Israel      
Italy      
Jamaica      
Japan      
Johnson Atoll      
Jordan      
Kazakhstan      
Kenya      
Kiribati      
Kosovo      
Kuwait      
Kyrgyzstan      
Lao PDR      
Latvia      
Lebanon      
Lesotho      
Liberia      
Libya      
Liechtenstein      
Lithuania      
Luxembourg      
Madagascar      
Malawi      
Malaysia      
Maldives      
Mali      
Malta      
Marshall Islands      
Martinique      
Mauritania      
Mauritius      
Mayotte      
Mexico      
Micronesia      
Midway Islands      
Monaco      
Mongolia      
Montenegro      
Montserrat      
Morocco      
Mozambique      
Myanmar      
Namibia      
Nauru      
Nepal      
Netherlands      
Netherlands Antilles      
New Caledonia      
New Zealand      
Nicaragua      
Niger 
 
     
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Nigeria      
Niue      
Norfolk Island      
Northern Mariana Islands      
Norway      
Occupied Palestinian Territory      
Oman      
Pakistan      
Palau      
Panama      
Papua New Guinea      
Paraguay      
Peru      
Philippines      
Pitcairn Island      
Poland      
Portugal      
Puerto Rico      
Qatar      
Rep Korea      
Rep Moldova      
Reunion      
Romania      
Russian Federation      
Rwanda      
Saint Helena      
Saint Kitts and Nevis      
Saint Lucia      
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines      
Samoa      
San Marino      
Sao Tome      
Saudi Arabia      
Senegal      
Serbia      
Serbia and Montenegro      
Seychelles      
Sierra Leone      
Singapore      
Slovakia      
Slovenia      
Solomon Islands      
Somalia      
South Africa      
Spain      
Sri Lanka      
Stateless      
Sudan      
Suriname      
Svalbard and Jan Mayen Islands      
Swaziland      
Sweden      
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Switzerland      
Syria      
Tajikistan      
Thailand      
TFYR Macedonia      
Tibet      
Timor-Leste      
Togo      
Tokelau      
Tonga      
Trinidad and Tobago      
Tunisia      
Turkey      
Turkmenistan      
Turks and Caicos Islands      
Tuvalu      
Uganda      
Ukraine      
United Arab Emirates      
United Kingdom      
United Rep Tanzania      
USA      
US Virgin Islands      
Uruguay      
Uzbekistan      
Vanuatu      
Various      
Venezuela      
Vietnam      
Wake Island      
Wallis and Futuna Islands      
West Bank and Gaza      
Western Sahara      
Yemen      
Zambia      






Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table D.1. Descriptive Statistics for All Included Variables 
 Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Valued  Refugee Sending 1210 5.01 4.28 0 14.97 
Valued  Refugee Receiving 1210 5.12 4.70 0 15.15 
Dichotomized Refugee Sending 1210 1.85 1.41 0 4.64 
Dichotomized Refugee Receiving 1210 1.60 1.52 0 5.18 
Valued  Migrant Sending 225 12.06 2.22 5.15 16.31 
Valued  Migrant Receiving 225 1.45 2.45 0 17.36 
Dichotomized Migrant Sending 225 5.05 0.44 3.09 5.39 
Dichotomized Migrant Receiving 225 5.01 0.66 0 5.42 
Valued Sending Residual 225 .00 2.30 -143155.60 3105699 
Valued Receiving Residual 225 .00 1.76 -245388.40 1815008 
Dichotomized  Sending Residual 225 .00 20.50 -21.62 78.11 
Dichotomized  Receiving Residual 225 .00 27.85 -22.07 154.11 
GDP per capita 924 7.70 1.63 4.38 11.25 
State strength 857 16.31 6.43 2.50 58.96 
Economic growth 996 340.87 1520.63 -.33.33 24108.56 
Urban population 1030 54.70 24.48 6.27 100.00 
Secondary school enrollment 824 67.91 32.48 5.13 157.42 
Political repression 955 1.06 0.67 0 1.95 
Political terror 879 0.79 0.51 0 1.61 
Collapse 1210 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Conflict 1210 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Fertility rate 993 1.06 0.52 -0.15 2.08 
Population density 1023 4.18 1.61 -1.99 9.81 
Infant mortality 959 3.22 1.08 0.38 5.13 
Life expectancy 991 4.19 0.17 3.37 4.41 
CO2 per capita 874 0.57 1.74 -6.39 4.10 
Cropland under cultivation 952 0.16 2.03 -7.35 4.20 
FDI penetration 993 2.92 1.33 0 8.59 
Trade openness 924 0.45 0.32 0 1.52 
Official development assistance 756 3.48 1.63 -6.10 8.78 
Semiperiphery 705 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Periphery 705 0.53 0.50 0 1 
INGO membership ties 1117 5.91 1.47 0 8.73 
Middle East / North Africa 1210 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Latin America / Caribbean 1210 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1210 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Asia and Pacific 1210 0.24 0.43 0 1 
Eastern Europe / Central Asia 1210 0.13 0.33 0 1 
Time period 1210 3 1.42 1 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
